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Abstract 
There is a long history of corporate scandals and failure in accounting
performance around the globe as a result of weak government mechanisms
overseeing companies due to the absence of clear government laws and
legislation governing the relationship between shareholders (owners,
investors) and executive managers (internal management) in a firm. Weak
government mechanisms reinforce the greed of the dominant and influential
groups within the various companies. This weakens the accounting and
financial performance of a firm and leads to it being unable to generate
sufficient profits to satisfy its shareholders, as well as being unable to attract
new investors or encourage them to invest within the firm.
As a result, various researchers are investigating the impact of corporate
governance (CG) mechanisms on firm performance. The majority of the
research regarding corporate governance and its impact on firm performance
has been conducted in developed countries, especially in the US and UK. 
Relatively less evidence is available in the Middle East, particularly in 
Jordan. Thus, the aim of the current study is to investigate the impact of 
various corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance for
Jordanian non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange
during the period 2012 – 2018. Different hypotheses have been generated
through agency theory to explore the relationship between the corporate
governance mechanisms and the accounting performance of Jordanian non-
financial companies. Agency theory is employed because it explains the
agency problems between the corporate manages and shareholders, which 
have a negative impact on the value maximisation objective. It has been
claimed that various features of the board of directors’ act as effective
corporate governance mechanisms for solving the agency problem between
corporate managers and shareholders.  
This study uses multiple regression panel data analysis to analyse the data. 
A fixed effect model is used to investigate the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on firm performance. Secondary data is collected
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for 95 Jordanian non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock
Exchange. The data is collected from three different sources: the Amman
Stock Exchange website, the annual reports of the selected companies and
from the DataStream database.
A mixed set of results is observed from the empirical investigation. The
findings of the study reveal a significant negative impact of board size on firm
performance, which indicates that large board size tends to be inefficient due
to poor coordination and communication. The findings of the study also
reveal that non-executive directors (NEDs) have a significant negative impact 
on firm performance. The findings are not in line with the hypothesis
generated from agency theory, which states that NEDs play a vital role on
the board by monitoring the firm’s performance and providing valuable
suggestions to the executive directors, as they are experts in their field and
have years of experience. However, CEO duality has a significant positive
impact on firm performance, which reveals that Jordanian firms perform
better if the roles of CEO and Chairman are performed by one individual. 
These findings are also inconsistent with the Jordanian CG code, which 
emphasises the separate of the role CEO and Chairman for implementing
the strict check and improve the balance of the board of directors. The
findings indicate that three board committees (audit, remuneration and
nomination) have a significant positive impact on the firm performance. 
These findings are consistent with the empirical results and Jordanian CG
code because establishment of board committees tends to streamline
various business operations, which has a positive impact on firm
performance. 
A corporate governance (CG) index has been generated based on the
Jordanian corporate governance code requirements. Compliance with the
corporate governance index has been checked for the Jordanian non-
financial firms. The findings indicate that the corporate governance index
also has a positive and significant impact on firm performance.
xi
  
 
 
         
       
      
       
       
       
 
   
The findings of the current study will help the Jordanian regulators to amend
the current Jordanian corporate governance code because the impact of 
different CG mechanisms on the firm performance has been checked
through real data and statistical tests. Further, the findings can assist the
Jordanian corporate boards and managers to improve their companies’
corporate governance system by implementing the significant CG
mechanisms that are explored by this study.
xii
 
  
 
   
 
         
      
        
  
       
  
         
  
       
       
       
       
    
 
        
      
      
    
         
     
     
     
       
         
       
   
 
      
        
          
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background of the study
This study investigated the impact of corporate governance (CG) on firm
performance in Jordan. CG provides a mechanism to streamline the
operating affairs of the business and help it to achieve the objective of 
shareholder wealth maximisation. Previous studies conducted by 
researchers shed light on the significance of the CG mechanisms and
highlighted how CG mechanisms assisted in overcoming the agency problem 
faced by public limited companies around the globe (Shabbir and Padgett,
2008; El-Faitouri, 2014; Akbar et al., 2016; Alqatan and Hussainey, 2019; Al-
Ahdal et al., 2020). The agency problem is the conflict of interest between
the corporate managers and corporate investors in the case of public limited
companies. It has resulted in the bankruptcy of various companies, such as
Enron (2001), WorldCom (2003) and recently Carillion (2018), Patisserie
Valerie (2019) and Thomas Cook (2019) (Kollewe, 2019).
Such conflicts can be overcome through effective management of the firm’s
affairs under the umbrella of corporate governance. Effective corporate
governance ensures proper utilisation of the firm’s resources, which 
increases investor confidence (Denis and Denis, 1994). The mechanism of 
corporate governance helps firms to manage internally and externally; first, it 
assists them in managing internal matters, and, secondly, it helps them
respond to the external environment and external conditions (Gregory et al., 
2005). Various researchers such as Rwegasira (2000), Nam et al. (2004)
and Akbar et al. (2016) have reported in their studies that the mechanism of
corporate governance protects a firm’s assets from misuse by managers,
which ensures safe and efficient decision making. Such measures help to
utilise resources properly, which enhances the performance of the firm. 
Although corporate governance phenomena are under investigation globally,
the majority of the work has been carried out in Western countries which are
developed nations, especially in the UK and US, and the Eastern point of 
  
 
 
         
       
      
       
    
     
     
      
       
     
      
         
  
 
          
        
      
       
      
       
       
    
     
       
 
     
         
    
     
          
    
  
 
view has not been greatly investigated. Only a few studies have been
conducted that explore the impact of CG mechanisms and firm performance
in Middle Eastern countries. Middle Eastern countries have a unique culture
(the majority of the population are Muslim and follow the Islamic guidelines in
daily life) and economic factors (financial markets (capital and money 
market) are not developed, and non-existence of bond market) that are
different from Western developed economies. Researchers have adopted
those CG mechanisms in their research that are implemented by the
regulators in those countries. This study is focused on the CG mechanisms
that are implemented by Jordanian regulators. Another unique feature of this 
study is that the impact of various CG mechanisms has been explored in a
standalone and collective manner by generating a CG index based on the
requirements of the Jordanian CG code. 
During the 90s the Jordanian government made efforts to motivate investors
to invest in Jordan. The government provided incentives to Jordanian
citizens based overseas and to international investors to invest in Jordan by
launching the Jordanian Economic Growth Stimulus Programme to achieve
sustainable development and enhance the competitiveness of the economy
(Kabariti, 2019). This initiative helped Jordan to integrate its economy with
the world at the global level. Under this initiative, the capital markets of 
Jordan were liberalised, and CG mechanisms were restructured. In addition
to this, an institutional framework was also developed, and new institutes 
were established. It helped to strengthen the regulatory environment and
ensured transparency and accountability in financial matters. These institutes
were the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), Jordanian Securities
Commission (JSC) and Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). As a result of the
above governmental efforts, the country’s economic conditions improved,
and the Jordanian capital markets flourished. The gross domestic product
(GDP) of Jordan increased to 2.3% and per capita GDP rose to 2,909
Jordanian Dollars in 2018, which was the highest level it reached during
2014 to 2018 (Central Bank of Jordan, 2020).
2
  
 
 
         
       
       
           
       
      
           
      
     
       
           
      
       
        
  
 
           
   
        
           
      
       
      
      
      
        
  
 
     
       
       
     
        
      
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of CG
mechanisms on the firm performance of Jordanian non-financial listed
companies on the ASE. Secondary data is collected for 95 non-financial 
companies for a period of six years ranging from 2012 to 2018. The study
has adopted the CG mechanisms that were proposed by the Jordanian CG
code 2011. Jordanian companies began to implement the requirements of 
the CG code 2011 in 2012. For this reason, the data is collected from 2012
to 2018. The focus of this study is also on non-financial companies because
the reporting style of financial companies is different from that of non-
financial companies. Various statistical tools, such as descriptive analysis,
correlation and multiple regression analysis, are used to explore the impact
of CG mechanisms on firm performance. This study will examine the effects 
of various CG mechanisms in a standalone and combined manner for the
Jordanian companies, and it is the first study of its kind in the context of 
Jordan.
The study in hand is keen to identify and understand the existing literature
about variables such as CG and organisational performance, particularly in 
Jordan. There is a visible literature gap that will be identified and answered
by the current study to enhance the existing knowledge in this field of study.
This study is equally essential for Jordanian corporate managers because
they can implement significant CG mechanisms in improving their firms’
performance. Empirical results have shown that the implementation of CG
mechanisms is helping corporate managers to streamline their operating
activities and enhancing accountability and transparency mechanisms.
Effective operations, sound accountability and a transparent system enable
firms to improve their performance (Mkheimer, 2018).
This study is beneficial for the regulators because regulators around the
globe are continuously updating the CG mechanisms (European Corporate
Governance Institute (ECGI), 2020). Jordanian regulators developed the first
CG code for Jordanian banks in 2006, a CG code for Jordanian companies
in 2007 and the CG code was updated in 2011. The outcomes of this study
will help the regulators to understand the real impact of various CG 
3
  
 
 
         
  
 
      
 
      
        
         
         
      
          
      
         
  
        
     
     
  
 
    
        
      
      
     
  
 
  
 
     
       
  
 
  
mechanisms that are proposed by the Jordanian regulators through CG
codes.
1.2 Theoretical framework adopted in the study
The theoretical framework is an essential and integral part of any given
research design. It is quite necessary to understand the theoretical stances
of every piece of research so that its visible contribution to the specific field
of literature can be highlighted explicitly. The study in hand is based on
agency theory, and the research questions and hypotheses are generated
based on agency conflict. Agency theory deals with the conflicts of interest
between principals and agents. In public companies, the shareholders are
the principals who hire agents so that the agents can achieve the
shareholders’ wealth maximisation objectives. The managers of the company
are the agents who need to work to achieve the shareholders’ wealth
maximisation objectives. Unfortunately, however, they work to achieve their
own personal goals; this conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders is known as an agency problem.
Therefore, the aim of this study, based on agency theory and agency conflict,
is to explain the relationship between the CG mechanisms and their impact
on the firm’s financial performance. It is worth mentioning that agency theory 
and its associated hypotheses are tested, and this theory testing enriches
the subject knowledge accordingly. Further details are provided in Chapter 2
of this thesis.
1.3 Research aim 
This research aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance
mechanisms on the firm performance for the non-financial Jordanian firms
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. 
4
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
         
  
 
        
      
 
         
   
 
           
  
 
         
 
 
   
 
       
    
     
    
        
     
      
     
 
     
     
         
1.4 Research objectives
The research aim is divided into the following objectives:
 To conduct a critical literature review in the field of corporate
governance and firm performance
 To collect the secondary data for various CG mechanisms and firm
performance for Jordanian non-financial firms from 2012 – 2018
 To analyse the data by using various statistical tools, such as
descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression analysis
 To present the findings of the study and compare and contrast the
results of the study with previous studies
 To provide a brief conclusion and recommendations in light of the
analysis of this study
1.5 Research questions
The board of directors is a critical CG mechanism, and previous research
has identified the independent director as a useful feature/character of the
board of directors (Gillan, 2006; Liu and Fong, 2010; Alqatan and Jussainey,
2019). Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Akbar et al. (2016) have stated that the
prime duty of board members is to protect the interests of investors and
ensure that agents (managers) are performing their duties to maximise the
wealth of shareholders. Thus, the framework of corporate governance
provides strategic guidance which helps to monitor the performance of firms 
through the board (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), 2004). The board of directors (BOD) also plays its role to minimise
the conflicts between the agent and principals. Accordingly, the BOD keeps 
an eye on top management to ensure alignment between the managers and
5
  
 
 
      
       
       
   
  
  
 
       
    
  
 
   
     
    
      
    
      
         
    
 
    
         
            
    
     
         
        
      
        
         
      
      
      
      
shareholders. This alignment will help to reduce the conflict and increase the
firm’s performance, ultimately protecting the interests of shareholders
(Braendle, 2019). The BOD has a significant impact on the firm’s
performance, so the first research question of this study is:
Research question 1
How does the BOD (such as size, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality
and Non-executive directors (NEDs)) show their impact on performance
of a company in Jordan’s non-financial listed firms
Board sub-committees can also help to increase the performance of the BOD 
(Vafeas, 1999). Companies usually tend to establish various committees 
which monitor the affairs related to audit (audit committee), remuneration
(remuneration committee), and hiring for vacant posts at the board level 
(nomination committee). These sub-committees assist the board of directors
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; El-Faitouri, 2014). Anderson and Bizjak
(2003) have stated that the remuneration committee helps to determine the
compensation of executives working within the firm.
Generally, executives and independent directors of listed firms are
nominated and controlled by the board (Vafeas, 1999). It can be very costly
to decide on a collective nomination if the firm has a very disbursed
ownership structure. Thus, the board undertakes the responsibility to
nominate and appoint executives and independent directors for the firm. 
Selection of an appropriate person for an executive position is crucial for a 
firm and this job is performed by the nomination committee, which ensures
the quality of nominations. Additionally, this nomination committee works as
a separate unit from the managerial team, which ensures the selection of the
most appropriate person for an executive role (Vafeas, 1999). On the other 
hand, if responsibility is delegated to the managerial team for the selection of 
executives, it will not ensure quality. It is possible that the executive directors
would select another executive director based on their personal affiliations, 
which could protect their interests rather than those of the shareholders.  
6
  
 
 
 
         
            
        
  
        
        
     
         
        
 
 
         
         
     
         
       
       
      
   
       
  
 
 
 
      
   
 
 
      
          
         
          
       
Offering an attractive remuneration package to the executives will motivate
them to act in the best interests of the shareholders and to align the interests
of the shareholders with those of the managers. Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
have stated that the board of directors delegates the task of designing wages
and compensation to the remuneration committee. This committee also
provides its consultancy role to the board regarding the payment to the
executive directors. Vafeas (2003) and Akbar et al. (2016) have stated that
21stthe financial scandal around the globe at the start of the century 
highlighted the need to implement regulations for strengthening the role of 
the compensation committee. 
Young et al. (2008) and El-Faitouri (2014) have stated that the audit
committee is a crucial part of a corporate governance system which helps to
restrict managers from being involved in financial crimes while managing
their firms’ affairs. The fundamental function of an audit committee is to
review the financial activities and evaluation of financial statements of the
firm with the collaboration of internal and external auditors. Additionally, the
audit committee also reviews internal controls to evaluate the performance of
companies (Aggarwal et al., 2005; Yawson, 2006; Wulf, 2007). Thus,
considering the significance of various board committees, the second
research question of this study is: 
Research question 2
Do the board committees have an impact on the firm performance and 
the organisation efficiency of non-financial listed Jordanian
companies?
It is essential to mention that the committees such as audit, remuneration
and nomination play a pivotal role in the performance of the firm.
Furthermore, the investigation in the current study focuses on examining the
impact of the level of compliance on corporate performance by adopting two
approaches, by using a standalone corporate governance mechanism to
7
  
 
 
          
       
        
     
         
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
      
      
    
     
      
         
      
       
     
       
 
 
      
          
         
      
        
      
       
        
investigate their effects on firm performance and by using the governance
index. Various researchers have taken the index-based approach to quantify
the impact of CG index on firm performance and found significant results
(Adams, 2003; Padgett and Shabbir, 2008; El-Faitouri, 2014; Akbar et al.,
2016). Hence, in line with considering the significance of using the
governance index, so the third research question of this study is: 
Research question 3
Does the corporate governance index (CGI) have an impact on the
performance of the non-financial listed Jordanian organisations? 
1.6 Rationale of the study
Firstly, this study might be helpful to enhance our understanding of reducing
agency conflict by using different corporate governance mechanisms in the
context of Jordanian non-financial companies. This investigation is dealing
with non-financial listed firms and will provide essential insights to
understand the behaviour of non-financial firms. These findings will enhance
the existing body of knowledge in the field of CG and performance.
Secondly, Jordan is a developing country. Thus, outcomes of this study
could also help other developing nations with a similar background to Jordan
in various aspects such as related to political, cultural, environmental and
economic conditions, especially in the context of the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region. 
Thirdly, a significant improvement has been witnessed regarding the
economic environment of Jordan and increasing listing of firms on the ASE
from 2000 to 2016. Thus, this study seeks to provide help to understand firm
performance through improvement in the economic environment. Hence,
assessing the impact of foreign investment in Jordanian firms and its 
comparison with the other comparable MENA markets can also provide
essential insights. This liberalisation has attracted a bulk of foreign
investment in Jordan, and its capital market has a high ratio of attracting
8
  
 
 
        
        
 
 
  
 
        
 
 
           
  
 
       
       
   
 
      
           
 
 
         
        
  
 
   
 
     
     
 
         
      
       
          
   
foreign investment around the globe (OECD, 2006). All the above-cited facts 
highlight the significance of the study, which motivated the researcher to
carry out this study.
1.7 Definitions of the key terms
This section provides the definitions of the key terms used in the current
study. 
CEO duality is the hiring of one individual person for the two positions at the
board level, such as CEO and Chairman of the company. 
Executive directors (EDs) are the directors who manage the operating
activities of the company, and they are responsible for achieving the
shareholders’ wealth maximisation objective. 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) are the directors who are responsible for
improving the governance system of the company by creating a sound
monitoring system. 
Corporate governance index is the index generated by the researcher based
on the corporate governance requirements of the Jordanian corporate
governance code 2011. 
1.8 Thesis outline
Chapter one introduces the current study and explains its significance, along
with providing the specific research questions with their potential insights. 
Chapter two reviews the background of the Jordanian economy and its
industrial sectors. It also provides the details of the country’s financial and
regulatory system. This chapter focuses on the theoretical background, and
provides a review of existing literature in the area of corporate governance
mechanisms and their features and firm performance. 
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Chapter three deals with the data and its extraction sources used in this 
study. Sample selection criteria and details of variables from performance
and corporate governance perspectives are also given in this chapter. The
philosophical orientation, the methodology and statistical tests applied in this
study will also be discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter four deals with the results of this study. The results of the descriptive
statistics are provided in the first section. The statistical inference has been
drawn based on findings of the research. Results are effectively presented in
tables so that interpretation can be made easily about the study
interventions. The results are discussed and compared and contrasted with
those of previous studies.
Chapter five of this thesis provides a conclusion along with different
recommendations. The study findings are discussed in specific alignment to
research questions set in the study. Research limitations and potential
avenues for future research studies are also provided. 
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1.9 summary
This chapter divided into eight sections, the first section shed light on the
background of the study, the second section deals with the theoretical
framework adopted in the study, as well as this section explained that the
study in hand is based on agency theory, and the research questions and
hypotheses are generated based on agency conflict, the third section deals
with the aim of research which is to investigate the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on the firm performance for the non-financial 
Jordanian firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.
The fourth section clarify that the research aim divided into five objectives
which are conduct a critical literature review in the field of corporate
governance and firm performance; collect the secondary data for various 
CG mechanisms and firm performance for Jordanian non-financial firms from 
2012 – 2018; analyse the data by using various statistical tools, such as
descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression analysis; present the
findings of the study and compare and contrast the results of the study with
previous studies; provide a brief conclusion and recommendations in light of 
the analysis of this study.
The fifth section of this chapter deals with the research questions that the
researcher developed to the study in hand, while the sixth section deals with
the rational of the study. whereas the seventh section deals with the
definitions of the key terms, the final section of this chapter deals with the
Thesis outline. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review
2.1 Jordanian economic sectors and Jordanian regulators
Being a small country, Jordan has limited natural resources from minerals
with the majority of the country being a desert landscape. Jordan emerged
as Transjordan in 1921, after the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.
Jordan’s geographical position gives the country substantial strategic 
importance from political and economic perspectives. Jordan is situated at
the crossroads of what the world’s communities such as Christians, Jews 
and Muslims call the Holy Land. Knowles (2005) stated that The Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) has proved to be one of the world’s most
vulnerable countries to external political, economic and security events. From 
1940, Jordan has remained under pressure due to a large variety of crises.
Occupation of coastal parts of Palestine, the Iran-Iraq War, America’s
invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring in 2011, all these factors have had an
impact on the country’s political and economic situation. The recent Syrian
crisis has also hampered the steady pace of Jordan’s economic growth. 
Citizens of Jordan have an upper-middle income level, and their average per
capita income was 4,330.3 USD in 2019 (The World Bank, 2020). Almost
80% of the population lives in urban areas. Thirty-eight per cent of the
population is comprised of young people aged 14 or less, suggesting that
Jordan is the youngest nation (The World Bank, 2018). The major exports of 
country are potash and phosphates. This scarcity is not limited with natural
resources relevant to minerals; also there are limited water resources in
Jordan which make Jordan low production related to agriculture products.
Such scarcity of natural resources put pressure on Jordan status and due to
these factors Jordan is placed at number 04 in poorest country according to
water resources. Due to such hardships because of natural resources,
almost 75% of jobs in Jordan are due to services sector. Thus 70% of 
Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is produced through service sector
(World Bank, 2018). 
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Jordan faces many economic challenges, such as poverty, high
unemployment and high inflation rate. The budget deficit is also a significant 
challenge for the Jordanian government. To tackle such issues and
problems, King Abdullah II Bin Al Hussein of Jordan has introduced many
economic reforms. These reforms are opening of the trade regime,
privatisation of state-owned companies and reducing subsidies on various
government-sponsored projects. Such efforts have attracted foreign direct
investment, ultimately creating a pool of jobs for the Jordan people. Despite
these efforts from the government of Jordan, global economic pressures 
have also depressed the country’s economic growth (World Bank, 2018).
However, government agencies are keen to address these issues and are
continually working to resolve the problems. 
In order to improve the living standards of the poor and middle class, the
government introduced two economic relief packages during 2011. These
two measures were considered as a budgetary supplement. However, during
that time, Jordan’s financial position was disturbed because the country had
to use more expensive fuel for electricity generation as the supply of natural
gas from Egypt was cut off due to attacks on the gas pipeline. Despite such
pressures, the government was able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and aid from Gulf countries, which helped to ease the budgetary 
expenditures. However, the budget deficit remained at 10% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) despite such help (United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), 2017). This budgetary deficit was managed through
assistance from the neighbouring countries during 2012. Also in 2012, the
financial crisis hit globally; however, limited exposure to foreign capital
markets helped Jordan to survive this global financial crisis. Jordan is not
isolated from its neighbouring nations, and it has strong ties with its Gulf
neighbours through trade, remittances, FDI and tourism. The Jordanian
government is trying to make the utmost efforts to devise the best policies for 
achieving economic benefits. As a result of these efforts, the reliance on
fuel-based electricity generation was shifted to nuclear power generation to
tackle power shortfalls (OECD, 2013). 
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By following methods of regional integration, Jordan has made itself
vulnerable to various volatilities pertaining to political, economic and social
aspects. After 2010, like other countries of the Middle East, Jordan also
absorbed the aftershocks of various waves of disturbances, and such issues
have had significant impacts on the country’s economic status. The stronger
citizen voice and accountability has also put pressure on Jordan’s
government. A general increase in the prices of commodities, an increase in
import bills, a decrease in foreign remittances, and low tourism activities 
were observed in 2011 (OECD, 2013). Disturbance in the adjacent countries
has also negatively affected Jordan’s economy. Interruption of the natural
gas supply from Egypt caused an additional $2.4 billion to the taxpayers 
because the government used costly fuels to generate electricity in 2012.
However, such financial blows have not hampered Jordan’s good
governance policies, and the government of Jordan is spending heavily on
the human development of its nation. 
Jordan is spending a high proportion of its development budget on
education, health, retirement benefits and social safety benefits; the country
is spending more than 25% of its GDP consistently on the above sectors. In
addition to this, Jordan provides gender parity to individuals across various 
public policies. During 2003, Jordan introduced a comprehensive
modernisation programme across the country, aiming to change the
education system to develop a knowledge-based economy (World Bank, 
2018). Such policies pertaining to expenditure and improvement in the
education system have helped Jordan to increase school enrolment, which is
high compared to similar income-level nations. However, it is becoming
difficult for the government to maintain the pace of development in the health
and education sector because of the growing population rates. 
During the last decade, Jordan has introduced critical reforms in various
sectors, and it has made notable progress in the areas of education and
health. This situation portrays a good picture of Jordan’s Social, Education
and Health systems. However, sound economic policies are needed to
overcome the negative impacts of global crises. In addition to the above
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factors, the high unemployment rate and over-dependence on remittances
are still significant economic problems for Jordan.
In 2011, the country went through the “Arab Spring revolutions” movement
which forced the government to introduce political reforms along with
economic governance. Jordan’s government tackled this movement through
gradual improvements in the judicial system to improve public accountability; 
these changes were approved through parliament by constitutional
amendments. To improve the economic situation, the government introduced
austerity measures to ensure transparency and accountability in public
matters. The government also focused on improvements in public sector
development by introducing reforms in budget and debt management. Such
measures have ensured a better economic future for Jordan at a gradual
pace; additionally, these measures have provided a supportive regional and
external environment (The World Bank, 2018). However, it is perceived that,
in the future, Jordan will have to face fierce competition from its neighbouring
countries because these countries are also attracting foreign investment. If 
the government overcomes the above challenge, then it would provide
employment opportunities to the masses and thus reduce poverty. 
Although businessmen across the world consider Jordan as the best place to
invest in this region, due to the security and safety that Jordan enjoys unlike
most of the region countries, nevertheless investment opportunities are not
being utilized properly. The government provides equal opportunities to local
and foreign investors due to the Investment Promotion Law of 1995. This law 
also provides guarantees against expropriation. The Investment Promotion
Law of 1995 provides some incentives to investors such as exemption from
customs duties and even tax holidays. In addition to this, investors can also
obtain the benefits pertaining to the unrestricted transfer of capital and
profits, as explained by the International Labour Organization (2013). 
Jordan’s government has introduced disclosure regulations which bind public
companies to disclose various financial information. These disclosure 
regulations ensure financial security. This disclosure is helping to develop
15
  
 
 
       
      
    
      
         
        
     
 
    
      
   
         
     
      
       
     
   
         
 
 
        
        
     
   
         
   
 
  
the country’s financial sector. These guidelines have been prepared to keep
in mind the cultural dimensions of Jordan. Companies are bound to disclose
board members’ ownership and top management’s salaries. Any
concealment of a fact by companies results in penalties. At present, various
penalties have been imposed on firms which have violated the disclosure
regulations, ranging from charging of fines to stopping the firms from
circulating on the ASE.
The popular movement that most of Jordan's neighbouring countries are
witnessing, due to the poor economic and political environment in these
countries makes the influx of refugee and emigration moving towards Jordan
is high. This influx hampers the delivery of public services in the country and
disturbs labour market conditions, posing a considerable threat to the
economy. Despite these challenges, which are not easy to resolve
apparently, Jordan has managed to maintain a steady pace of economic 
growth with visible presence. As per the report of The World Bank (2016) 
covering the economic perspectives of countries (Economic Monitoring
Report), Jordan’s GDP growth rate was 3.5% in 2015 and was expected to
touch 3.9 % in 2016. 
Although Jordan has limited resources as compared to its neighbouring
nations, the contribution of services and goods exports in GDP in the year
2014 was more than 40%. Other significant contributors to the GDP are 
foreign remittances, Gulf subsidiaries and development grants that contribute
up to 19% in GDP. The following shows the ease of doing business for the
country with other allies explicitly (The World Bank, 2018).
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Table 2-1 Comparative analysis of economic indicators
Source Almustafa (2017) 
2.1.1 Industry and services sector in Jordan 
Jordan’s industrial sector is comprised of manufacturing, construction,
mining, and power. These four Jordanian industrial sectors contributed 26%
to its GDP in 2014. During that time, almost 21% of Jordan’s labour force
was engaged in the industrial sector. The major industrial products of the
industrial sector are potash, phosphates, pharmaceuticals, cement, clothing
and fertilisers. The construction industry is the top industrial sector. This
growing trend in the construction sector is supported by the US-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement (FTA). This agreement between the US and Jordan
indicates that Jordan is one of the most important markets for the US.
However, the US has also engaged with other MENA countries through other
trade agreements. The Agadir Agreement, with the EU, is one of a number of 
such contracts which have the potential to reap benefits for Arab countries.
Jordan is also offering other attractive options to investors to start their
business in the country. Jordan has skilled labour, which also attracts foreign
investors to start their business in the country, and ultimately it will promote
economic development (OECD, 2013). 
17
  
 
 
      
    
       
      
    
     
 
 
  
 
    
      
      
      
      
       
       
        
    
 
        
       
       
       
        
        
       
      
 
 
   
 
    
      
Although the availability of natural resources in Jordan is limited, the
country’s abundant reserves of potash and phosphates are contributing to
the industrial production. Both potash and phosphates are used in the
production of fertilisers and were worth almost $1bn in 2018. (Central Bank
of Jordan, 2020). Furthermore, the textile sector is also a significant
contributor to Jordan’s economic development, and its net worth was almost 
$1.19 billion in 2017 (Central Bank of Jordan, 2020). 
2.1.2 Telecom and IT 
The telecommunication sector is also a major contributor to Jordan’s GDP, 
and its share is 13.5% of the country’s total GDP. During 2001, Jordan
introduced telecom liberalisation which made the country’s Information
Technology (IT) sector the most developed in the Arab region. Three
telecommunication companies are operating in Jordan and offering their
services to the country’s mobile phone users. Zain (Kuwait based) holds 39%
of the market share, Orange (owned by France Telecoms) holds 36% and 
Umniah holds 25%. The competitive environment of the mobile sector has
resulted in a price war to retain the market share (Zu‘ubi, 2013). 
The Information Technology Association (int@j) was established to prepare
Jordan for the implementation of the latest technological advancements in
the field of telecommunication. This association helps the country’s
telecommunication sector to compete with that of other countries. The
improvements in the IT and telecommunication sector have played their part
in enhancing Jordan’s GDP by almost 14%. Keeping in mind the growth
potential in the IT sector, the Jordanian government is keen to provide
training opportunities for the workforce to reduce the unemployment rate
(Zu‘ubi, 2013). 
2.1.3 Energy
Like other developing nations, Jordan also faces challenges in the energy 
sector. The demand for energy remains a major concern for the government.
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Lack of domestic investment in the energy sector has attracted $14 billion of 
foreign investment to meet the country’s energy needs. This investment
programme was aimed to reduce dependency on fuel imports by 2020.
Additionally, it was aimed to increase the proportion of nuclear energy 
production by 60% by the end of 2035 (The World Bank, 2018).
Jordan’s neighbours are rich in petroleum resources, but Jordan imports oil
from its neighbours to meet its own energy needs. Jordan had offered oil
supply routes to Iraq and, in return, purchased discounted oil from Iraq, but,
after the US invasion of Iraq, the oil supply to Jordan was disrupted. After
this invasion, Jordan shifted its primary and secondary sources through the
port of Al Aqabah by using tankers. Currently, Saudi Arabia is the primary
supplier of oil to Jordan, but oil is also imported from Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) (Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
2013). 
It was estimated that Jordan has average natural gas reserves of 
approximately 6 billion cm3 , but it is believed that natural gas reserves are 
much higher than this estimation. During 2003, 390 million cm3 of natural gas 
was extracted and consumed in Jordan because it is a domestic source of 
energy. For this purpose, the primary source is the Risha gas field. This gas 
field is situated in the eastern part of the country. Arab Gas line is the
primary pipeline which provides natural gas to Jordan from Egypt and passes
underwater to Al Aqabah. This pipeline starts from Egypt and is linked to two
major power stations. It provides approximately one billion cm3 of natural gas 
per year to Jordan (Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
2013).
2.1.4 Transport
The transportation sector is considered vital for the economic development of
Jordan. This sector provides almost 10% of the country’s total GDP, which 
was approximately $2.14 billion in 2007. These statistics indicate the service-
based economy of Jordan, and thus it is believed that the transportation
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sector holds a vital position in the country’s economy. Due to such potential
in this sector, the government of Jordan planned to revolutionise the
transportation sector in 2008. For this purpose, a new national transport
strategy was formulated and implemented to improve and modernise the
transportation sector. Privatisation was also part of this policy. The uncertain
situation and security crisis in Iraq promoted Jordan’s transportation sector.
Large numbers of tourists also use different modes of transportation.
Jordan’s government followed realistic measures to improve the
transportation sector by relocating Aqaba‘s main port and developing a
railway system. But the increasing trend in fuel prices hampered the
development of the transportation sector by increasing the operational costs
of transport. Despite these challenges, uncertainty in fuel prices also tends to
offer a lucrative incentive to investors, motivating them to invest in 
transportation (Jordan Ministry of Transport, 2013). 
2.1.5 Media and advertising 
In the modern contemporary world, there is no doubt that the media plays a
very critical role in setting the image (face) of any social entity such as 
Jordan. Media is considered to be one of the essential components of 
society, and has an impact on the people as well as the community. Although
the state mainly influences Jordan’s media, this sector has witnessed
significant privatisation and liberalisation during the last few years. Data
shows that, on average, almost $280 million was spent on advertisement in 
Jordan’s media in 2017. Jordan Television (JTV) remains the sole 
broadcaster in the country, but other mediums are also available for the
public to access information, such as blogs, websites and news portals.
These growing mediums have the potential to attract investments. 
Jordan’s Media and Advertising Industry expanded by 260% between 2000
and 2017 (Jordan Media and Advertising, 2018). Jordan Media and
Advertising (2013) stated that the majority of spending on advertisements
was made by the telecoms sector during 2017, with 205 contributions. After 
the telecom sector, the banking and finance sector had the highest spending
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on advertising (12%), whilst the services, real estate and automotive
industries spent 11%, 8% and 5% respectively. In order to obtain the best 
possible output from the media and advertising sector, Jordan needs a
vocational training facility to explore its emerging potential in the specific 
industries.
2.2 Regulatory institution and CG development in Jordan 
Jordan is representative of the mixed system of the Ottoman Empire (based
on French law), British common law, and Islamic law. In the case of 
corporate governance mechanism, Jordan developed its corporate
governance mechanism on an ‘insider-oriented’ corporate governance
system. However, Jordan’s government has been improving the country’s
legal and organisational structure. For this purpose, the government has 
introduced critical economic legislation, such as the Company Law (1997) 
and the New Securities Law (2002). These two frameworks provide
necessary legislation regarding corporate governance roles and concepts to
improve and enhance the country’s investment climate. 
The first decade of the 21st century has seen tremendous changes around
the globe regarding liberalisation and globalisation. Being an emerging
economy, Jordan’s government assessed the country’s worth and adopted
various policies to cope with the emerging trends in the MENA region. 
Various vital players implement economic reforms in Jordan, and out of 
these the corporate compliance authority is the key player. This authority 
follows company law to ensure economic reforms and developments by 
implementing corporate governance provisions. The Central Bank of Jordan
(CBJ) issued a Director’s Handbook of Corporate Governance in 2004. In
addition to this, the Central Bank of Jordan is continuously exerting efforts to
improve the country’s corporate governance mechanism. Further, the Central 
Bank of Jordan is also performing to enhance the banking system through a
Corporate Governance Code (Al-Amarneh, 2014). 
21
  
 
 
       
        
       
        
    
        
      
        
        
 
 
   
 
   
 
       
         
        
 
 
      
   
    
  
       
     
 
Developments in the mechanism of corporate governance are directly linked
with the shareholders’ rights. “In Jordan, shareholders enjoy a considerable
right in terms of access to secure methods of registering a property, the
strength of legal rights and legislation enforcement, getting credit from local
banks and financial institutions, sell or transfer shares, obtaining relevant 
information or actions on a timely basis, and other firm activities like voting
and board elections (World Bank, 2015)”.The weighted average CG 
compliance score for the Jordanian CG code was 3.91. The code was
compared with the subcategories of the OECD principles that are presented
in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2 Jordan CG compliance with OECD principles
Source Almustafa (2017) 
An assessment was made by Shanikat and Abbadi (2011) regarding the
corporate governance of Jordan and its compliance with OECD principles.
Key findings of their research indicate some interesting points, which are as
follows: 
 Shareholders can take part in the decision-making process, except in
significant cases such as the sale of assets. 
 Practically, shareholders are not treated as equal to managers, 
although regulatory authorities take action to control insider trading. 
 Stakeholders have active roles and rights in the implementation of the
corporate governance system because their rights are protected by 
Jordan’s company laws and regulations. 
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 Disclosure and transparency were observed to a large extent because
Jordan’s reporting standards follow the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and International Accounting Standards 
(IASs). 
 Boards largely fulfil their responsibilities, as these are extensively 
defined by law and regulation. 
In the MENA region, the financial development of Jordan is comparatively 
high in comparison with other countries (see the below table). According to
Creane et al. (2007), the government of Jordan has imposed minimal
restrictions on the property rights. In addition to this, in Jordan the banking
system is well developed and efficient as compared with other countries of 
the region. During the last few years, the government of Jordan has
increased the efficiency of the banking sector through prudential measures
and regulations. This has been ensured through the establishment of a
corporate governance code for the banking sector that was implemented by
the Jordanian banking industry in 2007. 
For shareholding companies, the code of corporate governance was issued
in 2008. Additionally, this code was supposed to help business firms to
secure their rights. This code provides guidelines regarding various 
corporate governance issues such as board size and composition along with
ownership structure. In an attempt to update guidelines regarding the
corporate governance mechanism, the government of Jordan with the
collaboration of market participants and the Ministry of Industry and Trade
developed a new code in 2011. This new code specifies distributions of 
rights and responsibilities of various entities related to firms, such as 
shareholders, BODs, and top management. This new code also provides 
guidelines regarding effective decision-making processes in firms. Table 2-3 
illustrates ownership and BOD structure from 2008 to 2014 of non-financial
listed firms.
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Table 2-3 Ownership and board structure for Jordanian companies
Source Almustafa (2017) 
Economic crises during 2008 have put many economies under pressure and
caused the failure of many firms around the globe. Like other countries,
Jordan has also attempted to enhance its financial security and improve its
economic environment in response to these economic crises. Despite the
war and instability in neighbouring countries, Jordan has maintained its
steady economic growth during the last few years. This sustained economic
growth has witnessed an increased volume of trade and market
capitalisation, which has increased the number of firms listed on the Amman
Stock Exchange (ASE) (ASE, 2012). This state of affairs shows that Jordan
has been working continuously from 1990 to up till now to improve its
economic liberalisation and corporate governance.
Various measures have been adopted by the Jordanian government in this
regard to improve financial stability and create a better economic
environment. One such measure was the establishment of the ASE to trade
public securities. An additional criterion was the establishment of the
Securities Depository Centre (SDC) to protect investors; further, the Jordan
Security Commission (JSC) was established to keep control over the equity
market. These measures have helped to ensure disclosure and
transparency, which also protects investors. Although such practices have
made Jordan an advanced country in terms of corporate governance in
MENA countries, both the World Bank and the IMF (2004) assessed that
24
  
 
 
      
    
      
   
 
   
 
    
      
   
     
        
        
         
       
 
 
    
     
           
      
        
    
          
     
       
 
 
       
   
      
         
      
    
corporate governance in Jordan was insufficient and it still needs to
improvement (ROSC, 2004). These suggestions also endorsed the findings 
of Glaeser et al. (2001), regarding economic liberalization that tend to
produce short-term economic growth in case of developing economies. 
2.2.1 Jordanian capital market 
Amman Financial Market (AFM) was set up in 1976, but it was restructured
in 1994 to enhance its size, liquidity, disclosure of reliable information and
transparency. Later, the AFM was replaced with three primary entities. These
entities were the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan Security
Commission (JSC) and Securities Depository Centre (SDC). The ASE
remained a well-developed and credible regulated market for many years
with a market capitalisation of approximately US$5 billion. In addition to this,
the ASE is an outstanding emerging stock exchange (Central Bank of 
Jordan, 2015). 
Such developments in Jordan’s financial system brought significant positive
changes in the country, and the number of listed firms increased dramatically
from 1999 to 2015. In 1999, only 152 firms were listed on the ASE whereas 
in 2015 there were 228 firms listed. The market capitalisation also increased 
remarkably during the same period. The average market capitalisation of 
listed companies in MENA countries was far less in comparison to that of 
Jordan (109%) during 1990 – 2014; for example, it was 34.34 in Egypt and
60.85 in Israel. Various research studies have shown that effective financial
markets ensure economic growth and development in both a developed and
a developing economy (Bayraktar, 2014). 
The Jordanian capital market has played a vital role in the country’s 
economic development. The country’s financial sector has dominated the
market along with the industrial sector that holds 41% market capitalisation.
The service and insurance sector proportions are much less, at 8% and 2%
respectively. The above statistics highlight that the ASE has performed far
better than other financial markets in the MENA region. Statistical data has
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also pointed out that the investment of the public sector in various ASE
companies is 18%, investment of individuals is 30%, and rest is invested by
private institutional investors (Bayraktar, 2014)
Jordan’s government is attracting overseas investors by allowing them to
invest in different projects and they can start a public company by holding a 
50% stake in it. Jordan has exempted the dividends income and capital gains
from tax so overseas investors can invest in Jordanian financial markets.
Such lucrative options have provided a competitive edge to the companies
listed on the ASE. The three regulatory bodies, ASE, JSC and SDC, are 
currently involved in monitoring, regulating and supervising the country’s
financial affairs. With the implementation of the Securities Law (2002) and
Accounting and Auditing Standards, the regulators have controlled the
economic issues of the Jordanian corporate sector (Almustafa, 2017).
Table 2-4 ASE market performance
Source Almustafa (2017) 
26
  
 
 
    
 
       
        
          
       
    
    
       
     
        
 
 
          
     
       
      
    
     
       
    
  
 
        
           
      
         
 
         
  
 
        
       
   
2.2.2 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC)
The JSC was established in 1997 to regulate the capital market. This 
commission was established under the Securities Law No. 23 and it reports
directly to the country’s prime minister. The aim of establishing the JSC was
to protect investors. Additionally, it was created to regulate the capital
markets by implementing various accountability and transparency 
mechanisms. This commission also acts to protect the capital markets from
potential financial crimes. In addition to the above, the JSC is performing its
role in creating awareness about the operations of financial markets in
Jordan so investors can take part in the country’s economic activity (Jordan
Securities Commission, 2020). 
The JSC is run by a board and this board is comprised of five full-time
commissioners. These commissioners have vast experience in the
operations of the security market, and the Council of Ministers appoints them
for five years. This board prepares laws to monitor and regulate the security 
market. Additionally, it also lays down regulatory instructions for the country’s 
capital markets. The board also issues a licence to firms which offer different
financial services and run mutual funds for their clients. This commission is
also responsible for adopting the accounting standards which are introduced
and implemented in Jordan (Jordan Securities Commission, 2020).
To keep an eye on recent developments at the international level, the JSC
tends to foster its relationships and cooperation with both Arab and non-Arab
regulatory bodies. Collaboration with other regulators has resulted in the
exchange of ideas for enhancing the efficiency of Jordanian capital markets.
However, the current government is continuously focusing on this opportunity
to further capitalise it, following the mission of providing leadership to
Jordan’s corporate sector (Jordan Securities Commission, 2020). 
The JSC has maintained its focus on attracting both local and overseas 
investors to the Jordanian capital markets to expanding the investor base.
Various activities are targeted for this purpose, such as increasing public 
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awareness through published material, delivering lectures and arranging
visits of university students. The JSC, along with other stakeholders, is
attempting to devise a mechanism for implementation of international
corporate governance principles. It is also maintaining its collaboration with
media and legislative authorities to protect investors in the capital market.
The JSC also offers various training programmes internally and externally to
increase the capabilities of its employees to safeguard the Jordanian capital
markets (Jordan Securities Commission, 2020). 
2.2.3 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The ASE was established in 1999; it is a private institute and is responsible
for managing the affairs of the security market in Jordan. The ASE holds
administrative powers and has financial autonomy to regulate the trading of 
securities. The organisational structure of the ASE shows that it has seven
members who act as the board of directors. It has 68 brokerage houses
which facilitate the exchange of information with the board and monitor and
report to the board. The ASE utilises regulatory and monitoring measures to
ensure fairness and transparency in the securities market and protect the
rights of investors. In addition to these measures, the Amman Stock
Exchange has also issued various directives for the smooth running of the
security market’s operating affairs. The above mechanisms implemented by
the ASE have provided a safe environment for investors in which they feel
that their investment is safe. It also comes under the jurisdiction of the ASE
to devise processes and methods to ensure transparent trading of securities 
on the stock market. The ASE also disseminates relevant information to all
the key players of the security market to enhance the transparency and
accountability within the security market (Amman Stock Exchange, 2020). 
The Amman Stock Exchange and Jordan Securities Commission work
closely to ensure proper implementation of local and international regulations 
for the smooth running of the market. These institutions also engage with
other domestic and foreign regulators to improve the performance of the ASE
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and build close relations with other entities to adopt the latest developments
in the field. The ASE is a member of and collaborates with the World
Federation of Exchanges (WFE). Additionally, the ASE is also working as a
member of the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges (FEAS). These
collaborations are helpful to encourage international investors to the ASE.
The Finance Ministry is very keen and excited to launch investment-focused
seminars and workshops to motivate investors by providing the required
information and knowledge. This helps in boosting the morale of investors 
and overall facilitate investing in Jordan (Amman Stock Exchange, 2020). 
2.2.4 Securities Depository Centre (SDC)
Jordan’s SDC is a public utility institution, and it was established in 1997
under Securities Law No. 23 of 1997. The SDC, which has a legal
personality with financial and administrative autonomy, commenced
operation in May 1999 and is the only entity in Jordan that is legally 
empowered by Securities Law No. 18 of 2017 to oversee the registration and
deposit of securities, transfer of ownership and safekeeping of securities,
and clearance and settlement of securities transactions in Jordan. For the
SDC to perform its operations, it was necessary to establish a central registry 
and depository of authenticated shareholders along with a primary settlement
process. The SDC ensures that the shareholders' registers of all public 
shareholding companies are held and maintained at the SDC in electronic
form (Securities Depository Centre, 2020).
The SDC also works under the supervision of the JSC, and its role is to
boost the confidence of investors in securities. It has financial and
administrative autonomy in Jordan. Another primary function of the SDC is to
develop an electronic database of registered shareholders. The SDC is one
of the significant institutions in the Jordan capital market as it holds the
ownership registers of all issued shares. It has been assigned, in cooperation
with the JSC and the ASE, the task of developing the Jordan capital market
(Securities Depository Centre, 2020).
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2.2.5 Corporate governance development in Jordan 
Over time, Jordanian investors were demanding a secured regulatory
environment in which they felt that their investment was safe. This fact raised
the need to implement a corporate governance code in Jordan so that the
system used to govern Jordanian companies could be improved. For this
purpose, the regulators developed the Jordanian corporate governance code
(JCGC) that brings harmony to the Jordanian capital markets. The
implementation of the JCGC ensures that the local market is following the
essential criteria for enhanced transparency and accountability. This code
has provided a sense of security to Jordanian investors and spread a
positive message at the global level regarding the country’s capital markets.
As discussed, Jordan’s financial markets have attracted investors and
businesspeople in the past decade to invest in the country. The primary 
cause of this is the implantation of the JCGC by the Jordanian regulators
(Central Bank of Jordan, 2020). 
Mallin (2016) has stated that the Cadbury Report (1992) and OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) laid the foundations of corporate
governance around the world. The recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
(1992) were used by the regulators to develop the corporate governance
codes for their countries. The focus of the CG codes was mainly linked with
firms’ board structure and ownership structure. Keeping in mind the
guidelines of various international corporate governance codes, Jordan
formulated its corporate governance code for banks in 2006. The Jordanian
code was based on the best practices, OECD principles of corporate
governance and the guidelines of the Basel Committee to improve the
corporate governance mechanism for the Jordanian banking sector.
The JSC and ASE developed the rules and regulations required for the
implementation of the JCGC. The JCGC provides a clear framework for
improving the relationship between the managers and the shareholders for
the elimination of agency conflict. The code also defines the duties, rights 
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and responsibilities of all the stakeholders. However, the Central Bank of 
Jordan has also played a crucial role in devising corporate governance
mechanisms for the Jordanian banking sector. It has also issued a handbook
of corporate governance to facilitate the directors (Jordan Securities
Commission, 2020).
Al-Jazi (2007) stated that various laws which are relevant to CG have been
issued and implemented in Jordan. The JCGC (2006) issued by the Central
Bank of Jordan has mainly covered issues such as the structure of the
board, AGMs, financial disclosures, accounting and auditing practices of 
companies, and ownership structure. Jordanian regulators issued a
corporate governance code for public companies in 2007 that was amended
in 2011. The main guidelines of the JCGC (2011) are that the size of the
board should be between five and 13 directors, at least 1/3 of the directors 
should be NEDs, and CEO duality should be observed (Jordan Corporate
Governance Code, 2011). 
In order to improve the investment outlook, a disclosure department is 
working under the JSC and is accountable for implementing rules (JSC, 
2017). In addition to this, Jordan’s government has signed separate
agreements with developed and developing economies to encourage foreign
investors. These agreements have been signed with the UK, France, the US,
Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Romania, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Yemen,
Bulgaria, Austria, China, Spain, Syria, Poland, Kuwait and Singapore (Jordan
Investment Board, 2013). Further, Jordan has gone under various financial
and economic reforms to ensure transparency and accountability in order to
enhance investor confidence. Jordan is included in the top three nations in 
the MENA region that have successfully attracted foreign investment (Al-
Muhtaseb, 2010). The next section of the thesis will provide the definition of 
corporate governance, corporate governance models, and the theoretical
background of the study. 
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2.3 Definition of corporate governance
CG has gained popularity during recent years from all stakeholders, such as
academia, professional bodies and government agencies. It has gained
interest from around the world due to corporate crimes. Different researchers
and professionals have defined CG differently, but the term is separated into
two main perspectives, narrow and broader. In the narrow perspective, CG is
defined as a tool that is helpful to protect the stakes of shareholders. In the
broader perspective, it is a tool to protect the stakes of all the stakeholders of 
the business, such as investors, owners, creditors, suppliers, customers and
government agencies (Gillan, 2006; Tricker, 2019). 
Gillan and Starks (1998) and Zingales (1997) defined CG in narrow terms, 
and the emphasis of their definition was on protecting the stakes of 
shareholders. Gillan and Starks (2000), Solomon (2016), Millan (2016) and
Tricker (2019) defined corporate governance in a broader sense and stated
that CG mechanisms are helpful for companies to implement a sound
monitoring system for the managers, so they operate in the best interests of 
all the stakeholders. 
Aldamen et al. (2012) stated that managers should put their efforts into
achieving the objectives of shareholders, so they feel that their investment is
protected. An agency relationship exists between managers and
shareholders. If managers are achieving the shareholder wealth
maximisation objective, then shareholders get an impression that there is no
conflict of interest between them and the managers. On the other hand, if the
investors are not receiving a high return on their investment, then
shareholders will get an impression that the managers are not working in 
their interest, and this phenomenon is known as agency conflict. This 
situation leads to the implementation of a system to monitor and control
managers. The cost of implementing this system is borne by the
shareholders, and it is knowns as agency cost. Keasey et al. (2005, p.251) 
defined CG as: 
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“The set of mechanisms – both institutional and market-based
– that induce the self-interested controllers of a company
(those that make decisions regarding how the company will be
operated) to make decisions that maximise the value of the
company to its owners (the suppliers of capital).”
The above definitions elaborate the broad view of corporate governance. The
implementation of CG mechanisms is helpful to streamline business
operations. Streamlined business processes help managers to achieve the
shareholders’ wealth maximisation objective. Furthermore, all the
stakeholders appreciate the managers if they enhance the performance of 
the company (Solomon, 2014). 
Firm performance holds a central position in governance mechanisms, and
agency theory provides the best illustration to provide a framework to
conceptualise the relationships between firm performance and structure of 
the organisation. Denis and McConnell (2003) stated that, in the absence of 
agency conflict, the performance of the company can be enhanced. But a lot
of real-world examples have witnessed that managers have tried to gain
personal benefits from the investment of shareholders, such as at Enron,
WorldCom, etc. For this reason, hypotheses will be developed based on the
agency theory and from the perspective of agency conflict that is adversely 
affecting the performance of companies (Tricker, 2019). 
Agency theory deals with the issues of agency problems and the owner’s
interests with the purpose of maximising the shareholders’ wealth. Generally, 
it is believed that, if the agency problem is decreased, then the performance
of the firm is increased. This conceptualisation provides a way to increase
the shareholders’ wealth. Hence, both the definitions of CG have limitations,
and agency theory provides hypothetical clarifications to elaborate variables 
and associations between the variables to test the relationship.
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2.4 Theoretical framework
The theoretical underpinning of this study is primarily based on agency
theory to investigate the relationships among study constructs, i.e. corporate
governance practices and firm performance. Agency theory deals with the
shareholders and managers in the corporate world. 
Conceptualisation provided by agency theory helps to focus on only two
parties, i.e. the owners (principal) and managers (agents). This one-
dimensional perspective helps to carry out analysis very easily (Watson and
Head, 2016). According to agency theory, it is assumed that conflict of 
interest increased due to managers being opportunistic from the
shareholders’ perspective. These explanations provide a powerful and robust
basis for explaining and testing the relationships between the firm
performance and CG. In addition to this, agency theory provides and
suggests remedial measures by reducing the conflicts/problems between
shareholders and agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Scant literature in this 
field of study suggests some sources of agency problems, such as available 
free cash flows, under-investment/over investment and not considering the
rule of optimistic grid present worth (Dhumale, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Tricker, 2019). 
Performance of the firm depends upon the policy formulation and
implementation by the management team. Furthermore, increasing the
motivation of managerial personnel to handle the affairs of a firm is also
crucial for top management, and, in the case when the objectives of 
managerial staff are misaligned due to improper monitoring, this can result in
severe consequences for firms and owners (Liu and Fong, 2010). Thus,
agency theory provides a monitoring mechanism to bring alignment between
the objectives of the firm and its managerial staff, which protects the interests
of shareholders/owners and ultimately increases the firm’s performance
(Mallin, 2019).
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The ownership structure of any organisation/firm also has an influence on the
affairs of the firm, and the board of directors is the fundamental characteristic
which can mitigate the rising conflict among owners and managers in order
enhance the firm’s performance. Other factors which can increase the firm’s
performance are board size, the duality of CEO and chairman on one hand,
and the ratio of non-executive directors (NEDs). The underlying phenomena
behind the functioning of the executive and non-executive directors in
managing the firm’s affairs are explained by stewardship theory as well as 
resource dependency theory. Besides this, these two theories also provide
explanations regarding how directors influence the firm’s performance.
However, there is overlap between some aspects of agency theory and
these other two theories (Solomon, 2014). 
Agency theory tends to provide alignment between the interests of agents
(managers) and principals (owners) by proposing that this alignment can be
created through introducing incentives for the agents so that they could 
perform better to safeguard the owners’ interests and enhance shareholders
value. In this regard, a statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) provides
guidelines and elaborates that introducing incentives can motivate the agents
to improve their efforts so positively reflected in firm performance. This
alignment can result in reduced conflict between the two parties, ultimately
reducing agency problems and increasing firm performance. 
2.4.1 Agency theory
Usually, in public listed firms, the organisational structure is devised in such
a way that there is a distinction between ownership and control of agents and
their principals. In this relationship, principals (owners) hire agents
(managers) to manage the affairs of the firm in the owners’ best interests
and, in return for the managers’ efforts, the owners pay them financial
compensation in the shape of a salary and incentives (Sappington, 1991). 
This relationship can generate a conflict of interest due to a divergence of 
interests between these two parties. This conflict of interest which can impact
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the firm performance has been investigated previously by most researchers
through agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mallin, 2019). 
The theory revolves around the fact that conflicts of interest between the
principals and agents arise due to the opportunistic nature of managers
(agents). However, this premise considers managers as a conscious entity
but also at the same time as opportunistic. Thus, under agency theory it is 
assumed that managers or agents tend to maximise their personal
wealth/value instead of the shareholders’ wealth/value (Demsetz, 1983). In
addition, agency theory holds the assumption that due to less available
information to the principals/owners, could not assess properly the efforts
imparted by managers to increase the firm’s value. (Mallin, 2019).  
According to the conceptualisation of Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency
costs are comprised of monitoring and bond costs as well as remaining
losses. To monitor the activities of managers, a cost has occurred, which is
termed the monitoring cost. On the other hand, the bonding cost occurs in
developing the systems and structures, and this cost can be in the shape of
financial or non-financial cost. The residual losses occur when managers 
tend to promote their own interests; this cost can also occur due to improper
monitoring or bonding activities. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), 
residual loss occurs when the monitoring and bonding costs increase in
comparison to the profit generated. 
Agency theory considers the connection between investors and supervisors
to be the essential relationship established with a specialist, in which the
owners seek directors to manage the company to the most significant
advantage of the former (Sappington, 1991). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) featured the primary connection with the
specialist. They studied the arrangement of the ownership of the
organisation, in particular, the work of responsibility for value as a
component to regulate the administrator's enthusiasm to that of the owners. 
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) described the work of senior
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management by verifying the potential advantage of official supervisors in
expanding companies. In this way, the office hypothesis mainly concerns the
institutional action paths that influence the organisation's comparisons. The
highlights of the operator's vital worldview are that s/he recommends 
clarifications and answers for different types of office problems and provides 
an approach to avoid discussions by creating motivating force agreements
and a commitment approach to create management components (Mallin,
2019).
The office hypothesis suggests that the Non- Executive director (NEDs) take
an essential job in controlling and administering the officers (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). In this way, NEDs could increase the value of companies due
to their external information and capabilities and their ability to verify (Fama, 
1980). In this sense, both the organisation hypothesis and the trust in the
activities anticipate a causal and positive connection between the company’s 
performance and the proximity of the NEDs. In contrast, the management
hypothesis claims that internal executives might be more inclined to take
over managers than NEDs because of their better learning in relation to
business tasks (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990). 
Furthermore, the administration hypothesis argues that the low maintenance/
formal position of NEDs largely represses their ability to verify and makes
their commitment to essential leadership unimportant (Bozec, 2005). In this
sense, instead of speculation about organisation and dependence on assets, 
the management hypothesis holds that NEDs will probably have a negative
influence on the execution of the company.
NEDs can also add to the expansion of the board measure, which has the
benefit of a broader set of skills which further add to the lack of essential 
leadership and correspondence that is reflected in the moderate
performance of the sheets (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). As the
size of the board increases, the problems of coordination and
correspondence also increase (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Furthermore, the
hypothesis proposes the division between the director and the managing
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director from a similar position; the combination of these works in a single 
individual can cause the expansion of the organisation’s problems,
weakening the feasibility of the observation of the CEO (Jensen, 1993).
However, the stewardship hypothesis recommends that a powerful
administration depends on the level of managerial solidarity, so it is
appropriate for the administrator and the CEO to have a position similar to
that indicated from this point of view (Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Donaldson
and Davies, 1991).
Agency theory proposes that specialists are less inclined to work. To reduce
this difference in interests, investors must use internal quality control
systems to select managers and, in this sense, balanced supervisors must
act to satisfy their ability to increase investor esteem and improve the
performance of society. This primary factor should be complemented by
intentional effort to select and control supervisors, with CG tools that
recognise any feasible problem. Assuming that organisational cost 
guarantees that the manager does not seek personal responsibility, ignoring
the interests of investors, office expenses reduce the office problem and
contribute to improving the company's performance (Pike et al., 2018).
The manager is an agent within the firm who acts on behalf of the owners
(principals). For instance, a salesperson acts on behalf of the other person,
namely, the principal. This principal can be a manufacturer and the agent
can sell goods to others on behalf of the manufacturer. In other cases, a
stockbroker on the stock exchange can be an agent of the client (principal)
and can perform the activities of selling and buying on behalf of that
principal. Thus, agents act by using the name of the principal and proceed
with agreements and carry out transactions on behalf of that principal
(Mallin, 2019).
According to company law, directors also act as agents of the company.
Individual directors, as well as Board of directors (BODs) as a whole, perform
various activities on behalf of owners and usually have the power to make
contractual agreements with the other dealing parties. Hence, due to their
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dominant position in the company, directors have the authority to decide
what a firm can achieve. However, this power is not free from evil. Thus,
this authoritative position of directors within the firm raises some
questions regarding the usage of power in the case when owners
(shareholders) and directors are different individuals. This raises two
questions:
- How it can the principals (shareholders/owners) be assured that 
directors/managers, being agents, are acting in accordance with the
interests of shareholders, and they are pursuing their interests?
- In a case when directors are not performing in accordance with the
shareholders’ viewpoint, then how can shareholders/owners
motivate them to pursue their goals?
Being agents of the company, directors have various duties, and one of 
these is to perform the fiduciary duty. Alternatively, it can be called a duty of 
trust. Hence, to maintain trust, directors should work on behalf of principals
in such a way that it should promote total good faith. Further, directors
should not prioritise their interests at the cost of shareholders/owners’
interests. Hence, if a director is found guilty of a breach of their fiduciary 
duty (duty of faith and trust), then they must be held liable in law, in the case
when the firm is willing to initiate legal proceedings against them. The rest of
the BODs could undertake this legal action against such a director or 
directors.  
Agency theory deals with the relationship between the owners of a
company and its managers; here, managers are called agents and owners
are called principals in this relationship. The conceptualisation of agency
theory holds that, when a firm is first established, its owners perform the
managerial duties and they are also the managers of that firm. Over time, as
the firm or company grows, its owners tend to hire managers to perform the
managerial duties due to its increased size. Hence, owners expect that
these managers will perform in the best way and will protect the owners’ 
interests. Thus, due to this, there exists an agency relationship between the
owners and managers of that company (Tricker, 2019).  
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2.4.2 Stewardship theory
Stewardship theory focuses on the mental and sociological strategies for
supervision, as opposed to the monetary (financial) tools of the organisation
hypothesis. According to Davis et al. (1997), this holds that hierarchical 
individuals have some kind of positive aggregate character that induces
positive behaviour. Muth and Donaldson (1998) agree that the monetary
advantage is not the sole engine of administrative behaviour, and
supervisors require some vigilance to monitor the affairs of investors
adequately. Subsequently, the separate property is not considered a
deficiency of the administration hypothesis, since the useful practices are 
deemed to be the inactive/natural behaviour of the leaders (Davis et al.,
1997), and are responsible for a variety of intentions despite the monetary
benefit (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Solomon, 2016).
Fama and Jensen (1983) found that the supervisors of the internal part of the
board are almost certain that the external leaders form significant
associations because of the deep understanding of the hierarchical exercises 
delighted by the previous ones. The administration hypothesis states that the
concern for the professional movement prevents operators from acting
against the interests of investors. The administrators’ commitment to
organisational performance is identified with the environment in provision of 
socio-social and mental elements (Clarke, 2004; Mallin, 2019). For instance,
it is believed that garments have better performance with a more prominent
reinforcement and the realisation of a job, which is a mental aspect. Publicly,
managers usually recognise themselves as hierarchical agents and therefore
believe that the power the directors give them is a means to train the
association and several representatives to reach the authorised goals (Pike 
et al., 2018).
Donaldson and Davis (1994), in terms of a situational perspective, write that
managers are expected to behave optimally in a participatory way. 
Furthermore, the duality between CEO and president will guide and control,
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especially with regard to the more consistent decision-making process and
strategy (for example, investments), which should add to higher success. As
executives have increasingly comprehensive and in-depth information on
daily activities within their companies, their options are better informed
(Tricker, 2019). 
2.4.3 Resource dependence theory
The hypothesis of the dependence of the activities indicates, the CG
structures, for example, the management, influence the entry of the company
into the primary activities for the execution of the company (Pfeffer, 1973). 
The hypothesis of the trust in the resources supports, in particular, the
structures within a large NED organisation, due to the greater competence
and information they can provide, as well as to the better management of the
systems (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In this way, NEDs can promote
improving the management of systems with external partners, including
customers, governments and various organisations (for example, banks, 
suppliers and buyers). In this way, NEDs improve access to assets
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007), which makes access to less expensive sources 
of information possible and, in this sense, strongly influences the
performance of companies (Mallin, 2019).
Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that variety in the
board's opinion and the basis of external leaders are vital components to
meet the organisation's needs for any subsequent capital or to monitor the
possibility of condition. Aljifri and Moustafa (2001) and Pearce and Zahra
(1992) believe that stable bonds help them to secure their commercial 
advantages in case of ecological vulnerability. They further explained this
phenomenon with the help of some useful data from a variety of sample
organisations around the globe.
Furthermore, the theory of heritage dependence clarifies the strategies that
organisations use to access money resources. Regarding dissolution
problems, organisations are exceptionally informed to select delegates for
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the money establishments on their pages (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). In
any case, if the company has an abnormal amount of bank bonds, it will
likely appoint a chief bank loan official during the meeting to encourage
access to the bank. At the end of the day, it is a more straightforward method
of obtaining credits (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Pike et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, Kaplan and Minton (1994) recognised that organisations often
desire to assign budget leaders on the board if the costs of the actions or the
performance of an organisation are divided. Furthermore, it is prescribed that 
internal managers be supplanted by experienced external managers when a 
company’s performance worsens (Hermalin and Weishbach, 1988). The
hypothesis of resource dependency uses external links of the council
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Hitt et al. (2000) argued that the development
experiences sector negative effects of low capital availability, mind-boggling
expenses, related to improperly created money markets and the
unpredictability of financial improvement. In this sense, organisations are
forced to discover innovative approaches to obtain benefits from the external 
connections of the board of directors. In the creation of nations,
organisations must have ties with external resources (Tricker, 2019).
The theory of the dependence on activities maintains that the prepared
condition of the company is reflected in the structure of its board of directors
(Hillman et al., 2000; Boyd, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972), which implies that leaders 
are chosen for their aptitude to encourage the right of entry to the necessary 
capital. In this sense, it should be likely to recognise the rigid conditions of 
the board. For example, the closeness of financiers to management 
recommends that organisations seek modest access to capital, from which
they derive that they plan large companies or find themselves in monetary
problems (Hillman et al., 2000). In general, it may be required that a board
with different individuals with connections changed to external resources has
more significant access to these assets, which improves the performance
and the esteem of the company (Pike et al., 2018).
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As discussed in the above section that research questions are generated on
the basis of agency theory. Agency theory is explaining the relationship
between the corporate managers and corporate owners. But there are lot of 
real-world examples in which the companies were bankrupted due to agency
conflict between managers and shareholders (Tricker, 2019). Various
corporate governance rules and practices are adopted by the companies to
eliminate the agency conflict between the managers and shareholders. This
research will use various corporate governance mechanisms that are
adopted by the companies to overcome the agency conflict, such as board
size, CEO duality, non-executive directors and presence of board sub-
committees. 
Board size is an essential corporate governance mechanism because an
effective board is vital to control the operational and governance system of 
the company (Lehn et al., 2009). CEO duality is providing an opportunity to
the Chairman and non-executive directors to generate an effective
monitoring and check and balance system on the CEO and executive
directors in running the operations of the company (Arosa et al., 2012). The
presence of non-executive directors on the board are ensuring that an
effective monitoring is implemented within the company as well as executive
directors can get vital professional advice from the non-executive directors 
because they are expertise in their area (Mallin, 2019). UK corporate
governance code (2003) has recommended that all the public companies
should establish audit, nomination and remuneration committees on the
board so these areas can be executive and non-executive directors. Further,
UK corporate governance code (2008) has stated that all the members of 
these committees should be non-executive directors for limiting the
involvement of executive directors from audit, recruitment of board vacancies
and setting the remuneration of executive directors. The above corporate
governance mechanisms are adopted by the companies to overcome the
agency conflict, which in turn helpful to enhance the firm performance. For
this reason, the impact of the above corporate governance mechanisms will
be studies in this research study.
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The following section will provide the conceptual framework for the study that
is adopted by the researcher. The reason to discuss the conceptual
framework is to provide information that what corporate governance
mechanisms and control variables will be used in the current study. Further,
the section will provide information about various statistical tools that will be
used to analyse the impact of corporate governance and control variables on
the firm performance for the Jordanian listed companies. 
2.5 Conceptual framework
It is the written presentation which provides explanations for the variables of 
the study, either in the shape of graphics or in narrative form. Further, this
conceptual framework provides study factors/variables and hypothesised
relationships among the study constructs (Wooldridge, 2002). Statistical tools 
will be used for the analysis. The correlation will be used to explore the
relationship between the variables. Multiple regression will assist in
examining the impact of different independent variables on the dependent
variable. The following section provides details of the conceptual framework 
that is adopted for the study. 
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Table 2-5 Conceptual model 
Dependent variable
Corporate performance measured by
 “Return on assets (book value measure)
 Return on equity (book value measure)
 Tobin Q (market value measure)”
Independent variables 
Control variables 
 Sales growth
 Capital expenditure 
 Leverage 
 Firm size 
 Research and development expenditures
 Liquidity
Corporate governance variables 
 “Non-executive directors 
 Board size
 Duality
 Audit committee
 Remuneration committee
 Nomination committee
 Corporate governance index”
Source: Self-generated
The framework seeks to investigate the main premises of the study in hand
and has been discussed thoroughly in the current scenario. Further, in-depth
details regarding the variables, their measurement and the study hypotheses
are provided in the last section of this chapter. 
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2.6 Corporate governance issues in developing countries
According to Allen (2005) and Oman et al. (2004), CG in developing markets 
had recently received much attention due to the increasing popularity of this
field of management. The emerging markets will have a broad budget base
for physical creation, including stock exchanges, commercial banks and
central banks. However, they will have fewer procedures and frameworks for
accounting, administration, guidelines, and other monetary bases and
markets, and will be less productive with a smaller amount of liquidity than
the world's most progressive cadres. These distinctions direct to a more
obvious vulnerability and danger and improve the conceivable results of
global improvements for financial specialists from all nations (Kearney, 2012;
Mallin, 2019).
Many problems are affecting developing economies, such as uncertainty and
risk, political insecurity, fragile production, high amount of government
mediation and low-security dimensions for financial specialists (Tsamenyi et 
al., 2007). It is necessary to adopt valid CG structures. Furthermore, the lack
of CG and a welcoming connection between banks, companies and
government is one of a number of serious problems that have caused the
‘associated free society’ (Singh and Zammit, 2006). Nenova (2009) points
out that the significant challenges linked to CG for creative nations are: the
exchange of esteem (of investors or partners that do not control) to govern
large investors; weak legal system; and problems related to audit
(Gutterman, 2019).
It has been observed that different parts of developing markets are of 
fundamental importance in the impact of decisions made regarding the
management of a company, for example, the ownership structure, the
progress of the budget market and the nature of the administration (Fan et
al., 2011; Ararat and Dallas, 2011; Tricker, 2019). Furthermore, the concept
of a follow-up board in the interests of investors and to evaluate directors in a
viable way is of urgent importance for an organisation in developing markets
where CG components, in general, will be weak (Douma et al., 2006). 
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In developing nations, companies are usually established as family
businesses where the family dominates the board of directors and often the
decision to appoint executive and non-executive directors is based on
nepotism and personal interests rather than on the basis of experience
competence (La Porta et al., 1999). The closeness of relatives in an
organisational meeting, in particular the creator, has been correlated to
better levels of performance within specific nations; connections can be of 
great importance with close cooperation between high-level companies
within countries, for example, Thailand. On the other hand, an increasingly 
effective result after the proximity of the marginalised appeared in several 
markets, for instance, in the Republic of Korea (Fan et al., 2011; Mallin,
2019). 
It is believed that there should be an abnormal state of administrative
freedom within a council, with unofficial heads that shape most individuals
and positions such as director and executive director, which is why the
oversight the board may improve, and office problems may decrease
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Ararat and Dallas
(2011) argued that they might end up being inadequate because there is not
enough useful analysis for the investors they control. Investor control can be
inclined to look for plans that have almost no advantage for investors, with
poor critical leadership that has a negative effect on the organisation (Ararat
and Dallas, 2011; Tricker, 2019).
2.7 Corporate governance: international principles and practices
Previous research (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Short et al., 1999; Solomon, 
2014) recognised two main CG models: the sample of the marginalised (or
Anglo-Saxon), which is used in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand; and the internal (or continental) information
screen, which is used in the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, France,
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The highlights of the internal and
external models are shown in Table 2.6.
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The internal GC model is organised by a high dependence on the banking
fund, a fragile legitimate insurance of minority investors, weak exposure,
concentrated ownership, a part of the rule for property and council members 
in organisations, and the limited opportunity to combine or win (Rosser, 
2003). Furthermore, Solomon (2013) argued that these investors could be a
small meeting of investors (for example, loan banks), individuals of 
organisations (for example, establishing families) and the state. Furthermore,
Solomon (2014) drew attention to the fact that insider information alluded to
relationship-based frameworks due to the welcoming connection between
the companies and their predominant investors.
From the first moment, without a doubt, an intimate connection between
managers and investors would limit the problem of the office (agency); there
is little effort to adapt the organisation's rewards, managers and investors to
the possibility that they are mainly similar people. However, other GC
problems seem to arise in such situations, for example, regarding the
reduced size of the possession and manage partition (especially in family 
organisations) (Solomon, 2014). There may be a seizure of the prize by 
alternative investors in light of the issue of data irregularity, as alternative
investors are incapable of increasing data about the organisation's activities 
due to a lack of clarity. In such circumstances, ambiguous exchanges related
to money and abuse of services are regular (Solomon, 2016; Mallin, 2019).
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Table 2.6 Features of insider and outsider CG systems
Source Mallin (2019)
Instead of focusing on employees, the untouchable model is represented by
a strong dependence on the value of money, reliable and legitimate secure 
investors (especially minority shareholders), and dispersed ownership, and is
reduced to working representatives, credit institutions and a different partner,
solid settlement models, and considerable opportunities to combine and
obtain a substantial need for dissemination (Rosser, 2003; Tricker, 2019).
But outside (Anglo organisations) demonstration is owned by outside
investors. The official problems that arise due to this posting have already
been clarified. Various specialists (Fukuyama, 1992; Villalonga, 2006;
Rosser, 2003; Mallin, 2019) argue that globalisation plays a central role in 
the distinctive combination of CG models throughout the world and their
absorption by the Untouchable Anglo model. In this regard, one can count on
all local and final products for exchange with the marginalised Anglo-Saxon
or marginalised authoritarian settings.
Singh (2003) announced that most developing markets are defective. He
noted that these areas of activity are experiencing the negative effects of 
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asymmetric information, simple accounting, administration and degradation
in a much more obvious way than in sectors of the nation’s able created
activity. Bruner et al. (2002) argued that one of the disadvantages among the
most generous purposes behind financial emergencies in developing
markets is the lack of GC evidence. Singh and Zammit (2006) stated in 
previous inquiries that defect-making companies are developing bad rivalry; 
poor CG; and an intimate connection between government, business and
banks. As a result, Singh (2003) was confident that improving his GC models
was crucial for developing markets. Klapper and Love (2004) prescribe that
these corporate sectors urge organisations to accept extensive GC studies.
Jordan has experienced extensive monetary and political changes from the
1990s to the 2000s, showing that Jordanian organisations are administered
everywhere. Furthermore, an effort was ready to relate the GC standards in
Jordanian organisations. This fact prompted the Jordanian Securities
Commission (JSC) to release the JCGC in 2006 (further subtleties in this
regard are discussed in the attached sections). The JCGC has updated
various standards and CG meters that currently exist worldwide in universal 
codes. The proposals of the JCGC were separated from those of the OECD
and the Cadbury Report (1992). The JCGC was prejudiced by the Cadbury
Report (1992) and OECD (2004) standards for consultative groups
composed of senior management, investor rights, transparency and
transparency, obligations, and the intensity of the trustee and partition review 
commissions between the administrator and the managing director (Pike et 
al., 2018).
2.8 Corporate governance and firm performance
The classic principal-agent model proposes that managers being an agent of 
shareholders tend to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders, which tends to increase the agency problems. This agency 
problem can be due to several issues which managers face within
organisational circuits, such as job security and compensation. Managers as 
agents tend to shape their behaviours according to the firm size despite the
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firm’s performance. Principals or shareholders bear agency cost in the shape
of monitoring the activities of agents or managers in order to reduce
information asymmetry as well as assessing the managerial efforts in
enhancing the firm’s performance. Thus, the critical component of such
agency cost pertains to the monitoring cost, which occurs while gathering
information regarding the actions and efforts of managers. On the other 
hand, the manager being an agent of the firm also bears a bonding cost, and
this cost might reduce the agency conflict, although assessment of this
bonding cost is not an easy task for principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Mallin, 2019). 
From the existing body of literature, agency theory provides useful insights to
deal with and mitigate agency problems in corporate governance
mechanisms. As evident from existing literature, agency theory also justifies
performance-based compensation and managerial ownership in shares
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory also provides the necessary 
mechanism to reduce agency problems by increasing the role of externals for
monitoring control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance
mechanisms provide various ways to deal with agency problems through an
agency model with the core purpose being to bring harmony and alignment
among the interests of principals and agents accordingly (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Tricker, 2019). Several studies have documented the internal 
governance mechanisms and their role in enhancing the firm’s performance.
Particularly, board and ownership structures have remained critical areas of
interest in order to decrease misalignment among the principals and agents
so that overall firm performance could be increased. Thus, alignment
between the interests of principal and agent brings common interest which
further ensures enhanced firm performance and greater value maximisation. 
Nevertheless, this chapter elaborates on the mechanisms which can be
fruitful in reducing agency problems. The chapter also seeks to posit insights 
regarding increasing managerial incentives for the common interests of 
principals and agents. More specifically, this chapter deals with board
structure (e.g. the board size, CEO duality and the presence of NEDs)
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control variables which have been used in this study. Additionally, this study
investigates the role of foreign investors in predicting the performance of a
company and hence contributes to the existing body of knowledge in the field
of corporate governance in developing economies such as Jordan.
2.8.1 Board of directors (BODs)
The board of directors plays a crucial role in managing the managerial affairs
of firms as well as in managing the potential conflicts among shareholders
and managers. In the principal-agent relationship, the board of directors play 
its monitoring role in the case when the common interest of both agents and
principals is misaligned. There is always the probability of agency problems 
as managers, being agents, tend to pursue their own interests instead of 
protecting the interests of shareholders. To tackle such situations, principals
usually appoint the board of directors to enhance the firm’s performance and
reduce conflicts. Thus, this divergence of interests needs better monitoring of 
the firm’s affairs, which may result in enhanced agency costs in the shape of 
monitoring cost as well as residual losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Al-
Ahdal et al., 2020). This situation results in such costs, which are borne by
the shareholders. Thus, the reduction of agency costs remains a prime focus
to enhance the shareholders’ wealth. 
On the other hand, the board of directors is the apex body in the hierarchy of 
corporate control systems. Liu and Fong (2010) and Alqatan, Chbib and
Hussainey (2019) stated that more power and control exercised by the board
of directors ensure maximisation of shareholder value as managers as 
agents found themselves in a position to align with the principal's interest.
Thus, it can be argued that the board of directors is an essential instrument
in the mechanism of corporate governance to protect the interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Hence, an independent board of 
directors is considered favourable and seeks to bring an effective and
efficient governance mechanism by independent directors who can oversee
the activities of managers or agents in a more transparent and unbiased
manner (Liu and Fong, 2010; Shu and Chiang, 2020). 
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The power inherited by the board of directors enables significant decisions in
favour of the organisation (Gillan, 2006; Booth et al., 2002; Detthamrong, 
Chancharat and Vithessonthi, 2017). The board of directors also ensures
that managers are protecting the interests of shareholders by pursuing
aligned interests. Fama (1980) stated that the BODs is considered a crucial
instrument which helps to inspect the decisions of managers. According to
the assumption of agency theory, the board of directors is an essential tool
which helps to ensure the implementation of corporate governance in the
true spirit, which further tends to reduce the agency conflict among
shareholders and managers (Fama, 1980). From the viewpoint of resource
dependency theory, BODs act as a co-optative mechanism, and this
phenomenon helps to calibrate the organisation with the requirements of 
external environments (Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009; Razzaque and
Mether, 2020).  
According to the perception of Solomon (2014), there should be some
fundamental observation regarding the selection of the board of directors;
such board members should hold frequent meetings, and there should be
effective communication among the board members and owners/investors. 
Board members should have the ability to develop consensus and harmony 
in accepting the suggestions of other members; and they should have a high
level of integrity and concern regarding taking financial risks. Walker (2005) 
stated that there are two main key points which should be kept under 
consideration in selecting the board’s members, one is to choose appropriate
members, and other is the financial compensation. However, Ingely and Walt
(2002) and Tricker (2019) concluded that there should be diversity in the
board members, such as board members should be from both genders, i.e.
male and female, as well as diversity should also exist in terms of their
experience. The worth and effectiveness of a board member are assessed
based on the value addition in the firm. Such suggestions are also
considered in the UK combined code, which elaborates that: 
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“The board‘s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of
the company within a framework of prudent and effective
controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed. The
board should set the company‘s strategic aims, ensure that
the necessary financial and human resources are in place for
the company to meet its objectives and review management
performance. The board should set the company‘s values and
standards.” (UK Combined Code, 2006, p. 3; Mallin, 2019) 
Responsibilities of the board of directors are classified from three
perspectives: control perspective, services perspective, and resource
dependence perspective. The board of directors is responsible for appointing
or terminating the managers (taking care of the organisation’s day-to-day 
operations) and the CEO if they are not protecting the shareholders’ interests
(Monks and Minow, 1995; Braendle, 2019). The second perspective relates
to the services role, which elaborates that they should provide a counselling
facility to the CEO regarding various administrative and managerial issues. 
Further, the BODs also have the power to impart their advice regarding
policy formulation and its implementation (Johnson and Daily, 1996). The
third perspective concerns the resource dependency theory. According to
this theory, it is the fundamental purpose of the board to assist the firm in the
utilisation of internal and external resources to improve the firm’s
performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Anderson et al., 2020). 
However, such roles performed by the board of directors in a firm result in
conflict between the board and the CEO. To mitigate such conflicts, Fama
and Jensen (1983) recommended that most of the board members should be
non-executive directors so that these members should mediate in case of 
disagreements. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Bhaumik et al. (2019)
also stated that the presence of non-executive directors on the board
improves the check and balance system on the executives and enhances
board independence. They further stated that in the boardroom there always 
exists a significant conflict among board member and CEOs (Mallin, 2019). 
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Regarding board structure and its functioning in day-to-day operations of the
firm and the presence of non-executive directors, it is still the primary
research questions. Keeping in mind this issue in the context of the
Jordanian CG Code (JCGC, 2006), suggestions are available which support
the perception that there should be a reasonable board size ranging from five
to 13 members, each with a background of necessary skills and experience
level. In addition to this, the roles of CEO and chairman should be separate,
i.e. duality must be avoided, and 1/3 of the members should be non-
executive directors. Thus, due to such stipulations present in the JCGC
(2006), this study considered board size, CEO duality and percentage of 
NEDs (JCGC, 2011).
The effectiveness of the board depends upon its function related to its
capability to monitor management so that misaligned activities can be
eradicated. Resultantly, the quality of decisions taken by the board has the
potential to affect the performance of managers and firms. Thus, better
monitoring by board members could force management to act in the interests
of shareholders, ensuring value maximisation and reducing the agency
conflict. From here onwards, the literature review seeks to posit the point of 
view about various board-related CG mechanisms and their role in predicting
the performance of firms (Akbar et al., 2016).
2.8.2 Board of directors’ sub-committees
Board sub-committees play a critical role, and these committees enhance the
efficiency of the corporate board (Jiraporn et al., 2009; Tricker, 2019).
According to Harrison et al. (1994), Cifci et al. (2019) stated that board sub-
committees are classified into two major types as per their functioning: one
example is related to monitoring or oversight functioning, and the other is 
based on providing support to the management. The operating board
committees provide their expertise and support to the firm’s management
regarding strategic decisions. Such committees are intended to protect the
interests of shareholders by keeping an eye on the activities of corporate
executives. Agency theory also proposes monitoring activities to monitor the
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activities of executives through auditing services (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Further, the proper appointment of directors and senior management is also
related to the monitoring function of audit committees (Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2009; Mallin, 2019). 
The Cadbury Report (1992) proposed that, generally, board committees are 
an additional tool to manage the financial affairs of the firm as well as to
ensure accountability to protect the interests of shareholders (Cadbury,
1992). According to Harrison et al. (1994), successful management of board
sub-committees can induce responsible behaviours among the board
members. Thus, board committees ensure legitimacy and enhance the
credibility of corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, if such committees
perform their functioning well, then the conflict among shareholders and
managers can be reduced, which can result in decreased costs and
increased shareholder wealth (Weir et al., 2002; Shahid and Abbas, 2019). 
According to the observation of Harrison et al. (1994), the role of board
committees has been increased since the 1980s, and most of the available
corporate governance codes recommend such committees. These codes
advocate establishing three types of committees, such as nomination,
remuneration and auditing committees. However, in spite of the plentiful
literature available regarding recommendations regarding board committees
and their prevalence in the corporate system, the role of monitoring
committees on firm performance is not clear. However, some studies have
claimed that such committees have the potential to influence the firm’s
performance in a positive manner (e.g. Harrison et al., 1994; Sun and
Cahan, 2009; Qurashi, 2018).  
Operating committees of the board of directors are usually constituted and
dominated by an insider, while non-executive directors often form monitoring
committees, and thus these NEDs become a source to protect the interests
of minority shareholders (Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999). Researchers who
favour the small size of such committees argue that these committees
function very well with a small size because they can arrange meetings
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frequently, which helps to analyse the available information and so is very 
convenient for decision making (Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005; Shehata,
2015). In addition to this, the presence of NEDs on the board helps to
integrate and strengthen the knowledge and expertise of externals in the
firm’s decision-making process, and the board can concentrate on the issues 
of strategic interest (Harrison, 1987). Weir et al. (2002) stated that board
sub-committees thus help to promote the corporate governance mechanism
by increasing its credibility and legitimacy. It is essential to mention that the
importance of these committees in the modern-day organisation is clear 
when we talk about the efficient and effective implementation of the
corporate governance mechanism (Jacoby et al., 2019). 
Out of these committees, the audit committee usually performs its duty by
holding regular meetings with internal and external auditors to make the audit
processes transparent as well as ensuring robust internal accounting
controls. Such a review of accounts and financial information helps to reduce
the information asymmetry through timely and verified disclosure of financial 
information to stakeholders, which further decreases agency costs (Klein,
1998). A timely and robust audit through an audit committee ensures
transparency, and the chance of fraud becomes minute, which boosts
investor confidence as well as increasing the firm’s value. Thus, it is
essential to understand the internal control evaluation process to assess the
negative behaviours and errors which have become dangerous for the firm’s
integrity (Caplan, 1999; DeZoort, 1998; MacAulay et al., 2020). 
Weir and Laing (2000) and Razzaque and Mather (2020) argued that the
remuneration committee helps to reduce the agency conflict between
management and shareholders by selecting the remuneration/compensation
of senior management and this brings alignment among the interests of 
shareholders and agents. Thus, in the case when the compensation is not
fair, the senior management can conspire with the CEO to obtain benefits.
NEDs can bring harmony among the remuneration committees and
management by ensuring that remuneration will increase performance of the
management as well as improving the firm’s value (Gregory, 2002; Monks,
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2001). However, in some cases, external/independent directors tend to
consult with external experts regarding remuneration decisions, which can be
undermined in some instances if not appropriately managed (Monks, 2001; 
Al-Ahdal et al., 2020). 
Similarly, the nomination committee helps to reduce the conflict between
shareholders and agents through the appointment of qualified non-executive/ 
independent directors (Vefeas, 1999). The Cadbury Report (1992) stated
that nomination committees play a crucial role in strengthening the board of 
directors by selecting a suitable composition of board members. Thus, the
ability of NEDs to perform their monitoring role well depends upon the
recruitment process (Vafeas, 1999) as well as their independence on the 
board. In the absence of nomination committees, outside directors can
misjudge the performance of CEOs, which can result in higher compensation
to the CEO and increasing costs for the firm (Westphal and Zajac, 1995).
Hence, such agency conflicts can be either removed or reduced through
improving the functioning of a firm’s nominating committee (Jensen, 1993;
Anderson et al., 2020).
On the other hand, despite such positive comments from previous 
researchers, some have criticised the functioning of board committees and
have postulated that board committees can hamper the financial 
performance of firms. Some proponents of such arguments state that board
committees are a financial burden on companies (Vefeas, 1999). Other
authors state that such committees require a lot of managerial supervision, 
thus reducing the time for other day-to-day activities (Conger et al., 1998).
Such committees can replicate the overall functioning of board members and
lead to an overlap in the duties and responsibilities of board members.
Lastly, such committees increase the heterogeneity among the board
members, which can result in a lack of consensus and cohesiveness among
board members regarding essential issues. The literature is still debating the
pros and cons of all these committees (Detthamrong, Chancharat and
Vithessonthi, 2017). 
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Some empirical studies have documented the impact of audit committees.
For instance, a study by Wild (1994) investigated the market reactions in 260
listed USA firms for a period of 15 years from 1966 to 1980. He investigated
the influence of audit committees before and after their constitution. 
Statistically, a significant improvement was observed in share returns after
the establishment of an audit committee, strengthening the argument that
audit committees tend to enhance the managerial accountability, which 
ensures higher performance (Shehata, 2015). 
A similar study was conducted by Vefeas (1999) in 606 USA listed firms and
concluded that nomination committees increase the quality of the board as
well as enhancing its effectiveness. A similar study was conducted by Main
and Johnston (1993) on a sample of 220 UK listed companies to assess the
effectiveness of remuneration committees. The outcomes of the study
revealed the contradictory situation that these committees reduce
shareholders’ value while increasing executives’ pay. Klein (1998) conducted
a study on 486 US listed firms covering two years for the span 1992-1993 to
ascertain the link among the establishment of audit, compensation and
nomination committees and firm performance. The empirical results of this
study could not show a statistically significant association among these
variables (Mallan, 2019). 
Thus, every board committee performs some specific functions, and if all a 
firm’s committees perform their duties very well regarding monitoring and
operating functions then the firm’s performance may be increased. The 
present study investigates the impact of board committees of non-financial
listed companies in the context of Jordan. For this purpose, data has been
collected from various electronic databases and annual financial reports of 
the firms, keeping in mind the guidelines laid out by the Jordanian Corporate
governance code of 2006 regarding the selection of members of the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees from the board of directors. This
code was implemented from the start of 2007 (Gutterman, 2019).
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2.8.3 Board size
Generally, it is assumed that a larger board size will bring diverse knowledge
and expertise that will help to increase the firm’s performance. However,
empirically it has been found that larger board size can carry serious 
consequences such as lack of coordination and commination, which can
hamper the effectiveness of the board (Eisenberg, 1989). In addition to this, 
it has been observed that, in larger boards, directors do not criticise the top
management regarding improvement in performance, and they do not take
performance-related issues seriously (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Tricker,
2019). 
According to the perception of Jensen (1993), large-size boards (increasing
from seven to eight members) result in heavy monitoring and operating costs
due to less effective functioning. The agency model supports this argument.
In large-size boards, the CEO becomes the sole party who has control,
instead of the board having control and monitoring the firm’s management.
Such a situation provides space for the managers, and they tend to pursue
their interests at the cost of shareholder value by increasing the agency cost 
and reducing the firm’s performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998;
Solomon, 2014). Similar findings have been reported by Kholief (2008): that
a large board size does not induce cohesiveness among the board
members, and it becomes challenging for the board members to develop a
consensus over important issues. Hence, large boards become slow in their
monitoring and operating functioning and efficient decision making is 
hampered, increasing the agency cost for the firm through increased agency
conflicts, resulting in worse firm performance (Gutterman, 2019). 
Ahmed et al. (2006) posit the view that it becomes difficult in the presence of 
a large number of members to formulate and adopt new ideas because a 
large board lacks cohesiveness and consensus, which results in hampered
board functioning where novel ideas are not encouraged. Thus, such
situations indicate that conflicts among the board members themselves do
not bring them to the same page, i.e. the interests of shareholders. Instead,
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they pursue their interests, which increases the agency problem. In the
opinion of Cascio (2004), there is still a need to find out a sufficient and
suitable board size in firms so that firm’s affairs can be managed through its
board. 
Simply, it can be stated that there is no specific tool to measure a reasonable
and suitable board size in the firm. Similarly, there is no formula which can
suggest the number of directors from inside or outside the firm. However, 
some studies support the argument that a smaller board size is good, while
others have argued in favour of a large board size. For instance, in the
opinion of Yermack (1996), large boards have less cohesiveness and lack
proper communication. Such a situation brings agency issues and results in
decreased firm performance. Thus, a large board size can induce agency
problems and director free-riding problems, which can cause conflicts among
the board members resulting in poor performance of the firm (Jacoby et al., 
2019).
However, in a situation where the board is large in size, the CEO dominates
the decision-making process because s/he enjoys a powerful position in the
firm, which increases agency problems and resultantly lowers firm
performance (Miller, 2003). It is important to mention that a relatively large
board tends to be more effective in modern-day organisations in terms of 
decision making and improving a firm’s overall efficiency (Pfeffer, 1972,
Goodsten et al., 1994; Tricker, 2019).
This phenomenon tends to support the large board size because large
boards have more diversity and effective cohesion, which can help board
members to transcend challenging situations more efficiently (Goodstein et
al., 1994). Large boards can function smoothly in drastic economic
conditions or during financial turbulence and can mitigate the agency
conflicts in such circumstances (Mintzberg, 1983). However, in smaller
boards, lack of diversity can result in poor strategic development by reducing
the firm’s ability to cope with such situations (Goodsteing et al., 1994; Shu
and Chiang, 2020).
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Literature provides limited support regarding the argument that larger boards
provide diversity and expertise to the firm through their broad background
(Arosa et al., 2010; Dalton et al., 1999) and outside linkage (Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006; Yawson, 2006). In the perception of Dalton et al. (1999),
larger boards help the members to attract more highly qualified opinions.
Large boards also have the potential to improve the decisions and their
related outcomes, sharing ideas and contributions, which strengthens new 
knowledge and expertise for the management, thus reducing the agency
conflict and increasing the firm’s performance (Lehn et al., 2009; Mallin,
2019). 
Previous studies have not reported a clear picture regarding the relationship
of board size and firm performance, and in an attempt to find such relation
Anderson et al. (2004) conducted a study to assess the association among
board size and firm performance, which was found to be negative. They
reported that financial markets react in positive ways to the announcement of 
board downsizing in a firm. Similarly, a firm’s announcement regarding an 
increase in the number of board directors’ results in decreased equity value.
They further stated that this pattern is not observed in all types of companies
because it is not a linear function in many cases. They postulated that small
and medium-size firms are affected negatively with the announcement
regarding increasing the board size while large firms do not suffer from such
announcements (Shahid and Abbas, 2019).  
Yermack (1996) reported a negative association among the board size and
firm performance where firm performance was measured based on Tobin‘s Q
in a sample of 452 large US firms for a period of nine years covering the
span 1984 to 1991. In his study, he did not consider the utility and financial
companies because such firms follow government regulations and their
board of directors is bound to adopt these regulations in making decisions.
His study reported that firms with small boards show improved financial
performance in comparison to firms with large boards. He further stated that
incremental cost would observe an increasing trend with the increase in 
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board size and firms would obtain higher market value with smaller board
size. Findings of his study supported through empirical results proved that
firms had obtained more value in capital markets through diversification
(Detthamrong, Chancharat and Vithessonthi, 2017).
Previous studies have shown that small boards produce more favourable
results in regard to firm performance in comparison to large boards, as the
efficiency of the board decreases with the increase in board size because
large-size boards have barriers in coordination and processes (Al-Khouri, 
2006; Guest, 2008; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, Eisenberg et al.
(1998) stated that Yermack‘s (1996) study, which was conducted on large
firms, could not be generalised on small-size firms because the cultures of 
large and small firms differ. A study conducted by Eisenberg et al. (1998) on
a sample of 879 small and medium-sized firms over a period of three years
covering the span of 1992 to 1994, showed a negative association among
board size and firm financial performance where financial performance was 
measured based on return on assets (Solomon, 2014; Braendle, 2019). 
Various studies have documented the impact of board size on firm
performance (Bozec, 2005; Cheng et al., 2008; Guest, 2008) and proved that
small board size is linked with reduced agency cost, which leads to improved
financial performance. However, other researchers have also documented
the impact of large board size and firm performance and reported a positive
relationship between firm performance and large board size. Al-Muhtaseb
(2010) stated that the market responds positively to an increase in board
size. They argued that large board sizes show better monitoring of firms.
However, a large board size shows poor operating performance, and the
main reason behind this poor performance is the diversity of board size and
communication skills inherited by diverse board members. 
A study conducted by Sanda et al. (2005) on a sample of 93 Nigerian
companies for a period of four years covering the span of 1996 to 1999,
reported a positive association among board size and firm financial 
performance measured through return on equity. Their results supported the
argument that large board size provides improved access to the external 
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environment, which enables them to attract financing and raw materials
conveniently, as compared to firms with small boards. This argument is 
aligned with the resource dependency theory, which postulates that a large
board offers greater access to critical resources such as raw materials and
finance. These findings are in alignment with the studies of Kiel and
Nicholson (2003), Beiner et al. (2006) and Coles et al. (2008). Thus, it can be
assumed that this divergence might be due to the perception of shareholders 
and management regarding large board size and its relationship with the
knowledge-enhancing capability (Mallan, 2019). 
According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), large board size has the potential to
improve business decisions by reducing the agency conflict among
shareholders and agents, which reduces agency problems. Similar results 
were also reported by Mangena and Tauringana (2007). In their study, they
investigated the relationship of board size and firm performance of 72 firms
which were listed on the Zimbabwean stock exchange for a period of three
years, covering a span of 2002 to 2004. More sophisticatedly, their results 
remained unchanged despite adjusting the inflation factor. This situation
shows that large boards facilitate effective monitoring even in an uncertain
situation, either economic or political; this reduces the agency conflicts and
increases the firm’s performance. Ho (2003), Topak (2011) and Cifci et al. 
(2019) reported that financial performance and board size had no
relationship.
The above mixed results show that there is a lack of consensus among the
researchers regarding board size, either large or small, and firm
performance. Thus, the issue of large or small board size is related to
controlling and management activities of managers. Therefore, it can be
assumed that, if monitoring is carried out properly, it can amend the
behaviours of managers in alignment with the reduced agency conflicts and
increased firm performance. Under strict monitoring and control, it becomes
complicated for the managers to forego the interests of shareholders, and
they conduct improved decision making to maximise the shareholders’
wealth.
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The Jordanian corporate governance code was introduced in 2006 to
develop the capital market; it states that:
“The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board of
directors whose members shall be not less than five and not
more than thirteen, as determined by the Company‘s
memorandum of association.” (JCGC, 2006; JCGC, 2011) 
The legislator in Jordan has proposed that a board should consist of five to
13 members. However, some firms do not follow the instructions of the
JCGC, which might be due to variation in firm size and nature.
2.8.4 CEO duality
The duality of the CEO has the potential to influence the firm’s agency 
problems. Agency theory provides the necessary support behind the idea
that enhances the board’s independence from the activities of management.
This separation ensures improved performance as a result of proper
monitoring and overseeing (Jensen, 1993). Similarly, stewardship theory
postulates that there should be no separation in the control and monitoring
activities of the CEO, and there should be duality. In a case when a single 
person is obliged to make decisions and responsibilities, this might have the
potential to facilitate the integration of knowledge regarding firm operation
(Adams and Mehran, 2005; Adams et al., 2007; Arosa et al., 2012; Peng et
al., 2010; Jacoby et al., 2019). The CEO also lists all the relevant issues on
the meeting agenda which might be discussed at a board meeting. The CEO
generally provides an administrative facility to the firm and is accountable for
the necessary implementation of organisation-wise decisions and policies
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Akbar et al., 2016).
According to Mallette and Fowler (1992), if the roles of CEO and chairman
are combined into a single person, then it can result in increased overall
control and, on the other hand, it can minimise the power of the board.
Alternatively, duality in a single person can control the ability of independent
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directors regarding their ability to monitor and control the governance role. 
Under such a circumstance, the conflict between shareholders and agents 
will further hamper the firm’s performance negatively. Thus, to ensure the
independence of the board, the roles of chairman and CEO must be
separated so that there should be a proper balance of managerial behaviour 
(Ehikioya, 2009; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). This situation can also
be helpful to prevent managers from acting in their own benefit and interests.
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that separation of the roles of CEO and
chairman establishes a clear boundary among the control and monitoring
functions of non-executive directors. The UK Combined Code hence also
recommends separation of roles, stating that:
“There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the
head of the company between the running of the board and
the executive responsibility for the running of the company‘s
business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of
decision.” (UK Combined Code, 2006, p. 4)
Conversely, stewardship theory postulates in favour of duality. It states that 
duality has the potential to influence the performance of the company in 
positive ways due to various factors such as knowledge regarding the firm
and investment opportunities, which can ensure improved decision making
(Weir et al., 2002). As per the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2007), duality
can bring a positive performance in a firm because the chairman, being the
CEO, can provide their expertise and knowledge to the board directors. This
facilitation can also help the board members more effectively, and thus
duality can influence the firm’s performance in a positive manner. More 
specifically, the potential conflict between CEO and chairman can be
eradicated by fixing the responsibilities of CEO and chairman in a single 
person (Baliga et al., 1996; Harris and Helfat, 1988; Bhaumik et al., 2019). 
If the argument developed based on stewardship theory is accepted, then it
can be assumed that the CEO is actively engaged and driven to lead the
company (Boyd, 1995). Thus, it can be argued that CEO duality will benefit
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the firm even in challenging circumstances (Chahine and Tohme, 2009).
According to Tsamenyi et al. (2007), the phenomenon of duality is generally
observed in small-size companies because such firms have concentrated
ownership structures which indicate the integration of various roles into a
single person. According to Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), CEO duality 
might have the potential to help in removing agency conflict and reducing
agency costs if further supervision is offered. Further, duality can increase
the accountability of a company because, in the case of duality, the poor 
performance of the firm can be linked with the CEO easily (Bozec, 2005; 
Abor, 2007; Sheikh and Wang, 2012; Bhaumik et al., 2019). 
An investigation carried out by Rechner and Dalton (1991) on a sample size
of 141 firms from the Fortune 500 list for a period of six years covering the
span of 1978 to 1983 reported that firms with separate control of CEO and
chairman perform better than those firms who have duality. According to a 
study by Dahya et al. (1996) which was carried out on a sample of UK listed
firms, it was observed that the stock market responds in a positive way to
those firms where the roles of chairman and CEO are split from each other.
Similar findings were reported by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in their study of 
347 Malaysian listed firms, and they postulated that separation of chairman
and CEO role ensures improved firm performance.
Boyd (1995), Elsayed (2007) and Shahid and Abbas (2019) reported a
positive association between the duality and financial performance of firms.
According to the perception of Boyd (1995), if the two roles are combined
into a single person it can result in improved decision making. Similarly,
Davis (2001) and Donaldson and Davis (1991) reported that CEO duality
ensures a unified leadership which can facilitate the integration of knowledge
into the firm. These results are in alignment with the argument that CEO
duality increases the chances of improved decision making, which results in 
improved financial performance. Bozec (2005) surveyed a sample of 25
companies for a period of 25 years covering the span of 1976 to 2000 and
did not find any significant impact of CEO duality on the indicators of 
performance. 
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The above discussion indicates that scant literature shows mixed and
contradictory findings regarding the dual role of CEO and chairman. Both
perspectives (agency and stewardship theory) provide different insights 
regarding the role of CEO as chairman. In some instances, duality can
increase firm performance while, in other cases, it can hamper the decision-
making process, resulting in agency conflict and reduced firm performance.
According to the recommendations of the JCGC of 2006, the roles of CEO 
and chairman should be separated from each other.   
2.8.5 Non-executive directors
Some corporate governance codes recommend a combination of both of 
executive and non-executive directors in the board. According to agency 
theory, there is a need to ensure sufficient monitoring mechanisms to protect 
the interests of shareholders, and for this purpose the presence of non-
executive directors on the board is necessary. Thus, it can be assumed that
the presence of a higher number of NEDs will ensure reduced agency cost 
through proper monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Mallin, 2019). 
Raheja (2005) reported that the presence of executive directors could ensure
better performance due to their specific knowledge and intrinsic motivation.
Also, NEDs provide separate and independent monitoring which results in
improved performance, despite their potential to increase the firm’s
performance. They also have less knowledge relevant to the firm. The
emergent consensus is that a board must be diverse, which should have a
positive impact on the overall value of the firm so that accurate strategic 
decision making can take place (Gabrielsson, 2007). The presence of a large
number of NEDs on a board decreases the CEO’s power over the board,
which is also supported by agency theory. Thus, the presence of NEDs on
the board can safeguard the interests of shareholders (Gabrielsson and
Winlund, 2000; Tricker, 2019). 
68
  
 
 
         
       
         
    
        
    
        
       
 
 
    
       
        
    
       
         
            
    
            
       
  
 
       
         
         
  
        
    
            
      
      
 
 
The presence of NEDs increases the reputation and legitimacy of the
company (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It can also help to
overcome the issue of shortfall related to human resources (Daily and
Dalton, 1993). Despite this, the presence of non-executive directors also has 
the potential to mitigate the conflict among board members and can put them
on the track of improved financial performance. However, the critical nature 
of non-executive directors remains at its place in explaining the overall
corporate governance mechanism in contemporary firms around the globe
(Mallin, 2019).
However, stewardship theory postulates in favour of executive directors 
because NEDs have limited access to the specific or firm-related knowledge
and information of the firm’s internal process. In the perception of Bozec 
(2005) and Jiraporn et al. (2009), NEDs work as part-time workers for the
firm, and they cannot monitor managers because they do not have enough
information. Hence, in the presence of a large number of NEDs, decision
making will be very weak, and decision quality will not be up to the mark,
which will result in reduced performance for firms. Similar findings have been
reported by Weir and Laing (2000), and they argued that, due to NEDs only
having part-time contracts, they are not familiar with the day-to-day 
operations of the firms (Higgs and Britain, 2003; Solomon, 2014). 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) stated that it is not easy for NEDs to
enhance firm performance because of several issues; first a link might exist
between the CEO and the NEDs apart from their genuine relations in the
context of that firm. On the other hand, the resource dependence perspective
argues that the internal strength of the firm enables it to gain a competitive
advantage which cannot be achieved through NEDs (Shehata, 2015). 
Despite agency theory arguing that the presence of NEDs can improve the
financial performance of a firm, previous studies based on empirical findings
in the existing literature show mixed findings (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009;
Gordini, 2012). 
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Gordini (2012) stated that there is a positive association among NEDs and
the financial performance of a firm, and NEDs have the potential to increase
the firm’s performance through their skills and experiences. Khan and Awan
(2012) found a positive and significant association between the NEDs and
the financial performance of a company in which financial performance was 
measured based on ROA and ROE and market performance was measured
based on Tobin‘s Q. It might be due to the close monitoring mechanism and
contribution to the firm.
These results/findings it concluded that NEDs ensure an effective monitoring
function to develop the managed and disciplined behaviour of the managers. 
Contradictory to these findings, some researchers have reported a negative
relationship for the relationship of NEDs and firm performance (Agrawal and
Knoeber, 1996; Bozec, 2005; Shu et al., 2020). 
Besides these results, some researchers have reported no relationship 
among these factors (Arosa et al., 2012; Kumar and Singh, 2012). Hence, 
keeping in mind the perspective of agency theory presence of NEDs on 
boards is mandatory, which can ensure proper control and monitoring
activities resulting in reduced agency conflict and enhanced firm
performance. This argument is also supported through resource dependency
theory, which states that the presence of NEDs on a board incorporates their
skills and expertise for improved networking and relationship. If NEDs play 
their role effectively, and they carry out the activities of monitoring and 
control efficiently, this can discourage the agents/managers from pursuing
their own interests. Thus, the presence of NEDs can be regarded as a
reliable regulatory mechanism (Mallin, 2019).
Stewardship theory supports the argument that the presence of NEDs will
increase the agency problems due to information asymmetry because NEDs 
work part-time for the firm and they do not have accurate information and
knowledge about the firm’s day-to-day activities. Thus, the overall
performance of the firm will be hampered. Jordanian firms have a one-tier 
board structure: NEDs and executive directors both sit on the same board.
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As per the recommendations of the JCGC (2006), board size should range
from five to 13 members. Additionally, the JCGC (2006) recommends that at
least 1/3 of the board members must be non-executives.
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2.9 Summary
Keeping in view all above mentioned facts, there is a visible evidence of 
presence of unique corporate governance mechanism in Jordan in order to
provide deeper understandings of economic environment and corporate
governance framework operating particularly in Jordan. This chapter firstly 
has reviewed Jordanian economic environment and seeks to provide general
background of various economic sectors which are working in Jordan and
contributing the economic development of Jordan. Major industries/sectors 
are also discussed specifically in this context. Like other nations, Jordan is 
also interested in attracting foreign investment; hence series of economic 
and financial reforms being planned are thoroughly discussed. A holistic
picture of overall investment culture which is prevailing in the country has
also been discussed
Corporate governance is a mechanism which provides a code of conduct to
manage the affairs of firms so that investors could get best output of their
savings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cadbury Committee, 1992). Although
various definitions have been given by scholars into the previous literature, 
this chapter of thesis elaborates the phenomena of corporate governance
from two perspectives one is shareholder’s perspective while other is
stakeholder’s perspective. In alignment to the study objectives regarding
relationship of corporate governance and organization performance a slight 
definition was more pertinent because this narrow definition provides more
realistic and in-depth explanations. Although different theoretical frameworks 
have been discussed in this study, but agency theory is more relevant and
explains proposed relationships. Aim of discussing relevant theories is
explain the mechanism from the aspect of each theory. Also, this chapter 
presented a picture of issues pertaining to the mechanism of corporate
governance from the perspective of developing nations.
This chapter also seeks to elaborate the various general themes regarding
CG and its practices in the contemporary organizations in developing
economics. “Internal mechanisms include the board of directors (e.g. board
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size, board sub-committees, CEO duality and non-executive directors) and
ownership structure (e.g. large shareholders or concentrated ownership, the
identity of shareholders and managerial ownership)”. Other board sub-
committees have not been discussed here due to their scope beyond this
study which is under discussion. More specifically this chapter has reviewed
literature pertaining to the impact of foreign investors on firm performance by
digging deep the relevant field of available knowledge in an emphatic
fashion. On the basis of these mechanisms, existing study tends to propose
a research framework and specific variables which need to be further tested
relevant to the CG mechanisms. The onward section of this study highlights 
the environmental concerns explicitly particularly in local context.
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Chapter 3 Research methodology
This study attempts to find out the impact of CG practices on the financial
performance of Jordanian firms in the industrial and services sector (non-
financial sector). More specifically, this study deals with issues of 
governance. The first section of this chapter elaborates on research 
philosophy and methods applied. This chapter also deals with the data
analysis techniques and various regression assumptions, such as
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. It also provides 
guidelines regarding detection of regression-related issues/problems and
their rectification. 
On the other hand, another section of this chapter deals with the CG
mechanism and its effect on the financial performance of firms listed on the
ASE for a period of seven years ranging from 2012 to 2018. Hence, this
section provides a detailed illustration of data used in this study to investigate
various CG-related mechanisms and financial performance. Initially, sources
are illustrated which have been consulted for data collection. Next to this, the
sample and its selection procedure are elaborated on. Study variables about
corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership
structure) along with measures of financial performance (ROA/ROE) are 
explained, and, at the end, control variables are discussed. The data sources
for various variables and their measurement are also considered.
3.1 Research philosophy
According to Burrell and Morgan (2005), with respect to the selection of 
suitable research, the paradigm is crucial in every research study.
Philosophical orientation in every study pertaining to social science holds a
pivotal role. As this study investigates the impact of the CG mechanism on
firm performance through hypotheses, the positivism paradigm has been
chosen as the most suitable research paradigm as it allows the researcher to
investigate and test the hypotheses empirically (Saunders et al., 2019).
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Burrell and Morgan (2005) stated that positivism helps to draw causal 
inferences among the variables and their relationship. The deductive
approach is linked to positivism, which helps to illustrate the causal 
relationship among variables and, more specifically, it helps to generalise the
results based on the sample (Saunders et al., 2016). Keeping in mind the
assumed relationships/hypotheses developed earlier, this study utilises the
deductive approach due to the reasons mentioned below:
 The deductive approach follows scientific principles in ascertaining the
nature and outcome of the event.
 It helps to conclude based on hypotheses testing based on existing
theories.
 This approach avoids developing or building a new theory.
 The deductive approach helps to infer causal relationships among
constructs.
 Quantitative data is used in a deductive approach.
 It is a structured approach and devises clear parameters. 
 This approach ensures the independence of the researcher. It makes 
the study free from researcher bias because analytical procedures are
followed, and the personal opinion or observation of the researcher is 
not incorporated.
 Under this approach, it becomes easy to generalise the results due to
the adequate sample size (Saunders et al., 2019). 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) stated that, due to the scientific nature of the
deductive approach, it follows a series of steps, which are as follows:
 Based on existing theories, the first testable hypothesis/hypotheses
are developed.
 Clarification regarding the testing of hypothesis/hypotheses is made.
 The next stage requires operationalising of study variables, and their
measurement is in quantitative terms. 
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 The next step requires testing the operationalised
hypothesis/hypotheses and inferring causal relationship among
variables;
 The final step requires testing the study results and based on these
results and later providing confirmation/endorsement or even some
modification in the theory based on results (Bell, Bryman and Harley, 
2018).   
According to Burrell and Morgan (1994), the deductive approach uses a 
functionalist paradigm and study objectives are set following the deductive
approach keeping in mind the population of the study. Hence, in this study 
objectives have been developed, keeping in mind the notion that the impact
of the corporate governance mechanism on the financial performance of the
firm can be measured empirically through applying research analysis tools. 
Accordingly, positivism helps to explain change or occurrence, and the
deductive approach describes the causal relationship among study
constructs. Positivism also helps to identify and predict relationships in
replicated scenarios. Thus, positivism can contribute better to designing a 
research strategy in testing hypotheses (Hussey and Hussey, 2009;
Saunders et al., 2019).
In summary, this study has followed a deductive approach, which is more
appropriate. It is essential to mention that most of the gurus of quantitative
research are of the same point of view regarding testing the theoretical
framework utilising quantitative tools. Moreover, a deductive approach is also
suitable in cases where the researcher is not interested in introducing a new
theory; instead, the researcher is quite keen to test the existing field of 
knowledge in that specific field of theoretical understanding. 
3.2 Research methods 
According to Punch (1998) on selection of appropriate research, the
approach is crucial, keeping in mind the research issues. Widely, around the
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globe, two research methods are used, one is quantitative and the other is
qualitative. A qualitative research method usually presents a descriptive
approach. It uses non-numerical data to represent a given phenomenon
(Berg, 2004) while, according to the perception of Babbie (2012), the
qualitative method is used to assess the variations in attitudes and
behaviours occurring in social processes over a given period. Conversely, 
Hussey and Hussey (2009) and Bryman (2016) postulated that a quantitative
approach uses statistical analysis based on numeric facts and figures and
provides a stronger argument based on reliability and validity to generalise 
the results. 
Additionally, a quantitative approach can use a large amount of quantitative
data for a longer period, which can increase the credibility and
generalisability of results (Berg, 2004). Alternatively, some researchers
recommend using both methods for better results. However, some
fundamental issues are attached to the qualitative research approach, which
suffers from a number of problems, such as the issue related to small sample
size, due to which it is quite inconvenient to draw results considering the
whole population (Hakim, 1987). Also, there are problems related to
measures of reliability in qualitative research methods as well as
transparency (Berg, 2004). In addition, qualitative methods consume a
massive amount of time, but might produce less suitable explanations of 
research phenomena (Berg, 2004; Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2017). 
Hence, due to the difficulties and weaknesses attached to qualitative data, 
the present study used a deductive positivism approach and hypotheses
have been developed based on available and pre-tested theories. Empirical
findings based on quantitative data demonstrate the acceptance or rejection
of hypotheses. For testing the hypotheses, the present study employed
regression as a major tool for data analysis (Ardalan, 2012). Hair et al. 
(2009) stated that regression is a suitable tool for data analysis in cases
where a single outcome variable is linked with one or two predictors. This
study selected multiple regression analysis as the primary instrument for
hypotheses testing because it is amongst the most common methods and
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previous researchers have endorsed it in testing the relationship of various
CG mechanisms and their relationship with the financial performance of the
firms (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Peoples, 2020).
3.2.1 Panel data 
Cross-sectional, time series and panel data are various types of quantitative
data used for empirical investigations. In cross-sectional data, different 
values of one or more variables are collected at the same point in time while,
in time series data, observations or values for one or more variables are
collected for more than one time period. On the other hand, panel data uses
the same cross-sectional units, which are collected over a time period.
Simply put, panel data uses time dimensions and spaces at the same time
(Gujarati, 2003). Previous literature provides support regarding usage of 
panel data regression approaches (Gujarati, 2003; Greene, 2012; Hall and
Wall, 2019). Using panel data provides various advantages which are
outlined here: 
 It uses prior data.
 It combines both time series and cross-sectional data.
 Variables showing high linearity can be identified easily and their
removal from the data becomes easy. 
In order to deal with the error term in panel data, two models are usually 
used, such as the fixed effects model and the random effects model. These
two models follow different assumptions to deal with error terms. The fixed
effect model assumes that the individual effect term is constant while the
random effect model follows a different approach, and it assumes that an
individual’s effect is random. According to the perception of Greene (2008, p.
285), a simple panel data regression model can be given as:
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Where: 
Yit is the dependent variable.
Xit are predictors.
Β and α are coefficients.
Z’iα is an unobserved individual-specific effect.
i and t are the indices for individuals and time.
Ԑit is the error term. 
Z’iα denotes heterogeneity pertaining to individual effect in the above model
while Z’i denotes a set of individual or group-specific predictors. These can
be either observed variable or unobserved variable, which are considered
constant over a specific time, t (Greene, 2008; Townsend and Saunders,
2018).  
3.2.2 Pooled regression
If Zi contains only a constant term, then OLS provides more consistent and
efficient estimates regarding constant (α)/intercept coefficient/slope vector 
usually denoted by β. Hence, the original model reduces to:
3.2.3 Fixed effect 
The fixed effect model provides a consistent estimate in a situation when Zi
is unobserved but correlated with Xit because this situation leads to biased
estimation through β, hence, the model reduces to:
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Where:
Yit = Outcome variable (here i = entity and t= time). 
β = Coefficient of the predictor. 
Xit= Predictor. 
αi (i=1…. n) = Unknown intercept for each entity in the model.
Where αi = Z’iα embodies all observable and specified means. According to
Greene (2012) and Pallant (2020), the fixed effect does not change. Each
entity possesses its features which might influence independent
variable/variables. It is the rationale behind the assumption of correlation
among the error term and independent variable/variables. Hence, in this 
situation, the fixed effect helps to remove time-invariant characteristics from
independent variables in panel data regression from the predictor variables.
3.2.4 Random effect 
A random effect model is used in cases where unobserved individual 
heterogeneity can be uncorrelated with variables in the model, and this
scenario model reduces to:
Fixed effect and random effect models can be distinguished based on
unobserved individual effects, simply by checking whether these effects are
stochastic or not (Greene, 2012). Further, Bell, Bryman and Harley (2018)
recommended that fixed and random effect models can be distinguished
based on unobserved individual effect.
It is believed that in the fixed effect model the random effect reduces to zero 
and based on this argument the fixed effect model is considered to be a 
restricted version of the random effect model and using random effect is
preferable due to its general nature. However, the larger number of 
parameters inherited in the random effect specification can result in loss of 
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efficiency in some cases when data does not support random effect. Hence,
it is suggested that the random effect should be tested against a fixed effect.
The advanced treatment of both models can help to distinguish their
usability, and a tool called the Hausman test can be used in this scenario. In
this case, assumptions can be followed to use/choose random effect
estimation, i.e. unobserved heterogeneity in the model should not be
correlated with predictors. Fixed effects models have been used in this study 
based on statistical results given in Chapter four.  
According to Greene (2012), specifications of the Hausman test are followed
by most researchers using random and fixed effect models. This test is
usually used to detect violation of random effects modelling assumptions. “If 
there is no correlation between the independent variable(s) and the unit
effects, then estimates of β in the fixed effects model (βFE) should be similar
to estimates of β in the random effects model (βRE).” Thus, the Hausman test
statistic (denoted by H) is used to measure the difference between two
estimates; an econometric model can be given as:
Here
βFE = Coefficient of estimates and time-varying covariates.
βRE = Estimated coefficients of the random effects model.
Var(βFE) = Asymptotic variances of large sample size. 
While testing the null hypotheses, chi-square with degrees of freedom is
equal to the number of repressors present in the model. At p < 0.05 (denotes
conventional levels of significance), two models show the difference, which is
large enough to reject the null hypothesis. Here, the random effect model is
rejected in favour of the fixed effects model. 
Contrary to this, if the Hausman test shows a p-value >.05, then the situation
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference and using random
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effect will provide an unbiased estimation and using random effect over fixed
effect is preferred under such circumstances. Simply, in most applications,
the value of correlation among covariates and unit effects is not equal to
zero. Hence, in the case when the null hypothesis is not rejected due to the
Hausman test, there might be an exact correlation which is higher than zero
and, and in this case, random effect estimation becomes biased. However, it 
can also be assumed that the Hausman test does not have necessary and
sufficient statistical power. While, in the case of using the model of random
effects, biasness will be still there in the estimation of coefficient (β), even if 
the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis. Admittedly, in many
instances it will be better to use random effect (even biased estimator)
against fixed effect (also unbiased estimator) if the random effect model
provides a necessary and sufficient variance reduction against the fixed
effect model (Bell, Bryman and Harley, 2018).
While using the random effect model, time-invariant variables can also be
added into the model. Contrary to this, when using the fixed effect model,
time-invariant variables are absorbed through the intercept. Using random
effects assumes that error terms of models are not correlated with the
independent variables, and this situation helps to imagine time-invariant 
variables as predictor variables. Hence, removing such variables from the
model can lead to biasness in the estimation model and, based on random
effects, it becomes very convenient to generalise the results beyond the
sample size used (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005; Cohen, Manion and Morrison,
2017). 
3.2.5 GLS estimator 
In the regression model, when unknown parameters are estimated, the
generalised least squares (GLS) technique is employed. This technique is
used in the case when heteroscedasticity exists or there is directly present
unequal variance in observations. GLS is also used in situations where a
certain degree of correlation exists among observations. This fact corrects
omitted variable biases even if there is autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
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in the pooled time-series data. This study used GLS to test random effects
models because this technique provides the freedom to the researcher to
investigate variation in pooled time-series data (cross-sectional observations
over time) (Gaur and Delios, 2006; Peoples, 2020). For a given correlation
matrix, Ω, GLS is given as:
While Ω can be expressed as:
Where Σ is n x matrix [σij], then:
Where σij denotes the ij element of Σ-1:
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3.2.6 Sample
The present study used a sample of non-financial firms listed on the ASE,
covering a period of seven years ranging from 2012 to 2018. This list was
obtained from the website of the official page of the ASE website. The ASE
deals with two sectors, one relates to financial firms while the other relates to
non-financial firms. The financial sector generally covers those firms which
offer financial services to companies such as banks, insurance companies,
diversified financial services and firms dealing with real estate businesses
(Hall and Wall, 2019). On the other hand, firms in the non-financial sector
include industrial and service sector organisations. A snapshot of firms listed
on the ASE as follow in table 3.1 below:
Table 3.1 Non-financial sectors on the Amman Stock Exchange
Non-financial sector
Description Total
Industrial Services
Number of firms 50 47 97
Percentage of 
51.55% 48.45% 100%
firms
Source: Self-generated
Secondary data is collected for the study instead of primary data or carrying
out an empirical research. The main reason to collect secondary data is 
because it is mandatory for the public companies to prepare a full set of 
financial statements at the end of their accounting year and publish in its
annual report. The full set of financial statements consists upon income
statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and statement of changes in 
equity (Melville, 2019). Accountants need to prepare the full set of financial
statements and auditors are responsible to audit the financial statements
before publication to ensure the faithful representation of the financial
statements. These financial statements contains all the financial data related
to the financial performance and financial position of the public companies.
84
  
 
 
         
      
       
       
         
       
        
         
        
      
      
         
          
        
  
 
           
       
          
      
       
      
       
      
  
        
            
        
       
     
        
       
         
  
The data required for this study is related to the financial performance,
financial position and corporate governance mechanisms of the public 
companies. This data is available in the annual reports of all the public
companies as it is mandatory for the public companies to publish it at year 
end, so the researcher has decided to rely on secondary data. The reliability 
of financial data is not an issued because auditors needs to audit the
financial data before it is published for the general public. Another reason to
rely on secondary data instead of primary data is that if researcher has 
contacted the companies to collect primary data then they should have
provided the annual reports to the researchers. Furthermore, other 
researchers who have conducted the similar research in Western countries
have collected the secondary data because the data is available and there is 
no reliability issue with the financial data. Due to the above reasons the
researchers have decided to collect the secondary data instead of primary 
data. 
Data used in this study was obtained from three sources: the first source is
the Orbits database; the second source is firms’ annual reports, while the
official page of the ASE website was used as the third source of data in this 
study. Data pertaining to CG-related variables such as details regarding
BODs was collected through the Orbits database, and the official page of the
ASE website, while data pertaining to other financial variables was manually 
obtained through annual reports. According to Fraser et al. (2006), a firm’s
annual reports provide more accurate data as compared to other data
sources pertaining to secondary data, because data used in annual reports is
highly reliable, which ensures quality reporting. In order to reduce the errors
related to data entry while copying data from the annual reports, the data
entered was marked, and all the entries were checked again to ensure that
was correct. Both the databases (i.e. Orbits database and annual reports)
provide necessary financial information about firms. Additionally, these two
databases also provide information regarding the names of auditing firms. A
total of 97 firms (industrial and services-related firms) are listed on the ASE.
Firms related to various industries and listed on the ASE are as follows in
table 3.2 below:
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Table 3.2 Firms related to different industries
Source: Self-generated
The study is based on 95 companies because the data for two companies
out of the total 97 companies was not available. The current study excluded
firms from the financial sector; the reason for the exclusion of these firms is
the presence of various government regulations and regulatory bodies, which 
provides a different controlling mechanism for financial sector firms (Abed et
al., 2012). Hence, using the financial sector in this study was not a
reasonable choice. Financial sector firms also follow a unique style in 
reporting their financial information, which was another reason for their
removal from the sample size of this study (Claessens et al., 2006; Al-Najjar 
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and Taylor, 2008; Estrin et al., 2009; Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010; Bell, Bryman
and Harley, 2018).
Keeping in mind the patterns of available literature (Yermack, 1996; Cheng
et al., 2008), the present study employed the same criteria for sample
selection. Yermack (1996), Cheng et al. (2008) and Saunders et al. (2019)
stated that data for several subsequent years is required for panel data
analysis. Further, financial data up to the year 2018 has been included in this
study due to 2018 being the most recent year for which data was available at
the time of data collection.
This section elaborates on the methodology and the methods applied due to
the availability of pre-tested theories and hypotheses developed. For testing
of hypotheses, multiple regression analysis was selected as a significant tool
for the study; in order to capture the effects of firm and time-specific
heterogeneities, panel data models can be specified as fixed effects or
random effects. Moreover, this chapter seeks to investigate some
specification tests which might tend to influence corporate governance
variables, which can result in statistical problems related to predictors in the
regression model. 
3.3 Variables and measurement of variables
3.3.1 Performance variables
Various researchers have measured firm performance differently (Cochran
and Wood, 1984; Ittner and Larcker, 2003). The majority of researchers have
measured it by using Tobin‘s Q (TOQ) (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; 
Akbar et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2020), return on asset (ROA) (Yermack,
1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Alqatan, Chbib and Hussainey, 2019), return
on equity (ROE) (Adjaoud et al., 2007), return on investment (ROI) (Adjaoud
et al., 2007) and net profit margin (NPM) (Bauer et al., 2004).
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A firm’s performance can be assessed in two dimensions, i.e. one is based
on market performance, and the other is based on accounting performance.
According to the perception of Daily et al. (2003), accounting-based
measures of the performance show the current accounting (financial)
performance of the company, while market-based measures of performance
indicate the investor’s perceptions of the firm’s potential market performance.
Although both measures are used in practice, various researchers have
criticised them; for instance, Hiffa and Hudaib (2006) mentioned that no best
indicator of financial performance has been recommended by previous
literature, and studies lack a consensus regarding the best measure of 
performance. Further, they stated that every measure has its pros and cons,
and hence no particular measure can be considered as a proxy to measure
the financial performance of the firm (Al-Ahdal et al., 2020).
Return on asset (ROA) was initially recommended by Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) as an indicator to measure the year-to-year fluctuations in business
return, which is based on actual business performance. contrary to this,
stock market rate of return has also been recommended by various
researchers which show the expected performance of the business. This
idea has been used widely by the proponents of the corporate governance
mechanism (Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Braendle, 
2019), and they have used this concept in their studies. Generally, the
accounting-based measures of firm performance do not consider prospects;
instead, they show comprehensive indicators of current accounting
performance. Conversely, market-based measures cannot present a vivid 
and real picture of the financial performance of firms where the economy is in
its developing phase or in emerging markets because under such
circumstances most of the firms operate under debt-financing. Hence,
market-based measures of performance do not represent the actual
performance of the firm (Kumar, 2004; Detthamron, Chancharat and 
Vithessonthi, 2017). 
According to Gompers et al. (2003), the market share price of companies
indicates market value with the signal that the capital market is working
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efficiently, as per the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Due to its status as 
an emerging market, the stock market in Jordan is yet to be developed in
such a way that it could compete with developed markets. For example, if the
information is publicly disclosed, it will result in and share prices will fluctuate
in accordance with the available information. Contrary to this, accounting
performance indicates greater internal control; however, managers have very 
little control over market valuation because market valuation and stock
returns are related to each other (Grossman and Hoskisson, 1998; Bhaumik
et al., 2019). 
Black et al. (2006) stated that inside and outside mechanisms of CG have
different impacts on firm performance. According to Wulf (2007), there is a
direct relationship between accounting performance and the firm's strategies. 
For instance, almost 80% of researchers have used accounting-based
measures (ROA and ROE) in their studies while measuring firm
performance, while many researchers have used ROA and ROE as a
measure of financial performance when investigating the impact of CG 
mechanism on firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Razzaque and
Mather, 2020).   
Tobin‘s Q is an indicator of the firm’s market performance defined as the
market value of equity divided by replacement cost (Yermack, 1996; Shu and
Chiang, 2020). According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Tobin's Q indicates
the effectiveness of management regarding the proper utilisation of the firm’s
resources to maximise the shareholders’ wealth. Various researchers have
used different methods while measuring Tobin’s Q; for instance, Yermack
(1996) recommended using market value and replacement cost, while Booth
and Deli (1996) recommended using a combination of market value and total
assets. Using different measurement styles to measure the Tobin’s Q will
produce different results even for the same period due to change in
estimation method and valuation of assets. Although Tobin’s Q can be
measured through various methods and various perspectives, difficulties are
embedded in the measurement/calculation of Tobin‘s Q. For example,
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calculating the replacement cost is not an easy task because companies do
not report it in their annual reports (Shahid and Abbas, 2019). 
Various researchers have recommended different advantages of measuring
performance based on accounting-based measures. Simply, higher values of
ROA and ROE indicate that the management of the firm is using its 
resources (assets and equities) effectively to maximise the shareholders’ 
wealth. Measuring performance based on ROA and ROE handles the firm
size very comfortably. Further, it becomes elementary to compare the
performance of the firms based on ROA and ROE (Lev and Sunder, 1979).
As recommended by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), year to year changes can
be considered in an entirely better way based on ROA and ROE as
compared to the stock market return. The reason behind this might be that
the stock market rate of return indicates an expected change in firm
performance while ROA and ROE indicate the more realistic and actual
condition of the firm (Akbar et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, many researchers have criticised the usage of accounting-
based measures of firm performance based on different aspects. For
instance, Ross et al. (2008) stated that ROA and ROE have been used since
long time, but the level of earlier earnings cannot show the real picture of 
future earnings/profits. Similarly, Krivogorsky (2006) and Jacoby et al. (2019) 
stated that ROA and ROE are based on the principles of historical cost 
accounting and hence, in this situation, they do not show the current
condition of the equity market. Another concern, pointed out by Alexander et
al. (2007), indicates an alarming situation as using different accounting
methods and techniques can bring different results while using the same
ROA and ROE in different years. In spite these, previous researchers have
pointed out that accounting-based measures of firm performance (ROA and
ROE) do not consider risk (Ross et al. (2008). Additionally, it is challenging to
assess the organisational environment and industry differences while using
ROA and ROE in determining firm performance because these measures do 
not reflect the relationship of the firm and customer satisfaction (Alexander et
al., 2007; MacAulay, Dutta and Hynes, 2020). However, to reduce the
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potential impact of these weaknesses and limitations, when measuring the
performance of the company using accounting-based measures, we have
considered some control variables in this study. These control variables help
to justify the use of accounting-based measures in assessing performance
(Shu and Chiang, 2020).
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Mehran (1995) ROE indicates
the financial performance of the firm based on return on shareholders’
investment and, based on this, it can be considered as an essential ratio
which reflects the investors’ concern. On the other hand, considering the
ROA as a measure of financial performance considers the firm resources to
carry out the firm activities. As per the contents of agency theory, there can
exist a conflict as managers can misuse the resources of the company to
protect their own interests, instead of securing the shareholders’ interests. 
Hence, using ROA and ROE as a measure of the performance shows how
managers are efficiently and effectively using the firm’s resources, and a 
lower level of ROE and ROA will highlight an ineffective managerial team. 
Thus, ROA and ROE can be considered as reliable measures from the
perspective of shareholders while measuring the firm performance. Keeping
in view above lines/argument present study has considered ROE and ROA
as measures of firm financial performance on the basis of accounting-based
measures.
Return on assets (ROA) shows the degree of managerial efficiency in 
utilising the firm‘s resources/assets to generate profit/earning. In some
cases, ROA is considered as Return on Investment (ROI). Mathematically, it 
is calculated as:
Return on Assets (ROA) = (Net Income) / (Total Assets) 
On the other hand, Return on Equity indicates firm performance based on
the amount invested by the owners/investors or how a firm is generating
profit in comparison to the amount invested. This is also called Return on Net 
Worth. Mathematically it is calculated as:
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Return on Equity (ROE) = (Net Income) / (Total Equity)
To calculate the ROA and ROE for sample firms, this study used the
DataStream database.
3.3.2 Control variables
Control variables have been considered in this study to explain changes in
firm performance. From the scrutiny of scant literature, it has been observed
that various researchers have used different control variables. Hence, this 
study considered already used control variables such as sales growth,
capital expenditure, firm size, leverage, research and development
expenditure and liquidity (Daines, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Black, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2020). Despite using the above-mentioned control variables,
it can be expected that other factors also have the potential to impact the firm
performance. However, the existing body of literature does not show any 
formula for considering the number of control variables in any study. Thus, 
keeping in mind the practice of previous studies, this research has adopted
mainly previously used control variables
3.3.2.1 Sales growth (SGH)
According to Kim (2006), those firms that show higher growth tend to seize
more opportunities, and market valuation of the company is increased with
growth opportunities. Firms which aim to grow need a large amount of 
money/financing, either internal or external, which drives firms to follow 
improved governance practices in order attract investors (Beiner et at.,
2006); this also reduces capital cost. Literature shows a direct and positive
association between firm performance and growth opportunities, which are 
measured based on year-to-year sales growth (SGH) (Gompers et at., 2003,
Drobetz et at., 2004, Cui et at., 2008, Henry, 2008; Alqatan, Chbib and
Hussainey, 2019). Hence, this study considers sales growth as a control
variable.
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3.3.2.2 Firm size (FSE)
Although firm size has been considered as a control variable in various
studies, there exists a lack of consensus regarding the relationship of firm
size and firm accounting performance (Nenova, 2003; Durnev and Kim,
2005). According to the findings of Short and Keasey (1999), larger firms can
create entry barriers for other firms due to access to specific resources; this
situation can generate a better accounting performance. According to Jensen
(1986), firm size can be used as a proxy to assess agency problems.
According to these findings, people in managerial posts tend to increase the
size of firms so that they can enjoy access to more power and large
resources. According to the findings of Fama and Jensen (1983) and Boone
et al. (2007), an increase in firm size brings diversification, which leads firms
towards natural complexity. This increased complexity increases the need for 
more advice on the board.
Further, it is believed that larger firms follow complex operations so that their
strategies can be better pursued. According to Serrasqueiro and Nunes
(2008), large firms show a better performance because they have a better
opportunity to raise funds, as well as following diversified strategies in their
operations. One more attribute of larger firms is the presence of a wide
variety of expertise which enables larger firms to make better decisions,
which increases their performance (Black et al., 2006; Bhaumik et al., 2019). 
Some researchers have also documented the difficulties which are faced by
larger firms such as more inspections and scrutiny by the regulatory
authorities, another stakeholder (Nenova, 2003; Garen, 1994). Under such
difficulties, it becomes difficult for family-owned firms to extract private profits
(Nenova, 2003). According to a study by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), with
the increase in firm size, i.e larger firms show decreased accounting
performance. The reason for this reduced performance might be the reduced
control by management due to the larger firm size, while small firms have
improved control over operations due to less complexity and smaller size
(Akbar et al., 2016). 
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According to Garen (1994), larger firms only have to face low costs in 
complying with CG codes, while small firms bear much higher costs due to
their small size. However, larger firms can take higher costs relevant to the
CG mechanism as larger firms have to face a higher level of media scrutiny 
as compared to smaller firms (Garen, 1994). Similarly, agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) also indicates that larger firms tend to face
increased agency costs due to their larger size because larger firms need
more controls and checks to restrain the managers from being opportunistic.
In addition to this, larger firms need a more significant amount of internal
control to bring an alignment between management and shareholders, which 
also raises the monitoring cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Keeping in 
mind the established literature, this study tends to assess the firm size based
on taking the natural logarithm of total assets (Elsayed, 2007; Topak, 2011;
Al-Matari et al., 2012; Lehn et al., 2009; Akbar et al., 2016). At the same
time, calculations regarding total assets of firms were drawn directly from the
balance sheet provided by the Orbis database. 
3.3.2.3 Capital expenditure (CAPX)
In order to gain a competitive advantage, firms tend to invest in innovative
initiatives to introduce new products and services (Back et al., 2004; Taufil-
Mohd et al., 2013). Such new products and services then provide
monopolistic positions to the firms and firms enjoy premium price profits due
to investment in technology-oriented decisions (Barton and Wong, 2006).
While investing in future projects to generate higher performance requires a
lot of amounts, and hence financial performance for the current period is
shattered due to such investments (Weir et al., 2002). Therefore, it becomes
necessary for technology-oriented firms to follow the code of corporate
governance mechanism to secure and safeguard their intangible assets
(Durnev and Kim, 2005). keeping in mid the existing quantum of literature
This study considered that investment opportunities measured in the shape
of the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX) tend to influence
firm performance in adverse ways (Durnev and Kim, 2005, Black et at., 2006; 
Tariff, 2006; El-Faitouri, 2014).
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3.3.2.4 Leverage (LEE)
The term is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Some
researchers have documented a negative impact of leverage on firm
performance while others have reported a positive effect. The positive effects
of leverage can be noted in the case when lenders involve themselves in the
monitoring process. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), leverage can
play a crucial role in reducing agency problems as an internal corporate
governance mechanism, particularly free cash problems.
According to the perception of Jensen (1986), if the level of external debt
increases, it can bring a positive impact on the performance of the firm. A 
higher level of debt will minimise the chances for the management to make
decisions according to their discretion, which will reduce the agency 
problems. For instance, according to the opinion of Jensen (1986), a higher 
level of debt might lead to a more disciplined management by disciplining the
managers to use available free cash flows for non-profitable projects. Where
the management is obligated to make periodic repayments of interest and
principal, this will ensure proper usage of free cash flow, and managers will
not become opportunistic. According to Stiglitz (1985), effective control over
management can be ensured through lenders rather than depending upon
owners. Moreover, Modigliani and Miller (1963) also favoured the presence
of high debt in the firm’s capital structure. They expected a positive
relationship could be observed among firm performance and leverage
through tax shield benefits. Similar findings have been reported by Agrawal
and Knoeber (1996) regarding a positive relationship between firm
performance and a higher level of debt. 
Contrary to this, Myers (1977) stated that the presence of a higher level of
leverage might negatively affect the performance of a company, because
increasing the level of leverage will undermine the firm’s ability to obtain
another debt. Such a situation will lead to the firm losing its investment
opportunity, which will reduce its capability to generate profit in the future.
Similarly, Myers (1977) and Stulz (1988) argued that the presence of a
95
  
 
 
        
      
       
       
  
        
 
 
   
 
        
        
     
       
        
          
   
       
 
 
       
       
      
     
      
    
         
        
     
      
    
 
 
 
higher level of leverage can hamper firm performance due to higher financial
risk. Additionally, they stated that a higher level of leverage would result in
increased interest payments, and increased monitoring cost will ultimately
reduce the firm’s financial performance (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; 
Dethamrong, Chancharat and Vithessonthi, 2017). Data related to firms’ level 
of leverage was extracted directly from financial statements provided by the
Orbits database. 
3.3.2.5 Research and development expenditure (R&D)
Companies tend to invest in new products to gain a competitive advantage
through these new products or services. Once these new products or
services become available, companies can demand higher prices and
generate profitability in the long term (Borghesi et al., 2007; Sheu and Yang, 
2005). Additionally, a new invention can also be considered as a barrier for 
rivals, preventing them from entering the market and attracting new clients
(Sharar, 2006). Following prior CG studies (see, for example, Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998, Dahya et al., 2007; El-Faitouri, 2014), this study uses R&D
as a control variable.
Also, financially restricted R&D corporations bear larger risk compared with
firms which are not restrained, and, because of this, they must halt their R&D 
ventures. Li (2011) analysed the affiliation among stock reversion, R&D
investment and financial constrictions. Outcomes exposed the robust liaison
of financial restraints and stock output. Contrary to the investment that is 
capital in nature, R&D investment is minor, elastic and flexible. It is a crucial 
task to assess finance by small firms, as evident from the literature, on the
whole (Shankit and Abbadi, 2011). Some authors visualise the way and
hardness of financial constraints as depicting institutional difference like SME
Bank while lending face severe constraints when they are in distress while
fee in the comfort zone in normal times (Baum, Schäfer, & Talavera, 2011; 
Akbar et al., 2016).
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3.3.2.6 Liquidity (LIY)
According to Jose et al. (1996), a company’s survival depends upon the
liquidity of the firm because liquidity has a significant association with the
firm’s sales and growth. Liquidity also has an impact on the risk level of the
firm because it reduces financial costs for the firm. A higher level of liquidity 
indicates firm development and shows that the firm has a strong position in
the market, as well as indicating its achievement. According to Fang et al. 
(2009), a higher level of liquidity helps to manage the agency problems, 
which tends to lead towards informed share prices. Thus, a positive
relationship between liquidity and firm performance can be predicted.
Liquidity is termed as the ability of a firm to meet its short-term obligations
and financial distress.
Liquidity is extracted from the balance sheet figures. Keeping in mind the
established literature (Fang et al., 2009; Jose et al., 1996), the present study
measured the liquidity of firms through current ratio (CR). This ratio is 
calculated through current assets (CA) and current liabilities (CL). Liquidity
ratio shows that a firm with higher liquidity can manage any external shock
related to financing and liabilities. This fact also helps to minimise financial 
distress. Additionally, a higher level of liquidity indicates an alarming situation
where the firm has to bear higher opportunity cost because, when a firm
keeps in hand a higher level of current assets, it reduces its ability to invest 
greater profits (Shahid and Abbas, 2019). 
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3.3.3 Corporate governance variables
3.3.3.1 Board size (BSE)
According to Ahmed et al. (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2008), board size
(considered as BSIZE in this study) is defined as the number of directors
who are on the board. Previous studies have shown mixed findings regarding
the relationship between board size and accounting performance of the firm. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, (1991), as well as Jensen (1993), found that small
boards bring better performance for firms. The increased agency cost results 
in a lower performance for firms. Similarly, boards with a large number of
members lose their ability to execute proper monitor and control functions;
this provides managers with space and they tend to follow their self-interests
and forego the interests of shareholders (El-Faitouri, 2014).
Hence, in large boards the CEO tends to control the board, which also has a
negative impact on the financial performance of the firm. However, in spite of 
these arguments, some researchers have argued in favour of large board
size and reported a positive relationship among firm performance and large
board size (Dalton et al., 1998; Lehn et al., 2009). This view consists of the
resource dependency theory because a larger board size improves external
linkages (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, larger boards provide an
opportunity for directors regarding the exchange of more highly qualified
counsel through external linkages. Larger boards also ensure access to
resources through improved external ties. Such resources can be new and
advanced technologies, new markets and raw materials. Larger boards 
facilitate diversity among board members and ensure integration of 
knowledge and skills, which leads to improved and informed decision
making, which might result in a higher level of firm performance (Lehn et al.,
2009; Razzaque, Ali and Mather, 2020). 
Hence, there is a lack of consensus among previous researchers regarding
the impact of board size on firm performance. Therefore, the existing study
explores the relationship between board size and financial performance of 
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the firm. In this study, number of board directors have been extracted from
the Orbits database.
3.3.3.2 CEO duality (CEOD)
Proponents of agency theory (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976 and Eisenhardt, 1989) recommend that, to minimise the agency
problem, ownership and control in the firm should be separated. This will
improve firm performance. Hence, agency theory supports the argument that
the roles of CEO and chairman should be separated to increase the
independence of the board and management and to ensure improved
monitoring and overseeing. This situation (theoretically) will result in 
improved firm performance (Jensen, 1993). Contrary to this, stewardship
theory recommends duality on the board, i.e. roles of CEO and chairman
should not be separated. The dual role of CEO and chairman will ensure
effective management because it will bring unity of command. If the
responsibilities and decisions are restricted to one person, it will result in
improved performance through positive impact (Dalton and Kesner, 1987; 
Arosa et al., 2012). In addition to this, duality on the board tends to reduce
misconceptions, because the chairman and CEO is the same person, which 
will reduce inconsistencies (Brickley et al., 1988; Alqatan, Chbib and
Hussainey, 2019).
As per recommendations of the JCGC (2006), the CEO and Chairman
should be assigned separate responsibilities and duties to avoid any conflict
of interest. This will ensure adequate supervision and monitoring. Many 
researchers in past studies have investigated the roles of Chairman and
CEO under duality through a dummy variable (Abor, 2007; Bozec, 2005;
Arosa et al., 2012; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Sheikh et al., 2012; Akbar et
al., 2016). Hence, to document the impact of separating the roles of 
chairman and CEO in Jordanian companies, this study used a dummy 
variable to measure the CEO duality, keeping in mind the previous research.
If the chairman holds the designation of CEO, a code of one was allotted,
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and otherwise zero was considered. This data was collected from the Orbits
database.
3.3.3.3 Non-executive directors (NEDs) 
According to the findings of Fama and Jensen (1983), internal managers 
hold the dominant position and their performance is increased in the case
when they initiate decisions and exert maximum control. However, in the
modern day where firms have to compete on a day-to-day basis, it is difficult
to handle between decision management and decision control. This situation
recommends that NEDs should be appointed in firms to ensure board
independence. This will ensure the separation of control and management
functions. Moreover, conflict among internal managers can be mediated
through NEDs. NEDS can also help to improve the relationships among
stakeholders, which will enable them to better perform their monitoring
function as compared to executive directors (Tricker, 2019). 
In addition to this, NEDs can constructively criticise the firm’s policies due to
their independence (Jensen 1993), and they can impart their opinion without 
any fear. Also, NEDS can help to minimise information asymmetry among
the stakeholders. This situation will lead to increased firm performance due
to a reduction in agency problems, because independent directors can
improve the flow of information through their nexus among stakeholders 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). NEDs can foster knowledge sharing, and they 
can provide their expert advice regarding the strategic plan, which can
reduce uncertainty (Mallin, 2019). 
Contrary to this, some researchers (proponents of stewardship theory) argue
that NEDS are only part-time and therefore they have less information
regarding the firm’s day-to-day activities, which can hamper their ability to
perform their monitoring function (Baysinger and Hookisson, 1990; Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). Hence, executive directors (insider directors) can
perform the monitoring function more effectively (Baysinger and Hoskinsson,
1990; Tricker, 2019). 
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Thus, this study considered the three perspectives to explore the impact of 
NEDs on firm financial performance (agency, resource dependence and
stewardship theories). Previous researchers (Arosa et al., 2012; 
Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2008) have investigated the role of NEDs in
predicting firm financial performance by considering their percentage in
board membership. Consistent with the previous studies, this study
measured NEDs based on their percentage according to total directors in
BODs. This information was obtained from the annual reports of the sample
firms (Akbar, et al., 2016).
3.3.3.4 Presence of board sub-committees (BSCS)
The existing body of literature recommends that board sub-committees can
increase the effectiveness of BODs in more efficient ways (Harrison et al.,
1994; Jiraporn et al., 2009; Chen and Jaggi, 2001). Such committees ensure
genuine audit and nomination of qualified directors as well as payment of fair
compensation to the directors (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn
et al., 2009; Al-Ahdal et al., 2020). Globally, most of the codes pertaining to
the CG mechanism recommend establishing board sub-committees (e.g. the
Cadbury Report 1999 in the UK and the Blue-Ribbon Committee 1999 in the
US).
During the last two decades, the presence of board sub-committees has
increased dramatically. As per the contents of the Cadbury Report (1992),
the majority of UK firms had a well-functioning remuneration committee while
48.6% of firms had a nominating committee. Besides such
recommendations, empirical studies have documented mixed impacts of 
board sub-committees on the firm performance. In addition to this small size
of the board, sub-committees enable committee members to hold meetings 
more frequently, which ensures timely decision making (Karamanou and
Vafeas, 2005). More specifically, sub-committees perform specialised tasks,
which increases firm performance. For instance, audit committees keep tight 
control over the reporting and internal control systems. 
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In contrast, nomination committees perform their duties in nominating the
qualified members who increase the firm’s performance through their
expertise. However, some studies have also reported negative
consequences of board sub-committees on firm performance. For example,
firms have to bear the extra cost in establishing board sub-committees, while
remuneration offered to sub-committee members can also be an additional
cost for the firm (Vafeas, 1999). According to Conger et al. (1998); Braendle 
(2019), sub-committees may impose excessive monitoring on the activities of 
executive directors, which can limit their initiatives in enhancing firm
performance. In addition to this, conflict among the members of committees
can arise due to diverse expertise and knowledge of board members
inducing conflicting situations.
The JCGC (2006) requires that all the firms listed on the ASE should have to
establish nomination, remuneration and audit committees. All these
committees should have independent non-executive directors as their
chairman. This code also requires firms must establish remuneration
committees with a minimum of three independent non-executive directors.
For nomination committees, this code requires that more than half of the
members should be independent NEDs. Keeping in mind the
suggestions/recommendations of the JCGC (2006), it can be assumed that 
board sub-committees can influence the financial performance of Jordanian
firms in a positive way.
3.3.4 Corporate governance index (CGI)
To assess the impact of CG on firm performance (accounting or market-
based performance), the corporate governance index (CGI) is structured and
considered as the predictor. In this study, the CGI has aggregated the
provisions of the JCGC (2012). The JCGC (2012) is comprised of three
parts. These parts are the introduction, board of directors/management
committee and control environment. The ASE had adopted this code as a 
requirement for all Jordanian listed companies to comply with the provisions 
of the JCGC (2012). In case firms do not comply with these provisions, then
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they are bound to provide justification in this regard. All of the previous 
studies which have documented the impact of CG on firm performance have
followed national or internal CG codes and thus, keeping in mind the
previous studies, this study followed the JCGC (2012) and its provisions 
(Schulze et al., 2003; Shabbir, 2008; El-Faitouri, 2014; Akbar et al., 2016).
The CGI tends to investigate the impact of CG as a whole in relation to the
firm’s financial performance measured through accounting-based measures.
Most of the previous studies have considered only one aspect at one time,
such as Gompers et al. (2003) and Cremers and Nair (2005) followed only 
shareholder rights, while Yermack (1996) considered the board of directors'
size in his study. However, this study constructed a GI which provides
sufficient room and allows the relationship between CG and performance of 
the firms to be measured.
Previous literature provides two methods to measure the quality of CG
mechanisms (Lang et al., 2004). The first method recommends using
subjective analyst disclosure quality rankings. Most of the professional
institutes use this method, which deals in ranking the CG codes of nations, 
e.g. Standard & Poor's (S&P). However, the second method, which is more 
common, uses researcher-constructed disclosure indices; this method is
based on the calculation of disclosure of governance aspects and finding out
the quality of the disclosure by using the proxy for it. This type of disclosure
is found in firms’ annual reports (Chen et al., 2007; Alqatan, Chbib and
Hussainey, 2019). Regarding CG disclosure, both methods have their pros 
and cons.
Above illustrated method of subjective analyst disclosure of quality, rankings
are criticised usually. First, this method does not consider disclosure in other
sources such as media and interim reports. In contrast, researcher 
constructed-disclosure indices can consider these types of disclosures (Long
and Lundholm, 1993). But some researchers have recommended using the
subjective analyst disclosure of quality rankings because this method could
be more convincing than the researcher-constructed disclosure indices
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method. After all, the latter method depends upon the knowledge and skills 
of the professional researchers who have expertise in their field (Sanda et
al., 2005; Tricker, 2019).
Moreover, the researcher-constructed disclosure indices are subject to errors 
and bias of personal choices by researchers, leading to false conclusions
(Connelly and Limpaphayom, 2004). Second, it is more labour intensive, so it 
is more convenient and reasonable for researchers to use a small sample
size of firms that have fewer observations than larger companies using
researcher-constructed disclosure indices (Sanda et al., 2005), which can
produce misleading results. Finally, Marston and Shrives (1991) suggested
using the current index, which has an essential advantage, which is that it 
can be compared with prior studies that have used this method in their
research.
Despite the criticism of researcher-constructed disclosure indices, this study
uses this method due to several factors. First, the subjective analyst 
disclosure of quality rankings has been used to rank the CG in a specific 
country (US). Thus, the standards of listing US companies may not be
suitable to other nations due to differences in corporate governance
regulations and approaches. Second, the subjective analyst disclosure of 
quality rankings may be out of date or suspended (Sanda et al., 2005). In
these circumstances, there is no corporate governance ranking for Jordanian
listed companies. Third, analysts' ratings usually focus on the largest
companies that are influential in their industry, and they are unlikely to
produce adequate variation in terms of corporate governance disclosure 
(Rosser, 2003). Finally, so far there is no published Jordanian study that
examines the relationship between a corporate governance index and
corporate performance by using a panel dataset with the generalised method
of regression models (Solomon, 2014).
Following prior studies (for example, Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 
2006; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Henry, 2008; Shabbir, 2008; Morey et al.,
2009; El-Faitouri, 2014; Akbar et al., 2016), this study uses a dummy coding
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scheme to evaluate the compliance of Jordanian listed firms with the code.
This method of rating includes giving a value of 1 if a company complies with
a particular provision of the JCGC and 0 otherwise. This study selects the
JCGC (2012) because it is the most recent version.
Table 3-3 shows the structure of the CGI and the provisions of the JCGC
(2012), which have been consulted to develop the index. From the provisions 
of the JCGC (2012), structures of BODs and their sub-committees have been
recommended. Additionally, the following table depicts definitions of the
index coding measurement of the variables used in this study. Further,
elements of the corporate governance index structure in this study are
among the most inclusive indices in comparison to already conducted
studies through the development of a governance index. For example,
Padgett and Shabbir (2005) developed a non-compliance index of 12
provisions based on the recommendations of the UK CG code of 1998. In the
same way, eight provisions from the UK CG code were used by Arcot and
Bruno (2007) in their study. Hence, the governance index also has some
limitations in measuring the provisions of CG codes, and practically difficult 
provisions are ignored by researchers while developing their index of 
corporate governance.
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Table 3-3 Composition of corporate governance index 
Source: Self-generated
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3.4 Data analysis 
The researcher will use various statistical tools to analyse the data for non-
financial Jordanian listed companies. The tools that will be used for analysing
the data are descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression.
Descriptive analysis will use to provide the summary of the entire data that is
collected for 95 non-financial Jordanian listed companies from 2012 to 2018.
Mean, variance, standard deviation, skewness, range, minimum and
maximum descriptive analysis tools will be used to provide the summary of 
the large data set.
Correlation will also be used to explore how different variables are moving
together with each other. The range of correlation between the variables is
between -1 to +1, where -1 is highlighting the perfect negative correlation
between the two variables and +1 is highlighting the perfect positive
correlation between the two variables. Correlation will be used to explore the
initial correlation between the variables of the current study. 
Multiple regression analysis will be used to explore the impact of 
independent variables on dependent variable of the study. Independent
variables are the variables that are not depending on other variables and
have direct effect on dependent variable. Dependent variable is the variable
that is being measured and dependent on independent variables and the
researchers are looking for the possible effect of the independent variables 
on dependent variable. General form of the model is as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + Σ𝑖
𝑛 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 …….. Equation 1
FPit = measure of firm performance of a firm i at time t 
𝛽𝑜 = intercept of the equation
𝛽𝑖 = change co-efficient for Xit variables
Xit = different independent variables for firm performance of a firm i at
time t
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i = the number of the firms i.e. i = 1, 2, 3 …. N (in this study N= 95
firms)
t = the time period i.e. t = 1, 2, 3 … T (in this study T = 7 years)
For the current study the dependent variable is firm performance and it will 
be measured through three different ratios including return on assets and
return on equity (book value measure) and Tobin’s Q (market value
measure). Various corporate governance mechanisms (board size, CEO
duality, NEDs, audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination
committee and corporate governance index) and control variables (sales
growth, capital expenditure, leverage, firm size, research and development
expenditures and liquidity) are used as independent variables to check their
effect on firm performance that is dependent variable.
Researcher will run regression twice. Firstly, it will run to investigate the
impact of various corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in 
a standalone environment. Secondly, it will run to investigate the impact of 
corporate governance index on the firm performance. After converting
equation 1 into our specified variables, the two equations will be
FPit = 0 + 1(SGHit) + 2(FSEit) + 3(CAPXit) + 4(LEEit) + 5(R&Dit) + 6
(LIYit) + 7(BSEit) + 8(NEDit) + 9(CEODit) + 10(ACEit) + 11(NCEit) + 12
(RCEit) +  …… Equation 2
FPit = 0 + 1(SGHit) + 2(FSEit) + 3(CAPXit) + 4(LEEit) + 5(R&Dit) + 6
(LIYit) + 7(CGIit) +  …… Equation 3
The abbreviation are provided below
FP = Financial performance
SGH = Sales growth
FSE = Firm size
CAPX = Capital expenditure
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LEE = Leverage
R&D = Research & development
LIY = Liquidity
BSE = Board size
NED = Non-executive directors
CEOD = CEO duality
ACE = Audit committee
NCE = Nomination committee
RCE = Remuneration committee
CGI = Corporate governance index
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3.5 Summary
This chapter elaborates material and methods applied due to availability of
pre-tested theories and hypotheses developed. For answering of research 
questions, multiple regression analysis was selected as major tool of the
study. “In order to capture the effects of firm and time specific
heterogeneities panel data models can be specified as fixed effects or
random effects”. Moreover, this chapter seeks to investigate some
specification tests which might have tendency to influence corporate
governance variables which can result in statistical problems related to
predictors in regression model.
Also, this chapter elaborates on the methodology followed to conduct the
study. This study used a deductive positivism approach in which already
established theories are used to construct study hypotheses. Keeping in
mind the complexity of relationships, a multiple regression analysis has been
considered to be an important data analysis tool in this study. Fixed and
random effects models have been used in this study to assess the
heterogeneities in panel data models before running the multiple
regressions. Additionally, this chapter has also discussed the under-
consideration control variables which might have the potential to influence
independent variables of this study in predicting firm performance. Moreover, 
this chapter has investigated some specification tests which might influence
corporate governance variables, which can result in statistical problems
related to predictors in the regression model.
This chapter has also shed light on the data and measurement scheme
followed in this study regarding sample size, and data selection criteria from
different databases and annual reports. The study considers data from three
perspectives: one is from the perspective of firm financial performance
(measured based on ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q), while the other two aspects
consider corporate governance variables (board size, CEO duality, presence
of NEDs and sub-committees) as well as control variables (firm sales, growth
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size, leverage and R&D expenditure along with liquidity). Data for 95
Jordanian non-financial firms is collected. This study has consulted three
sources for data collection: one is the Orbis database, the second is the
annual reports of the selected firms, and the third is the ASE website. 
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Chapter 4 Analysis and discussion 
As elaborated above in the methodology chapter, a framework was
developed to check the impact of CG on firm performance of non-financial
firms operating in the Jordanian context, and results are presented here. This
chapter encompasses descriptive statistics and different data reliability, as 
well as validity tests, correlation and multiple regression results, and provides 
a discussion on the findings. The second section of the chapter elaborates 
on the descriptive statistics of the statistical data which has been used for
analysis in this study. The third section of this chapter is based on regression
results, model specification test results, control variables results, and
provides the results and a discussion of CG variables on the CGI. The last
section provides a summary of the chapter. 
4.1 Results and discussion
The following section shows the results of the study based on which 
inference has been drawn. The current chapter is comprised of five sections.
The first section highlights the results of the descriptive statistics, while the
second section deals with the results of the statistical test. In contrast, the
third section deals with the results of the control variables. Similarly, the
fourth section deals with the results of corporate governance variables, and
the fifth and last section discusses the results of the corporate governance
index. 
Dividing the results into various sections simply has been carried out to
facilitate the presentation of the results and to make it easier to understand
the results by keeping in mind the effect of each type of variable.
Significance of the results has been set at three levels, i.e. .01 indicates
highly significant results, 0.05 indicates significant results and .10 indicate
marginally significant results. These significant levels are applied to all the
tables and results presented in this chapter. Coefficients and other
necessary information are reported at suitable places with appropriate tables
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derived from the original one. At the same time, overall results are presented
at the end of the thesis in Appendix 1.  
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics
The following section shows various indicators of descriptive statistics of the
statistical data used for analysis purposes in this study. Basic features of 
descriptive statistics are reported through central tendency and dispersion.
Here, the mean, max and min values of each variable are discussed as
measures of central tendency while standard deviation (SD) is reported as a
measure of data dispersion. Complete results of the descriptive statistics are
reported in Appendix 1.
Table 4-1 shows descriptive statistics for the firm performance, which is the
dependent variable (DV) in this study and has been measured through ROA,
ROE and Tobin’s Q. This table indicates that the average range for ROA in 
this study is a minimum of -1.96 to a maximum of 0.39. At the same time, the
average value of ROA is 0.020, with S.D of 0.137. Similarly, ROE ranges
from a minimum of -11.21 to a maximum of 0.51 with an average of -0.005
and dispersion of 0.569. Further, TOQ ranges from a minimum of 0.10 to a
maximum of 8.36 with an average of 0.823 and dispersion of 0.742.
Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q
Despt Rang Minimu Maximu Mea S. Varianc Skewnes 
. e m m n Dev e s
ROA 2.34 -1.96 0.39 0.02
0.13 
7
0.019 -6.885
ROE 11.72 -11.21 0.51 -0.00
0.56 
9
0.323 -16.79
TOQ 8.26 0.1 8.36
0.82 
3
0.74 
2
0.551 3.937
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Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables. The table
illustrates that the minimum value of SGH in this data was -1.00, while the
maximum value was 9.56, with an average of 0.163 and dispersion of 1.173.
Further, a minimum of FSE was 12.68 while the maximum value was 21.31
with an average of 17.09 and dispersion of 1.5114. Similarly, the minimum
value of CAPX is 0.00 with a maximum value of 0.41 and average of 0.031.
Dispersion (standard deviation) for CAPX is 0.046. LEE holds a minimum
value of 0.00 with a maximum value of 0.90 and average as 0.28, while the
standard deviation for LEE is 0.284. The minimum value of R&D in this data
was 0.00 while 0.04 was the maximum value with an average 0.002 and
dispersion of 0.006. Finally, minimum, maximum, average and standard
deviation values of LIY are 0.01, 1027.00, 9.784 and 80.89, respectively.
Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics for control variables
Dept. Range Minimum Maximum Mean S. Dev Variance Skewness
SGH 10.56 -1.00 9.56 0.163 1.173 1.377 4.700
FSE 8.63 12.68 21.31 17.09 1.5114 2.284 0.225
CAPX 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.031 0.046 0.002 3.835
LEE 0.9 0.00 0.9 0.28 0.284 0.081 0.696
R&D 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.002 0.006 0.000 4.068
LIY 1026.9 0.01 1027 9.784 80.89 6542.7 11.971
The following table, Table 4-3, shows descriptive statistics for the board
governance variables used in this study, i.e. board size, non-executive
directors and corporate governance index. First, statistics for the board size
illustrate that the mean value of board size in this study/data is 12.47, which 
can be considered as 13, whereas the minimum value is 7 and the maximum
value is 29. These statistics are for the total sample of 95 non-financial firms
listed on the ASE. These statistics indicate that, on average, 13 directors 
work in each company while the minimum number of directors is seven and
the maximum number is 29. By exploring the highest number of directors 
working in a firm, it was observed that only one firm has 29 directors on the
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board. This situation indicates that, on average, non-financial firms listed on
the ASE in Jordan meet the requirements of the CG Code 2006 and the
Company Law (1997). These requirements are also in agreement with the
recommendations of Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). As per
their suggestions, the average number of directors in a firm should be eight
to , while 10 should be the maximum number. Such a small sample size can
affect the decision-making process on a board. However, literature provides 
necessary support in favour of the small sample size for firms operating in
the context of developing countries. Average board size differs according to
the requirements and economic conditions. For instance, the average board
size is eight in Egypt and Malaysia (Elsayed, 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib,
2006; Akbar et al., 2016). Similarly, the average board size in the USA is
12.25 (Yermack, 1996). Besides these, a smaller board size on average has
been observed in Australia, which is 6.6 (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
Table 4-3 Descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables
Dept. Range Minimum Maximum Mean
S. 
Dev
Variance Skewness
BSE 22 7 29 12.47 4.36 19.005 1.297
NED 0.85 0.04 0.89 0.173 0.163 0.026 1.463
Descriptive statistics also indicate that, on average, 17% of board members
are NEDs, with a range of 10 to 37%. Past studies state that the presence of 
more NEDs on a board ensures that the board has more independence. This
independence might be the outcome of reduced information asymmetry
among the agents and principals (Black et al., 2006). According to the
findings of Brickley et al. (1997), the performance of the board increases
when NED performs on behalf of the agent (owners) with their improved
monitoring and advisory function. In the case of Jordan, the presence of
NEDs on boards is relatively small when it is compared to other nations; for
example, in the USA the mean is 54%, (Yermack, 1996) whilst in Malaysia it 
is 50% (Haniffia and Hudaib, 2006; El-Faitouri, 2014).
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Further, the JCGC of 2007 states that at least 33% of board members should
be non-executive directors to ensure independence. However, in our sample,
in the case of Jordan, the average composition of non-executive directors is 
less than the requirements laid down by the JCGC (2012). Nepotism might
be the possible reason behind this result. A different dummy variable is also
used for the analysis, such as CEO duality, presence of varying board sub-
committees, e.g. remuneration committee, audit committee and nomination
committee, and CGI.
Descriptive statistics also reveal that, on average (89%), it was observed that
most of the firms have the same CEO and board chairman. This situation
indicates that board/members are significantly influenced by the
CEO/Chairman. In the case of Jordan and family-owned businesses, it has
been observed that both roles (CEO and chairman) are played by a single
entity, who is mainly the founder of that business/firm. However, under such
circumstances in which a single person is playing both roles, it can be
assumed that non-financial firms listed on the ASE in Jordan are not 
following the CG requirements as laid down by the Cadbury Report (1992)
and the Jordanian CGC (2006). According to these, the two roles should be
separate. 
The other dummy variables such as the existence of different board
committees, e.g. remuneration committee, audit committee and nomination
committee, and CGI. 0 and 1 are recorded for the four dummy variables that
are included in the analysis. As 0 and 1 are recorded for the four dummy 
variables, these variables are not used for the descriptive statistics. 
4.1.2 Specification test results 
In this study, panel data has been used to find out the effect of corporate
governance on financial performance/market performance of the firms. Using
panel data increases the need to address the issues of econometric models 
which are specified in panel data. This study used Breusch and Pagan’s
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(1980) Lagrang multiplier test. The results of this test are highly significant,
which endorses the use of panel regression. According to the assumptions of 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrang multiplier tests if it has a null probability 
(Gujarati, 2003; Saunders et al., 2019), the null hypothesis is rejected and
using panel regression is recommended.
Further, panel data models are described/divided into fixed effect and
random effect models. These two categories help to assess the impact of 
firm and time-specific heterogeneities in the sample. However, choosing
random results against fixed effect and additional specification is required in
the shape of the Hausman test. If the Hausman test is statistically significant
(Table 4-4), then using random effect is prohibited, and it is recommended to
use the fixed effect model. 
Table 4-4 Panel model test 
Tests Results
Breusch and Pagan LM Test
Chi2 
P
71.42
0.000
Hausman Test
Chi2 
P
8.11
0.004
The first issue addressed in this section is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
exists when two or more than two predictors are highly correlated with each
other (Hair et al., 2009) because their higher correlation can affect the
estimation through the regression. Multicollinearity is identified through
various methods; the fundamental approach is to look at the values of 
correlations among predictors. If a correlation of 0.70 or higher exists, it
indicates multicollinearity. In this study, no higher correlation (>.70) was
observed in cases of all predictors (Table 4-8), control variables (table 4-7) or
even dependent variables (Table 4-6). This indicates that all the values are
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less than the threshold value of 10, and thus it can be inferred that there is 
no issue of multicollinearity in this model.
Secondly, panel data is usually biased due to the presence of serial
correlation, which is necessary to assess and eradicate because it can lead
to improper estimation/forecasting. This study followed the approach of the
Wooldridge serial correlation test (2002) to determine the serial correlation.
Results given below, in Table 4-5, indicate that all the variables are serially 
correlated. In addition to this, heteroscedasticity must be tested when using
panel data analysis, and the Breusch-Pagan test has been used to do this. 
Results of this test are given below, in Table 4-5, which indicates the
presence of a heteroscedasticity issue. Hence, this issue can be resolved by
using a cluster-robust standard error estimator (Rogers, 1993; Bell, Bryman
and Harley, 2018). 
Table 4-5 Specification test results 
Tests
Dependent Variable
ROA ROE TOQ
Wald (Chi-square) 6932.32 3445.7 5346.75
P 0.000 0.000 0.000
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 4408.78 532.34 3748.03
Heteroscedasticity P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wooldrige-test for autocorrelation 5.114 16.703 7.1034
P 0.030 0.000 0.000
4.1.3 Correlation 
Correlation is a statistical tool that is used to explore how different variables 
are moving together. The result of correlation always falls between -1 and
+1, which shows both negative as well as positive extremes. Values of 
correlation + .70 indicate strong correlation while values higher than +.70 and
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less than +1 indicate a near-perfect correlation. Similarly, values near 0
indicate weak correlation while the 0 itself indicates no relationship among
the constructs. Values near to +. 10 are considered weak correlations while
those near to + .30 are regarded as small correlations, and values of
correlations near to + .50 are regarded as a moderate relationship (Pallant,
2020). The complete correlation table is provided in the appendix 1, whilst 
Table 4-6 highlights the correlation among different dependent variables 
(ROA, ROE and TOQ) that are used for the current analysis. 
Table 4-6 Correlation for dependent variables
Description ROA ROE TOQ
ROA
ROE
TOQ
-
0.355
-0.106
-
-0.431 -
The above table illustrates that the value of the correlation between ROA and
ROE is .355. First, the positive sign shows a positive relationship between
these two variables, implying that both will move in the same direction if one
changes accordingly. The second instance about this relationship is the
presence of small correlation between the two. However, this value of
correlation is slightly above weak correlation and moving towards a moderate
level of relationship (r=.50). In the case of the relationship between ROA and
ROE, a negative correlation has been observed, indicating a negative
correlation. In this case, increase in one variable will decrease the other 
variable. However, the level of correlation is small, i.e. correlation -.106.
Similarly, in the case of the relationship of TOQ and ROE, the association is
also negative, indicating that, if ROE is moving in an upward direction, the
TOQ will move in a downward direction. However, the level of correlation is
near to a moderate level, i.e. near to 0.50.
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Table 4-7 Correlation for control variables
Description SGH FSE CAPX LEE R&D LIY
SGH -
FSE -0.097 -
CAPX -0.035 0.090 -
LEE 0.049 -0.317 -0.046 -
R&D -0.023 0.026 0.021 -0.004 -
LIY 0.012 -0.200 -0.049 0.152 -0.027 -
The above table illustrates the nature and direction of relationships among
the control variables. First, the correlation between the SGH and FSE has
been found to be negative at a small level, indicating that an increase in FSE
will decrease the SGH at a modest level. Similarly, the relationship of CAPX
and SGH has also been found to be negative, which indicates that an
increase in CAPX will decrease the SGH. The value of this correlation is very 
weak, i.e. -.035. Similarly, the correlation of LEE and SGH is also weak but 
positive, indicating that both LEE and SGH will move in the same direction if 
one variable is changed. R&D and SGH also have negative but weak
correlation showing that, if R&D moves in an upward trend, the SGH will
move in a downward direction; however, the level of correlation is very weak. 
LIY and SGH also have very weak but positive correlation, indicating that
both will move in the same direction but with a very weak relationship. In the
case of CAPX and FSE, the correlation is also small but positive, implying
that both variables will move in the same direction if one of them is changed.
However, LEE and FSE have been found to have a negative relationship
which is at a small level, i.e. -.317, indicating that an increase in LEE will
decrease the FSE. R&D and FSE have positive correlation but it is very 
weak. Similarly, the relationship between LIY and FSE is at a small level with
a negative sign, indicating that both will move in the opposite direction if one
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of them is changed. Further relationship between LEE and CAPX has been
found negative with little correlation. A very weak but positive correlation is
observed in the case of R&D and CAPX. In the case of R&D and LEE, the
correlation is minute, -.004, indicating almost no relationship among both
R&D and LEE. In case of LIY and LEE have been found in positive
correlation but at a small level. Finally, the relationship between LIY and
R&D is negative and weak.
Table 4-8 Correlation for corporate governance variables
Description BSE NED CGI
BSE -
NED -0.19 -
CGI -0.027 0.208 -
A weak negative relationship exists between BSE and NED and CGI, while a
weak positive relationship exists between NED and CGI. The above
correlation analysis also highlights that a weak positive or negative
relationship exists between all the dependent, controlled and CG variables.
Weak correlation among all the variables highlights that no multicollinearity 
issue exists among the variables. However, the value of the correlation
between CGI and NED is positive at a small correlation. In contrast, the
correlation between BSE and NED indicates a negative relationship between
them, meaning that if the board size increases then the number of NEDs will
decrease at a weak level.
4.1.4 Results of multiple regression analysis
Regression analysis helps to forecast a dependent variable on a given value
of the independent variable. Alternatively, it can be stated that it is used to
explore the impact of an independent variable on the dependent variable. For
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the current analysis, firm performance is the dependent variable, which is 
measured through three different accounting ratios: ROA, ROE and TOQ.
ROA and ROE are the accounting measures, while TOQ is the market value
measure. For the current study, independent variables are divided into
different control variables (SGH, FSE, CAPX, LEE, R&D and LIY), corporate
governance variables (BSE, NED) and dummy variables (CEOD, RCE, ACE,
NCE and CGI). 
Regression analysis in this study has been divided into two sections. Firstly,
the researcher will conduct the regression analysis by using all the corporate
governance variables in a standalone manner. The researcher will measure
the firm performance with the help of three accounting ratios (ROA, ROE and
TOQ) so the regression equation will be run three times to measure the
impact of different corporate governance variables in isolation on firm
performance. After conducting the regression analysis in a standalone
manner, the researcher will check the compliance of all the selected firms
against the corporate governance index that is based on 13 different
corporate governance requirements of the JCGC. The researcher will run the
regression equation three separate times using the three different accounting 
ratios that are used to measure the firm performance. In this way, the second
part of the regression analysis will assist the researcher in measuring the
impact of the corporate governance index on the firm performance of listed
non-financial Jordanian firms. The complete regression analysis tables are 
provided in Appendix 1. For ease of discussion, the researcher will break
down the regression tables into small tables that are provided in the following
section.
Before presenting the results of each independent variable, the researcher 
will provide the results of F-statistics and R-square because these two
measures provide information about the entire model that is used for the
analysis. F-statistics are used to check the significance of the entire model,
while R-square provides information on how much variation in the dependent
variable is explained by independent variables included in the model. Table
4-9 provides the results for F-statistics and R-square. 
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Table 4-9 F-statistics and R-square
Description ROA ROE TOQ
F-statistics 9.25 4.68 6.96
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
R 0.69 0.51 0.58
R square 0.48 0.26 0.37
Table 4-9 highlights that the F-statistics are highly significant for all three
models used for the analysis. The R square is highest for ROA (69%) while it
is lowest for ROE (51%), which means that the highest variation for firm
performance is explained by predictors of governance when firm
performance is measured using the ROA. The results indicate that more
independent variables should be included in the model to obtain more
information about the movement in firm performance. 
4.1.4.1 Results of control variables
Results of control variables have been found to be different across the
performance variables which have been measured in terms of financial and
market performance (ROA, ROE and TOQ). 
4.1.4.1.1 Sales growth (SGH)
According to the perception of Durnev and Kim (2005), firms which have
greater opportunities are more likely to grow faster as compared to other
firms. Theoretically, market valuation firms can provide a good picture of 
growth opportunities for the firms (Klapper and Love, 2004). In addition to
this, the growing firms need significant financial assistance, which drives
them to follow a better governance practice to maintain the investors’ interest
(Beiner et at., 2006); this also helps them to reduce costs. Past researchers 
have documented a positive relationship between firm performance and
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growth opportunities measured in terms of sales growth (SGH) (Gompers et
at., 2003; Drobetz et at., 2004). In line with the previous researchers, this
study followed sales growth on a year-to-year basis as an indicator of growth
opportunities (Cui et at., 2008; Henry, 2008; Cifci et al., 2019).
Table 4-10 Impact of sales growth on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Sales growth (SGH) 0.005 0.023 -0.038
Significance 0.032 0.028 0.017
The above table shows that sales growth has a positive relationship with the
firm performance for the three-measurement basis that is used for firm
performance, ROA, ROE and TOQ. Here, it can be noted that coefficients of
sales growth (SGH) as a measure of growth opportunities are smaller for all
the three indicators of firm performance. However, these results are 
statistically significant at 5%. In the case of ROA and ROE, the impact of 
sales growth is positive, while in the case of TOQ (market performance), the
effect is negative. These results are in line with previous empirical results
(Drobetz et at., 2004; Cui et at., 2008; Henry, 2008; Akbar et al., 2016).
4.1.4.1.2 Firm size (FSE)  
Firm size is measured by considering the figure of total assets, as shown
earlier in the methodology chapter. Keeping in mind the recommendations of 
previous researchers, the total assets of firms in this study were transformed
into logs. This factor helped to minimise the skewness and kurtosis as well
as helping to overcome the effect of outliers’ data points. Statistics reported
in Table 4-11 below illustrate a positive impact of firm size on firm
performance. Further, these effects are statistically significant in terms of its 
effect on three indicators of performance (financial and market performance),
ROA, ROE and TOQ. The positive relationship between the variables 
124
  
 
 
          
 
 
      
       
     
      
     
        
  
       
      
       
       
        
  
        
 
 
     
 
    
    
    
 
  
 
       
     
        
         
      
indicates that firms with a large assets base could achieve economies of 
scale.
Further, firms with larger assets can use their economies of scale to
introduce an efficient production process, which can increase their
performance. Hence, firms with larger assets have the potential to
secure/attract finance. Firms with larger assets can also generate funds
through both sources, either internal or external (Short and Keasey, 1999).
According to Meek et al. (1995), larger firms tend to be more complex and
more diversified when considering the market development and business risk 
because larger firms have more access to information as compared to small
firms. Additionally, based on positive effects reported in this study, it can be
assumed that firms with larger assets tend to involve themselves in broader
activities and value creation process. Further, larger firms have a varied
product range through their diversified resources and influence on the
market. It can be implied that larger firms are in a position to borrow on better
conditions due to their large asset base, which can be used as collateral
(Alqatan, Chbib and Hussainey, 2019). 
Table 4-11 Impact of firm size on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Firm size (FSE) 0.029 0.102 0.133
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.1.4.1.3 Capital expenditure (CAPX)
According to Jermias (2007) and Brown et al. (2009), firms which deal in
technology-related products tend to invest in innovative initiatives. This factor
helps them to gain a competitive advantage by introducing unique products
and new services. Later, these unique products and service help firms to
achieve a quasi-monopoly, which results in premium prices as well as
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ensures improved profitability in the long run (Jermias, 2007; Braendle,
2019). 
However, investing in unique and innovate methods is not an easy task. 
There is a need to protect the intangible assets of firms which are dealing in 
the technology sector because it is quite easy to steal intangible assets as
compared to fixed assets. Hence, corporate governance can protect the
firms from misuse of their intangible assets (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et
at., 2006; Brown et at., 2009; Al-Ahdal et al., 2020).
Table 4-12 Impact of capital expenditure on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Capital 
(CAPX)
expenditure
-0.177 -0.112 -1.104
Significance 0.17 0.84 0.12
The above table illustrates that the impact of CAPX is negative on all the
indicators of performance, both financial and market performance, for the
three-measurement basis used for firm performance, ROA, ROE and TOQ.
Here, the impact of CAPX has been found to be more influential on the TOQ
(market performance) of the firm as compared to the other two indicators.
However, these results are not statistically significant even at 5%, so no
relationship can be ascertained between CAPX and firm performance. 
4.1.4.1.4 Leverage (LEE)
This study used the percentage of long-term debt to total assets as a
measure of leverage, keeping in mind the alignment of previous studies.
Statistics given in Table 4-13 indicate that leverage has a negative impact on
TOQ with a significance level of .01. This factor suggests that higher levels of 
debt will decrease the performance of the firm. At a higher debt ratio there 
will be lower ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. However, these results are only 
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significant for Tobin’s Q (market performance) at a 1% confidence level,
whereas for ROA and ROE they are not significant. It can be argued that an 
increase in debt ratio can increase the firm’s operating costs, which might
undermine its ability to meet financial obligations regarding higher interest
rates (Dechow et al., 1996). 
In the same context, a higher level of debt can limit the firm in generating
new funds through loans, which can restrict the firm’s potential to invest in
valuable investment opportunities. Simply, it can be concluded that a higher 
level of debt further hampers the amount of dividend. The reason is that a 
firm with a higher debt ratio tends to pay lower dividends to avoid an external 
source of financing, which is a burden on the firm. Moreover, the presence of 
a higher level of debt can lead firms towards financial distress; also, it can
cause financial constraints and would become quite difficult for the firms to
borrow, as even banks become more cautious in such circumstances. On the
other hand, confidence of current as well as potential shareholders is
undermined (Chen and Jaggi, 2001; Stulz, 1988; Detthamrong, Chancharate
and Vithessonthi, 2017). 
Table 4-13 Impact of leverage on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Leverage (LEE) -0.025 -0.093 -0.33
Significance 0.26 0.33 0.01
4.1.4.1.5 Research and development (R&D)
Firms usually tend to invest in new products to gain a competitive advantage
through the introduction of new products or services. Once these new
products or services become available, companies can demand higher
prices and generate profitability in the long term (Barney, 1991, Calantone et
al., 2002). Additionally, a new invention can also be considered as a barrier 
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for rivals, preventing them from entering the market and attracting new 
clients (Golder and Tellis, 1993). Although research and development (R&D)
expenditure helps to ensure success in the economic environment as well as 
in the market, previous researchers have reported mixed results while
documenting the impact of R&D expenditure on firm performance. For
instance, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) reported that for each dollar increase
R&D expenditure generates almost 1.7 to 2.6 USD in future earnings.
Similarly, Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) documented the positive effect of R&D 
expenditures on future cash flows. Accordingly, Chan et al. (2010) stated that
every announcement related to the increase in R&D increases the share
prices of firms positively. However, other empirical studies have not found a
significant relationship between R&D expenditure and corporate performance
(Johnson, 1967; Hall and Bagchi-Sen, 2002; El-Faitouri, 2014). Following
prior corporate governance studies (see, for example, Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Akbar et al., 2016), this
study uses R&D as a control variable, measured through dividing the figure
of total R&D expenditure by the book value of the firm’s total assets.
Table 4-14 Impact of research & development on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Research 
(R&D)
& Development
4.111 7.809 10.933
Significance 0.00 0.03 0.04
The above shows the results of R&D expenditure on the financial and market
performance of the firm. These results are significant at 1% for ROA and 5% 
for ROE and TOQ. The table highlights that R&D has a positive effect on the
three-measurement basis of firm performance in both directions, financial
and market performance, such as ROA, ROE and TOQ. In the case of ROA,
the coefficient is 4.111 at 1% significance level, for ROE it is 7.809 at 5%
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significance level, while for TOQ it is 10.933 significant at 5% level of
confidence. However, a positive impact is found in all three indicators of firm
performance, but the more significant effect is observed in the case of ROE
as compared to ROA. Similarly, in the case of TOQ, the impact is more
significant as compared to the other two indicators of the financial 
performance of the firm. The results are also statistically significant at 5%, so
it can be stated that a positive relationship exists between CAPX and firm
performance for Jordanian non-financial firms listed on the ASE. 
4.1.4.1.6 Liquidity (LIY)
In this study, the impact of liquidity on the financial and market performance
of the firm has been found to be insignificant. However, in the case of 
liquidity (LIY), ROE has an insignificant p-value. The impact of LIY on TOQ
(market performance) of the firm was found to be highly insignificant.
Similarly, results for ROA were also insignificant. It can be argued here that
firms with a high liquidity ratio have the potential to absorb external shocks
very comfortably. Firms with a higher level of liquidity can handle economic
crises very easily, and such firms can reduce their financial distress.
Additionally, firms having a higher level of liquidity can enjoy the benefits of 
investing through greater opportunities as compared to those firms which 
have a lower level of liquidity. 
Table 4-15 Impact of liquidity on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Liquidity (LIY) 7.012 0.000 2.476
Significance 0.35 0.27 0.95
The above table illustrates that liquidity has a positive effect on the firm
performance, measured either through the market or financial performance
(ROA, ROE and TOQ). Here, to measure firm performance, a three-
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measurement basis is used. In the case of the impact of liquidity on ROE, a 
minute coefficient has been observed which is insignificant too. In the case of 
TOQ, the coefficient was more significant than for ROE; however, a large
coefficient was observed in the case of ROA as compared to the other
indicators of firm performance measured in this study. The results are not
statistically significant even at 5%, so no relationship can be ascertained
between liquidity and firm performance for Jordanian non-financial firms
listed on the ASE. 
4.1.4.2 Results of corporate governance variables
4.1.4.2.1 Board size (BSE)
In the case of board size (BSE), a negative impact was observed in all the
three indicators of firm performance (Table 4-16). In the case of effects of 
board size (BSE) on ROA, the coefficient was very weak with a negative
sign, indicating a negative impact on ROA. Similarly, in the case of the
impact of board size on ROE, the coefficient was minute with a negative
sign, showing a negative effect on ROE. Similar results were observed in the
case of the effect of board size on TOQ: a negative impact was observed. 
Impact for all three measures of performance, ROA, ROW and TOQ, was 
significant at 1% level of confidence, implying that with the increase in board
size the performance of the firm decreases. 
These findings are in line with the recommendations of many previous
researchers (e.g. Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996; 
Jacoby et al., 2019) that larger board size can result in poor coordination and
communications. With the increase in board size, the issue of coordination
and communication can be more complex, which leads to agency problems
through management and control issues (Eisenberg et al., 1998). The
presence of a large number of directors on a board promotes various 
opinions, which results in inefficient decision making due to the number of 
views. Simply, it can be stated that, due to differing views, it becomes quite
difficult for the board to exert their control over the management. On the
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other hand, a small board develops more cohesiveness, and the members 
can easily form a shared opinion, which boosts efficient decision making and
more tight and effective control and monitoring of managers/agents.
However, some past researchers have provided opinions in favour of larger 
boards (e.g. Miller, 2003; Dalton et al., 1999; Lehn et al. 2009). According to
these researchers, larger boards perform very well in managing firms’ affairs.
In contrast, in small boards, the CEO enjoys a position of power and usually 
overrides decisions to protect his/her interests, which may result in agency 
problems. This increased agency problem might result in lower performance
of the firm (Miller, 2003). 
Further, as per the statement of resource dependency theory, larger boards
have more significant networks, which enables them to strengthen their
linkages with external resources and thus attract expertise. This fact helps to
generate funds as well as helps to seize the benefits from the capital. In
addition to this, larger boards also tend to facilitate the directors to exchange
highly qualified counsel, which boosts the positive linkage with externals. 
Moreover, larger boards facilitate decision making, and this improves the
quality of idea sharing and contributions. This factor increased the board
performance in every aspect (Lehn et al., 2009; Shahid and Abbas, 2019). 
Hence, it can be assumed that larger boards can minimise the conflicts
among the board members, principals and shareholders, which increases the
shareholders' wealth and increases the firm’s performance as well.
Table 4-16 Impact of board size on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Board Size (BSE) -0.004 -0.020 -0.024
Significance 0.01 0.00 0.00
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4.1.4.2.2 Non-executive directors (NEDs)
As depicted by Table 4-17, NEDs have a significant impact on all the
indicators of firm performance, both financial and market performance,
measured in terms of ROA, ROE and TOQ. The effect was observed to be
significant with negative coefficients. The impact of NEDs on ROA and TOQ
was equal in terms of magnitude while it was more significant in size in the
case of ROE. The negative sign shows that NEDs tend to decrease the firm’s
performance, whether measured in terms of financial performance or market
performance. These findings are not in alignment with the monitoring
hypothesis of agency theory. This hypothesis holds that independence of the
board increases with the presence of a larger number of NEDs on the board 
because NEDs increase value addition in the board through independent
judgements (Cadbury Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; 
Tricker, 2019).
Further, NEDs, being an external source on the board, can boost the
experience and enhance effective monitoring of the firm’s affairs. As part of
the external environment, NEDS also play their role in developing a positive
reputation for the firm through monitoring services (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 
2009). Besides these arguments of this study, the results are also consistent
with the recommendations of past researchers (e.g. Weir and Laing, 2003;
Yermack, 1996). These researchers have reported that those companies
with a higher number of NEDs are most likely to experience lower
performance. The reason for this might be the presence of NEDs as part-
time workers who are not familiar with the environment of the firm. Thus, they
face complications in monitoring the issues and affairs of the firm, which 
might result in the firm’s poor performance. Possible reasons behind these
findings are given as:
 NEDs are mainly part-time workers who work for firms on a part-time
basis and are even considered as ceremonial functionaries. Due to
their part-time nature, they do not have sufficient information and
knowledge regarding the daily activities of the firm; these deficiencies
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undermine the potential of the NEDs to manage the affairs of the firm
properly, and they are unable to perform their duties effectively. The
incentives on offer might be an important consideration for the NEDs, 
and, in the case of fewer incentives, their motivation to serve the firm
may be hampered. They can overlook their responsibilities, which may 
result in lower/poor performance of the firm. 
 Due to their part-time nature, they have commitments with other 
stakeholders which might affect their devotion to the firm, hence
lowering their monitoring. For instance, a NED in one firm can be an
executive director in another firm. Thus, role conflict can undermine
his/her motivation and incentive to perform his/her task correctly and
effectively in both organisations. 
 NEDs can be unfamiliar with the affairs of the firm and its day-to-day
activities. This fact makes them unable to assess the complications 
and difficulties in arranging the firm’s affairs, thus lowering the firm’s
performance. Additionally, the lack of technical knowledge and
expertise among NEDs can result in the firm’s poor performance. 
 Furthermore, it is possible that the CEO and NEDs can indulge their
relationships or may develop their nexus to promote their own
interests. In such circumstances, NEDs and the CEO will not work in
the best interests of shareholders. Hence, it can be postulated that
NEDs in a firm cannot perform an active and productive role in 
monitoring the activities of the firm or execute their duties properly.
Despite inconsistencies in the findings, the results mentioned above are very
interesting in relation to NEDs. Simply, the negative association among the
NEDs and financial and market performance of the firm cannot overturn the
recommendations of corporate governance codes which are in practice
across the globe, nor can it be assumed that the recommendations of these
CG codes are wrong in the case of NEDs. Literature provides sufficient
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support that, in most developing nations, firms are controlled and managed
by the family business; this is even observed in the case of MENA countries
(ROSC, 2004). These operating families hold significant shares in the firms,
due to which they dominate the board. This dominance on the board can
result in lower performance because such members do not have the
necessary and sufficient knowledge due to the technicities involved in such
firms. However, in spite of these difficulties, NEDs in every firm do not need
to have the proper independence to perform their role effectively and
efficiently. In some cases, NEDs can even compromise on many issues due
to their close social circles or relationships with the managers, CEOs or even
with other board members, and this situation might hamper their ability to
interfere with management decisions independently (Mallin, 2019). 
Table 4-17 Impact of non-executive directors on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Non-executive
(NEDs)
directors 
-0.09 -0.196 -0.097
Significance 0.02 0.02 0.02
4.1.4.2.3 CEO duality (CEOD)
With regard to the impact of CEO duality (CEOD) on the performance of the
firm from both financial and market perspectives, a positive effect has been
observed (Table 4-18). These findings are highly significant in terms of ROA,
ROE and TOQ. Impact of CEO duality (CEOD) on ROE was smaller as
compared to the two other measures of firm performance. At the same time,
the effect of CEOD on TOQ was more significant as compared to the other
two indicators of financial performance. This positive impact on the
performance of the firm consists of the stewardship theory, and these results
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endorse this perspective of stewardship theory. The performance of the firm
increases when the two roles of CEO and chairman are held by a single
person. The above quoted positive relationship between CEO duality and
firm performance shows that the CEO’s knowledge regarding the firm can
increase the investment opportunities as well as enhance the firm’s strategic 
direction (Tricker, 2019). 
Duality also allows optimum decision making, thus reducing the wastage of 
scarce resources in a firm. Hence, the CEO/Chairman holding two roles at 
the same time can extend his/her services by rendering his/her valuable 
knowledge to the other board directors. This fact can facilitate the advisory
role in more effective and efficient ways. In addition to this, duality can help
to minimise the conflicts among the board members. Further, when the CEO
and Chairman are two separate roles, it can create tension and confusion
regarding implementation of decisions as well as formulation of policies and
procedures (Solomon, 2014). 
Contrary to this, when the two roles are combined in a single role, it results in
more consistent and effective management through cohesive decision
making. However, if the role is separated into two categories, it can promote
rivalry among the two key roles. On the other hand, combining the roles can
help to avoid the potential conflict between two personalities. Simply, duality 
provides a single command chain and eliminates the tension of reporting by
lower staff to ‘high ups’. It also promotes unified leaderships which can
facilitate enhanced understanding of firms’ day-to-day affairs and decisions.
Additionally, considering the case of the emerging markets of developing
countries, combining the roles of CEO and chairman is common in small
businesses; it offers cost-effectiveness and boosts organisational
performance due to unified leadership and monitoring. In the case of family-
owned businesses, it is common to combine the roles of CEO and chairman
in a single role through duality when the resources are scarce, and firms
have to manage within a competitive environment.
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These findings are in alignment with a number of previous studies (Elsayed, 
2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Weir et al., 2002; 
Tricker, 2019). These researchers have reported a positive association
between CEO duality (CEOD) and firm performance. However, firms can
face emerging challenges as well as being able to grab potential 
opportunities when they implement new strategies. In a case where both
roles are confined in a single entity, the CEO/Chairman is more likely to face
these challenges successfully due to their vast expertise and knowledge. 
The broad knowledge and expertise of the CEO/Chairman enable him/her to
understand the issues more deeply and respond accordingly, as compared
to NEDs (Weir et al., 2002; Mallin, 2019). 
Furthermore, CEO duality provides the freedom to focus on long-run
objectives. Freedom by one person holding both roles eradicates the tension
at board level, and thus lower interference improves the firm’s performance.
Therefore, in the case of rapid decision making due to a dynamic business
environment, a single entity holding both roles as chairman and CEO can
respond rapidly. This can result in improved decision making (Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006). From the perspective of cost, duality helps to eradicate the
tension regarding extra remunerations/compensations (Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998). In addition to these benefits, it is quite easy to hold a
single person accountable. In the case of any poor performance, the
CEO/Chairman can be blamed very easily and comfortably (Abor, 2007;
Bozec, 2005; Shu and Chiang, 2020). 
While these results are consistent with previous studies, somehow
inconsistencies are also attached to them when the perspective of agency
theory is considered. According to this perspective, the roles of CEO and
chairman should be separated. According to this theory, duality in a firm
indicates a problematic situation. Agency theory argues that CEO duality
represents a problem because the same person will manage the
performance as thoroughly as well as it will also evaluate the performance of 
the firm. 
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According to agency theory, CEO duality will result in less efficient and
effective supervision and management of the firm’s affairs. The reason is 
that, under such circumstances, management will become opportunistic,
which will increase the agency problems. Hence, probably, under CEO
duality, there is a chance that the CEO will not control the board properly, in 
order to protect his/her interests. This fact will also result in inadequate
monitoring and come at the expense of shareholders. Alternatively, it can be
argued that, under CEO duality, the role of CEO is rooted in the board,
because it is the prime responsibility of the chairman to set the board agenda
to manage the affairs of the firm through increased information (Braendle,
2019).
Due to these reasons, it can be concluded that duality leads to entrenchment
of the executives as well as the CEO and, under such circumstances, the
CEO as well as the other board members will become inefficient in
performing their monitoring role. Hence, it can be stated that CEO duality
hampers the functions of the board as well as reducing the performance of 
the board members. This dysfunction results in misalignment among the
interests of shareholders, managers, board members and CEO. This
situation leads to increased agency problems, thus reducing the
maximisation of shareholder wealth.
The findings of this study are inconsistent with the Cadbury Report (1992)
and OECD. Also, these findings are contradicted by the UK Combined Code
and JCG Code (2006). All of these governing mechanisms state that the
roles of CEO and Chairman should be separate to avoid agency conflict and
to increase the performance of the firm. Furthermore, these findings are in
contradiction to the findings of some previous studies (e.g. Chahine and
Tohme, 2009; Dahya et al., 1996; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). These
findings have found a negative association between duality and firm
performance, and this study has observed a positive association between the
duality and indicators of financial and market performance of the firm. The
negative relationship observed by previous researchers between
performance and duality might be due to the entrenchment and reduced
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board monitoring function, which provides the freedom to the CEO to follow
his/her interests at the expense of the shareholders’ interests (Tricker, 2019). 
Keeping in mind the context of Jordan, where companies usually tend to be
smaller, the presence of CEO duality can provide a meaningful advantage
from the perspective of cost and management. Furthermore, in Jordanian
firms, duality can provide improved supervision and cohesiveness among the
board members. It can also provide unified leadership, which may result in
improved firm performance. As Jordanian businesses are often family 
owned, the founder is more likely to be the CEO due to his/her vast 
experience and knowledge about the firm. In addition to this, most firms in
developing nations are controlled by families where family members hold a 
majority share. The same case is observed in MENA countries which have
the same structure of businesses as Jordan (ROSC, 2004). Hence, due to
the generic nature of duality, it is not present in Jordanian firms (Mallin,
2019). 
However, in mature markets, it can be observed that duality does not
decrease the firm performance compared to in different cultures, and duality
might have positive results too, especially in the West. Further, most
Jordanian firms are operating in a simpler organisational environment as
compared to firms in developed nations. Hence, CEO duality (OECD) might 
provide benefits in terms of cost, improved decision making, strategic
alignment and speedy decision making. Further, it can improve
communications among the various stakeholders of the firm, such as board
members and managers.  
Separating the roles of CEO and chairman in small firms might produce
complications in terms of internal power conflicts, which could further extend
among management. In a case when the firms are simpler and operate in 
smaller product lines, it can become a major cost for the firm. Furthermore,
small firms lack resources, and such firms need to be able to make a speedy
and rapid response to various market fluctuations. This speedy and quicker
response helps small firms to minimise and control costs to become more
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successful (Akbar et al., 2016). If a small firm has duality, it will be more
difficult for it to respond rapidly.
Moreover, the financial cost associated with separating the roles of CEO and
chairman might take away from the benefits in a small firm. A similar case
can be observed for administrative cost. However, in large firms where
operations are complex, separating CEO and chairman can provide fruitful
benefits because such benefits will exceed the cost associated with the
separation of the two roles (Qurashi, 2018). 
Table 4-18 Impact of CEO duality on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
CEO duality (CEOD) 0.381 0.214 0.598
Significance 0.00 0.01 0.00
4.1.4.2.4 Establishment of board committees
Board sub-committees are an important part of the CG mechanism. These
sub-committees help the board and board directors to increase the firm’s
performance through efficiency and effectiveness. Such board committees
help to reduce the impact of corporate managerial teams. Further, these
committees also help to minimise the effect of large shareholders on the
board. Past researchers have provided evidence that such sub-committees
tend to enhance the quality of the CG mechanism of firms, which further
increases their performance (e.g. Bizjak and Anderson, 2000; Ruigrok et al.,
2006; Laplante and Tong, 2007; Anderson et al., 2020). This study tested the
impact of various sub-committees, audit committee, remuneration committee,
and nomination committee (Table 4-19). The results provided a clear picture
regarding the impact of such committees on the firms’ financial and market
performance. 
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Here, the impact of RCE on ROA, ROE and TOQ was found to be positive
and significant at 1% level of confidence. However, the effect of RCE on
ROA was found to be more substantial as compared to the other two
indicators of performance (ROE and TOQ). At the same time, the impact of 
RCE on ROE was observed to be smaller as compared to TOQ. Similarly, 
the effect of ACE on ROA, ROE and TOQ was also found to be positive and
significant at 1% level. The impact of ACE on ROE was found to be more
influential as compared to the other two indicators of firm performance (ROA
and TOQ). At the same time, the impact of NCE was also found to be
positive and significant on all three indicators of firm performance (financial
and market performance).
Previous researchers have reported that the audit committee tends to ensure 
the quality of the internal audit, which increases the transparency within the
firm. Similarly, the compensation committee ensures remuneration efficiency, 
which further boosts corporate transparency. In an attempt to align with the
market reforms, most Jordanian firms have started to appoint audit,
remuneration and nomination committees to improve transparency. This fact
shows that firms in Jordan have considered increasing their transparency.
Thus, it can be assumed that, in such circumstances, audit and remuneration
committees improve the firms’ performance (Alqatan, Chbib and Hussainey,
2019).
In comparison to the state-owned companies, privately-owned firms tend to
follow the CG mechanism more deliberately and effectively, and these
companies tend to strengthen their CG mechanism. Therefore, in private
companies, the presence of audit and remuneration committees will bring
increased performance (Kang and Stulz, 2008). Hence, in state-owned
companies, the board sub-committees do not show any significant
improvement in the performance of the firm. In large-size firms, shareholders 
and executives are powerful enough to manage the affairs of the firm. 
Usually, they control the management of the company due to their dominant
positions (Wei and Geng, 2008). In such scenarios, the nomination
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committee cannot perform very well so it can be assumed that in such firms
the nomination committee cannot perform very well to increase the firms’
financial performance (Tricker, 2019).
Table 4-19 Impact of board committees on firm performance
Description ROA ROE TOQ
Remuneration committee (RCE) 0.683 0.452 0.625
Significance 0.017 0.021 0.018
Audit committee (ACE) 0.149 0.572 0.348
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nomination committee (NCE) 0.524 0.327 0.826
Significance 0.016 0.024 0.031
4.1.4.5 Results for multiple regression for corporate governance index
This section of the analysis chapter will present the results of multiple
regression that are obtained by incorporating the corporate governance
index (CGI) collectively instead of using different corporate governance
variables in isolation. Table 4-20 presents the results of multiple regression
generated by measuring firm performance with ROA. 
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Table 4-20 Multiple regression results by measuring firm performance
by ROA
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant -0.35 0.00
Sales Growth 0.09 0.03
Firm Size 0.02 0.00
Capital Expenditures -0.20 0.13
Leverage -0.03 0.19
Research & Development 3.79 0.00
Liquidity 6.58 0.38
Corporate Governance Index 0.01 0.01
R 0.65 R Square 0.423
F statistics 9.093 Significant 0.00
Table 4-20 highlights that the F-statistics are highly significant when firm
performance is measured through ROA. The R square is approximately 42%, 
which means that 42% of the variation for firm performance is explained by
the independent variables when ROA measures firm performance. The
results indicate that more independent variables should be included in the
model to obtain more information about the movement in firm performance. 
The results of different control variables are in line with the results of 
previous regression equations where different corporate governance
variables were included in the model separately to explore the impact of CG
on firm performance (where firm performance is measured through ROA). 
The positive and significant relationship between firm performance and sales
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growth, firm size, research and development expenditures, and corporate
governance index has been witnessed. In contrast, insignificant results have
been seen between firm performance and capital expenditure, leverage and
liquidity. 
Table 4-21 Multiple regression results by measuring firm performance
by ROE
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant -1.20 0.00
Sales Growth 0.03 0.04
Firm Size 0.08 0.00
Capital Expenditures -0.01 0.98
Leverage -0.11 0.25
Research & Development 6.15 0.04
Liquidity 0.07 0.31
Corporate Governance Index 0.03 0.04
R 0.33 R Square 0.109
F statistics 3.999 Significant 0.00
Table 4-21 highlights that the F-statistics are highly significant when firm
performance is measured through ROE. The R square is approximately 11%, 
which means that 11% of the variation for firm performance is explained by
the independent variables when ROE measures firm performance. The
results indicate that more independent variables can be added to the model
to obtain more information about the movement in firm performance.
The results of different control variables are in line with the results of 
previous regression equations where different corporate governance
variables were included in the model separately to explore the impact of CG
on performance (where firm performance is measured through ROE). The
positive and significant relationship between firm performance and sales
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growth, firm size, research and development expenditures, and corporate
governance index has been witnessed. In contrast, insignificant results have
been witnessed between firm performance and capital expenditure, leverage
and liquidity. 
Table 4-22 Multiple regression results by measuring firm performance
by TOQ
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant 2.49 0.00
Sales Growth -0.05 0.04
Firm Size 0.10 0.00
Capital Expenditures -1.00 0.16
Leverage -0.34 0.13
Research & Development 13.26 0.02
Liquidity 4.54 0.91
Corporate Governance Index 0.02 0.00
R 0.49 R Square 0.24
F statistics 6.557 Significant 0.00
Table 4-22 highlights that the F-statistics is highly significant when firm
performance is measured through TOQ. The R square is approximately 24%, 
which means that 24% of the variation for firm performance is explained by
the independent variables when TOQ measures firm performance. The
results indicate that more independent variables should be included in the
model to obtain more information about the movement in firm performance. 
The results of different control variables are in line with the results of 
previous regression equations where different corporate governance
variables were included in the model separately to explore the impact of CG
on performance (where firm performance is measured through TOQ). The
positive and significant relationship between firm performance and sales
growth, firm size, research and development expenditures and corporate
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governance index has been witnessed. In contrast, insignificant results have
been witnessed between firm performance and capital expenditure, leverage
and liquidity. 
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4.2 Summary
This chapter has presented and discussed the empirical results. The results
have been reported in alignment with the study objectives and research
questions to assess the effect of internal CG mechanisms on the financial 
and market performance of the firm. More specifically, this chapter
elaborated on the findings and their discussion based on descriptive and
regression results. Regression was run through control variables, sales 
growth, firm size, capital expenditure, leverage, research and development
expenditures and liquidity. 
In order to make the results more straightforward in accordance with the
findings, the small tables were generated separately in accordance with the
study objectives. However overall table containing total results of the
descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression have been reported
in the Appendix 1.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and recommendations
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides information about the key results of the analysis, how 
the research aim and objectives have been achieved, limitations of the study, 
contributions of the study, scope for conducting future studies and relevant 
recommendations based on the analysis of the study.
5.2 Research findings
This study aimed to investigate the impact of various CG mechanisms on the
performance of Jordanian non-financial companies listed on the ASC. The
data was collected for 95 Jordanian non-financial companies from 2012 to
2018. In order to achieve the aim of the study and answering the research
questions, various statistical tools were used for the analysis, such as
descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression analysis. 
The aim of the study was further sub-divided into five research objectives, 
such as conducting a critical literature review in the field of corporate
governance and firm performance, collection of the secondary data for 
various CG mechanisms and firm performance for Jordanian non-financial
firms from 2012 – 2018, data analysis by using various statistical tools
(descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression analysis),
presentation of the findings of the study and compare and contrast the
results of the study with previous studies and providing a brief conclusion
and recommendations in light of the analysis of this study. 
To achieve the first objective, the researcher conducted a critical and 
systematic review of the existing literature in the field of corporate
governance and firm performance. This critical review of the literature is
provided in Chapter 2 of the study, which is divided into three sections. The
first section provided a brief history of Jordan and the contribution of its
various industrial sectors. The section also provided a short history of various 
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Jordanian regulators and their contributions in the preparation and revision of 
the country’s multiple corporate governance codes. The second section of 
the literature review chapter provided the theoretical background of the
study. Different corporate governance theories were reviewed, such as
agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and resource
dependency theory. This section explained that corporate governance
mechanisms have been developed to overcome the agency conflict between
managers and shareholders. For this reason, the research questions were 
generated based on agency theory. The third section of this chapter
compared and contrasted the results of various research studies that have
been conducted in the field of corporate governance and firm performance. 
The second objective of the study was to collect the secondary data for the
Jordanian non-financial firms listed on the ASE from 2012 – 2018. The data
was gathered for six financial years because the study is focused on the
corporate governance mechanisms recommended by the 2012 corporate
governance code of Jordan. The secondary data was collected from three
primary sources, the official website of the ASE, annual reports of the non-
financial companies and Orbits digital database. Secondary data was 
collected for the study because financial data has no reliability and validity 
issues as it is audited by external auditors. 
The third objective of the study was to analyse the data using various
statistical tools, such as descriptive analysis, correlation and regression
analysis. The results of the analysis were provided in Chapter 4 of the study. 
The descriptive analysis tools (mean, median, mode, standard deviation, 
range, minimum and maximum) were used to provide a summary of the large
data set. Correlation was used to explore how dependent and various 
independent variables were moving together. Regression analysis was used
to investigate the relationship between the dependent variable (firm
performance, which is measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q) and various 
independent variables in a standalone manner (sales growth, firm size,
capital expenditures, leverage, research and development expenditures,
liquidity, the board size, non-executive directors, CEO duality, remuneration
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committee, audit committee and nomination committee). Furthermore,
regression analysis was also used to explore the impact of firm performance
on the corporate governance index. The corporate governance index was 
generated by combining various corporate governance mechanisms in order
to explore its effect on the performance of Jordanian non-financial firms. 
F-statistics were used to check the effectiveness of various regression
models. The results showed that all the models were highly significant. R-
square demonstrated that the independent variables explained high
variability on the dependent variable. The study examined the effect of 
various board-related CG mechanisms (for example, the board size, CEO
duality and presence of NEDs). Multiple statistical tests showed that the fixed
effect panel data model was valid, so the study used this model. 
The firm performance was measured by using accounting-based measures
(ROA, ROE) and market-based measures (Tobin Q). The result of the
analysis showed that board size and non-executive directors were negatively 
correlated with firm performance. In contrast, CEO duality and board sub-
committees were shown to have a positive relationship with firm
performance. The results also showed that there is a positive relationship
between corporate governance index and firm performance. 
In the case of board size, the results showed a highly significant negative
impact of board size on Jordanian companies’ performance. The reason for 
these results might be because Jordanian companies’ boards are generally 
controlled and dominated by large block owners, usually a family member or
a family band. This fact might result in the appointment of managers and
board members based on friendship or nepotism instead of experience and
skill. Large block owners can use their power to influence management 
decisions to lead to undermining their monitoring function, and this might
result in decreasing a company’s performance. 
In the case of non-executive directors, our results showed a negative and
highly significant impact of NEDs on Jordanian firms' performance. The result
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is inconsistent with JCGC (2012), which states that at least a third of the
board of directors should be independent NEDs to ensure the independence
of the board. Besides this, the result is inconsistent with the monitoring
hypothesis of agency theory, which states that the presence of a more
significant proportion of NEDs on the board adds value to the firm by
providing the firm with independent decisions and judgements (Cadbury
Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). The possible explanations
for this finding might be: NEDs are part-time workers, who are unfamiliar with
the operations and company business; this makes them unable to
comprehend the complications and difficulties that face the company, as well
as leads to undermining their ability to apply their monitoring functions.
In the case of CEO duality, our results showed a highly significant positive
impact of CEOD on the performance of Jordanian non-financial listed
companies. This result is inconsistent with the JCGC (2012), which 
recommends separation of the roles of CEO and chairman to avoid any
conflicting interests between them, and also to maintain efficient supervision
of management. This finding is also inconsistent with the agency theory that 
supports the notion of separation between CEO and chairman to minimise
the agency problem. On the other hand, the results support the stewardship 
theory, which emphasises that having one person performing as both CEO
and Chairman will increase the company’s performance because the
enterprise is monitored. It may be beneficial for Jordanian companies to be
CEOD because they are friendly with the CEO and it provides proper
management and monitoring, as well as providing more stability and durable
control.
Furthermore, in Jordan, the president is generally the founder and organiser 
of the business, so it is more probable that the president will be the CEO due
to his or her knowledge and experience about the firm's affairs. Besides,
commonly, Jordanian companies have worked in a relatively more 
uncomplicated business environment, unlike large companies in the markets
of developed nations. Therefore, CEO duality can be useful for Jordanian
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companies because it could speed up the decision-making process and
enhance communication and coordination among the board members.
In terms of establishment of board sub-committees, the study found a
positive impact of three board sub-committees, the audit committee,
remuneration committee and nomination committee, on firm performance for
Jordanian non-financial listed companies. The results of the study are 
consistent with the JCGC (2012), which recommends establishing
committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees, and
are also consistent with the empirical results related to the board sub-
committees.
As discussed before, the corporate governance index was generated based
on the Jordanian corporate governance code requirements. Compliance with
the corporate governance index was checked for the Jordanian non-financial
firms. The findings indicated that the corporate governance index has a
positive and highly significant impact on the firm performance of Jordanian
companies. The results of the analysis are not consistent with previous
studies where the researchers did not find any significant positive
relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance
(Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; El-Faitouri, 2014).
The last objective is achieved through this chapter, which provides a 
summary of the entire research study. This chapter also provides
recommendations to the reader based on the analysis. The achievement of
the five objectives has enabled the researcher to achieve the research aim of 
the study, which is to investigate the impact of various corporate governance
mechanisms on the performance of Jordanian non-financial firms that are
listed on the ASE.
5.3 Limitations of the study
The findings of research studies are important, but there are some limitations
that researchers face while conducting their studies. In this study, the first
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limitation is the sample size of the study that is composed of non-financial
companies. Companies in the financial sector are controlled by different
reporting regulations and rules as compared to financial companies (Abide-
al-Allah, 2011). For this reason, financial companies have been removed
from the sample. Thus, the size of the sample was reduced from 276
companies to 95 non-financial companies.
The second limitation is to include only some board structure variables
including board size, presence of NEDs, CEO duality and board sub-
committees. A broader understanding of features of a board structure could 
also be drawn from the education level, gender and nationality of members.
But only the objectively quantifiable variables were included in this study, to
avoid bias within the findings. Hence, as the board of directors is considered
to be an essential mechanism of the corporate governance that affects a 
company's performance, this study recommends that future studies
determine the impact of some additional board characteristics such as
education level, gender and nationality of members on company
performance.
5.4 Research contribution
Corporate governance has become a quite important research area that
focuses on various mechanisms that are used by the regulators to ensure a 
proper check and balance and monitor system to protect the stakes of all the
stakeholders. 
The literature review revealed this crucial importance and highlighted the
issues with conflicts of interest between the principals (owners) and (agents)
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, effective corporate
governance mechanisms need primarily to ensure shareholders' equity by 
ensuring that the company's resources are used properly and enhancing
investors’ confidence to attract more investments (Dennis and McConnell,
2003).
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A proper corporate governance structure ensures better decision making,
and effective management results in reducing the conflicts and improving the
performance of a company. Most of the previous studies related to the
various corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on company
performance have been conducted by researchers in developed countries
and markets, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, but in
developing countries relatively little is known about corporate governance
and its mechanisms, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENF), 
where there are different cultural and economic considerations.
This study makes a new contribution in that it is the first to examine the
impact of various corporate governance mechanisms on the accounting
performance of Jordanian industrial and services companies listed on the
ASE. The data was extracted from different sources: the Orbits database, the
ASE official website and annual reports of selected companies. The results
of this study will enhance our understanding of corporate governance in
terms of agency theory in developing countries, in particular Jordanian
companies and companies in the MENA region, where the same cultural and
economic circumstances prevail.
5.5 Further studies
There are many opportunities for future research and improvement. Firstly, to
enhance the Jordanian banking system, the Central Bank of Jordan issued
the Bank Corporate Governance Code in 2006. Therefore, the researcher
recommends the need to study the impact of corporate governance on
financial firms’ performance. The sample of the study should be increased,
and the results from such an investigation would improve understanding by
providing another perspective of the effect on financial firms.
Secondly, additional study is recommended to examine the impact of the
characteristics and features of the board on company performance, in
particular the education level, experience, gender and age of the board
members. It will effectively help to understand the characteristics and
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features of the board of directors and its impact on the performance of the
firms more efficiently. Filling the gaps in these areas will help to provide
further understanding of the board practices and their effect on the
performance of Jordanian companies.
Thirdly, an average economic growth rate of 8.1% over the first 10 years of 
the 21st century (2000-2010) made Jordan one of the faster-growing
economies in the region. This fast growth was due to various reforms
conducted by the Jordanian government for the purpose of improving the
investment environment and attracting local and foreign investors to invest in
the Jordanian market. Besides this, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 promoted
a large number of Iraqi investors to invest in Jordan due to stability in the
investment environment. But Jordan's economic problem became appeared
since 2011 due to the drain of the country economic resources, and higher 
state expenditure resulting from the presence of more than 600,000 refugees
escape from Syria cause the Civil War, as well as the bad economic and
political conditions of the neighbouring countries of Jordan because of the
so-called Arab Spring revolutions. Such circumstances have put the brakes
on the Jordanian economy where facing severe fiscal strains. these critical 
condition of Jordanian economic might affect the financial decisions of local
and foreign investors alike. Hence, since the data collection of this study that
had a cut-off in 2018, further study is recommended to explore the effect of 
CG on firm performance under different economic conditions.
The adoption of CG principles more than a concept or code that the
companies should adopt. Establishing new companies and creating new 
positions for these companies to gather with in structure, does not mean that
we followed of corporate governance mechanisms. Application of corporate
governance mechanisms should ensure better decision- making policies,
maximizing profits and reducing risk of human interference activities such as
cheating. In addition, application and following of corporate governance
should maintain the rights and interests of shareholders as well as provide
the best measures for financial stability and management effectiveness. 
Moreover, application and following of corporate governance principles can
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best help Jordan's economic interests. Hence, an urgent need has raised for
Jordanian companies to properly implementation the corporate governance
practice.
Implementation corporate governance principles will lead the better
participation in the decision- making process improve the prevention of 
corruption cases and attract domestic and foreign investment, thus creating
such a better investment environment will bring better investment as well as
offer more employment opportunities. The concept of corporate governance
has many direct and indirect references in many legal clauses and items; to
name but a few, there is the companies Act 22 for the year of 1997 and its
amendments, and the securities Act No 28 for the year 2000, and the law
that regulates accounting for legal professionals (Law No. 73 of 2003). These
legal references allows to use of corporate governance principles in
Jordanian companies.
Implementation of corporate governance principles will attract domestic and
foreign investment, thus creating a better investment environment that will
bring more employment opportunities. Despite efforts made by the Jordanian
governance to ensure the implementation of corporate governance
standards, it can still be observed that numerous companies are not
implementing the corporate governance mechanisms effectively to protect
the stakes of all the stakeholder groups. Therefore, the researcher
recommends further cooperation between the public and private sectors to
intensify their efforts to implement the JCGC in a more effective manner t in
order to improve the firm performance listed on the ASE and thus attract
more local and foreign investors to invest in the Jordanian market.
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5.6 Summary
This chapter closed the research cycle that was open in Chapter 1 by
explaining how to achieve the research objectives presented in Chapter 1,
and also presents the key results of the research based on the statistical
analysis, . This chapter also provides information about the limitations that
the researcher faced while conducting the study. Moreover, this chapter
introduces the study contributions and the scope of further studies in the
future and relevant recommendations based on the results of the study 
analysis.
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Appendix 1 Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Description
Variable
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean S. Dev Variance Skewness Kurtosis
ROA 475 2.34 -1.96 0.39 0.02 0.137 0.019 -6.885 94.226
ROE 475 11.72 -11.21 0.51 -0.005 0.569 0.323 -16.79 322.61
TOQ 475 8.26 0.1 8.36 0.823 0.742 0.551 3.937 28.05
SGH 475 10.56 -1 9.56 0.163 1.173 1.377 4.7 26.535
FSE 475 8.63 12.68 21.31 17.09 1.5114 2.284 0.225 0.725
CAPX 475 0.41 0 0.41 0.031 0.046 0.002 3.835 21.361
LEE 475 0.9 0 0.9 0.28 0.284 0.081 0.696 -1.124
R&D 475 0.04 0 0.04 0.002 0.006 0 4.068 17.82
LIY 475 1026.9 0.01 1027 9.784 80.89 6542.7 11.971 145.07
BSE 475 22 7..00 29 12.47 4.36 19.005 1.297 2.124
NED 475 0.85 0.04 0.89 0.239 0.163 0.026 1.463 2.857
CGI 475 4 4 8 4.442 0.897 0.804 2.847 8.429
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Table 2 Correlation 
Variable ROA ROE TOQ SGH FSE CAPX LEE R&D LIY BSE NED CGI
ROA -
Sig
ROE 0.36 -
Sig 0.02
TOQ -0.11 -0.43 -
Sig 0.15 0.00
SGH 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -
Sig 0.19 0.05 0.00
FSE 0.28 0.21 -0.23 -0.10 -
Sig 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.17
CAPX 0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.09 -
Sig 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.01 0.66
LEE -0.14 -0.11 0.19 0.05 -0.32 -0.05 -
Sig 0.96 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.05
R&D 0.17 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 -
Sig 0.05 0.76 0.38 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00
LIY -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.01 -0.20 -0.05 0.15 -0.03 -
Sig 0.32 0.17 0.07 0.58 0.64 0.97 0.19 0.79
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BSE 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.43 -0.01 -0.10 0.13 -0.07 -
Sig 0.29 0.00 0.36 0.69 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.85 0.15
NED -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 -
Sig 0.25 0.66 0.06 0.06 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.66 0.23 0.92
CGI -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.82 -
Sig 0.10 0.97 0.00 0.05 0.75 0.00 0.66 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.03
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Table 3 Multiple regression results for ROA
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant -0.40 0.00
Sales Growth 0.01 0.03
Firm Size 0.03 0.00
Capital Expenditures -0.18 0.17
Leverage -0.03 0.26
Research & Development 4.11 0.00
Liquidity 7.01 0.35
Board Size 0.00 0.01
Non-Executive Directors -0.09 0.02
CEO Duality 0.38 0.00
Remuneration Committee 0.68 0.02
Audit Committee 0.15 0.00
Nomination Committee 0.52 0.02
R 0.69 R Square 0.48
F statistics 9.245 Significant 0.00
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Table 4 Multiple regression results for ROE
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant -1.44 0.00
Sales Growth 0.02 0.03
Firm Size 0.10 0.00
Capital Expenditures -0.11 0.84
Leverage -0.09 0.33
Research & Development 7.81 0.03
Liquidity 0.00 0.27
Board Size -0.02 0.00
Non-Executive Directors -0.20 0.02
CEO Duality 0.21 0.01
Remuneration Committee 0.45 0.02
Audit Committee 0.57 0.00
Nomination Committee 0.33 0.02
R 0.51 R Square 0.26
F statistics 4.676 Significant 0.00
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Table 5 Multiple regression results for TOQ
Description Unstandardised B Significant
Constant 2.682 0.000
Sales Growth -0.038 0.017
Firm Size 0.133 0.000
Capital Expenditures -1.104 0.118
Leverage -0.330 0.007
Research & Development 10.933 0.035
Liquidity 2.476 0.952
Board Size -0.024 0.004
Non-Executive Directors -0.097 0.016
CEO Duality 0.598 0.000
Remuneration Committee 0.625 0.018
Audit Committee 0.348 0.000
Nomination Committee 0.826 0.031
R 0.58 R Square 0.370
F statistics 6.962 Significant 0.000
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